Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game

Gallice, Andrea (2008): Preempting versus Postponing: the Stealing Game.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_10256.pdf

Download (158kB) | Preview

Abstract

We present an endogenous timing game of action commitment in which players can steal from each other parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie (market). We show how the incentives to preempt or to follow the rivals radically change with the number of players involved in the game. In the course of the analysis we also introduce, discuss and apply the concept of pu-dominance, a generalization of the risk-dominance criterion to games with more than two players.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.