Canegrati, Emanuele (2006): Yardstick competition: a spatial voting model approach.
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I analyse a yardstick competition game using a spatial voting model, where voters vote for a candidate according to the distance between their Ideal Point and the policy selected by a candidate. The policy which is closest to a voter’s IP provides the voter with a higher utility so that minimizing the distance means maximising the utility. I demonstrate that in the presence of asymmetrical information the existence of yardstick competition entails a selection device but not a discipline device, suggesting the existence of a trade off between these two goals. In the second part, I analyse an economic environment characterised by the presence of shocks, whose sign and magnitude are private information of incumbents. This time, the introduction of yardstick competition acts both as a selection and a discipline device.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Yardstick competition: a spatial voting model approach|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations > H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I - Health, Education, and Welfare > I3 - Welfare and Poverty > I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
|Depositing User:||Emanuele Canegrati|
|Date Deposited:||04. Dec 2006|
|Last Modified:||17. Feb 2013 05:05|