Canegrati, Emanuele (2006): Political Bad Reputation.
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The goal of this paper is to explore how the connection between political ideology and voters’ preferences is able to generate different equilibria in a yardstick competition game, where good incumbents are forced to create a bad reputation or, in other words, to mimic the bad incumbents’ behavior in order to win the elections in a two-candidate political competition.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Political Bad Reputation|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
|Depositing User:||Emanuele Canegrati|
|Date Deposited:||04. Dec 2006|
|Last Modified:||06. Mar 2015 13:54|