Canegrati, Emanuele (2006): Political Bad Reputation. Unpublished.
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The goal of this paper is to explore how the connection between political ideology and voters’ preferences is able to generate different equilibria in a yardstick competition game, where good incumbents are forced to create a bad reputation or, in other words, to mimic the bad incumbents’ behavior in order to win the elections in a two-candidate political competition.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Subjects: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
| ID Code: | 1018 |
| Deposited By: | Emanuele Canegrati |
| Deposited On: | 04. Dec 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 07. Nov 2007 01:29 |
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