Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment

Germani, Anna Rita and Morone, Andrea and Morone, Piergiuseppe (2009): Investigating Discretionary Environmental Enforcement: a pilot experiment.

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Abstract

In this work, we conducted a laboratory experiment in order to test the findings of a theoretical environmental enforcement model played as a strategic game where the firm’s behavior is influenced by the course of actions discretionally undertaken by both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Our experimental findings suggest that the presence of the DOJ can be counterproductive in increasing social welfare, since it implies solely additional enforcement costs, which, in turn, might reduce the probability of conducting inspections by the EPA without affecting the probability of firm’s compliance.

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