Salant, David and Watkins, G.C. (1996): Cost-allocation principles for pipeline capacity and usage. Published in: Energy Studies Review , Vol. 8, No. 2 (1996): pp. 91-101.
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This paper applies principles f rom game theory to the problem o f allocating the cost o f a shared facility, such as a pipeline. The theory o f cooperative games s t r ongl y suggest s t hat no method e x i s t s for allocating costs that wi l l achieve all major policy goals. We apply results from the theory o f cooperative games a n d principles o f cost allocation to assess some c o mmo n l y adopted rules for allocating costs and def i ni ng u n i t charges. Mos t notably, the postage-stamp toll is f o u n d to fail a mi ni mal set o f commonly applied principles.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Cost-allocation principles for pipeline capacity and usage|
|English Title:||Cost-allocation principles for pipeline capacity and usage|
|Keywords:||cost allocation; pipeline|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation
L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L95 - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
|Depositing User:||David Salant|
|Date Deposited:||12. Dec 2008 17:44|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 04:16|
Yo u n g , H. Pe y t o n (1994) ' Co s t Al l o c a t i o n , ' Ch a p . 34 i n Ro b e r t Au ma n n a n d Segi u Ha r t (eds.), The Handbook o f Game Theory, Volume I I ( Ams t e r d a m: No r t h - Ho l l a n d ) .
Le wi s , W. Ar t h u r (1949) Overhead Costs; Some Essays in Economic An a l y s i s ( Lo n d o n : G. Al l en & Unwi n) .