Schuldenanstieg und Haftungsausschluss im deutschen Föderalstaat: Zur Rolle des Moral Hazard

Wolff, Guntram B (2007): Schuldenanstieg und Haftungsausschluss im deutschen Föderalstaat: Zur Rolle des Moral Hazard.

Abstract

The paper discusses moral hazard problems as a potential reason for the observed strong increase of indebtedness of German states (Länder). Indeed, financial markets do not react much to the strong differences in fiscal fundamentals of German Länder. Using a case study, the paper also shows that this has not changed with the recent Berlin ruling. Overall, it therefore appears to be worthwhile to consider a reform that would entail stronger involvement of investors into risk of individual states. However, it is unlikely that this would prevent the build-up of large debt positions and compensate for the deficit bias of fiscal policy. Strict fiscal rules still appear necessary.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Increasing debt and potential bail-out clauses in the German federation: on the role of moral hazard.
• Language: German
• Keywords: Moral hazard, fiscal federalism, sovereign bond markets
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations ; Federalism ; Secession; H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government ; Intergovernmental Relations > H74 - State and Local Borrowing; H - Public Economics > H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt > H63 - Debt ; Debt Management ; Sovereign Debt

References

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