Athanassoglou, Stergios and Brams, Steven J. and Sethuraman, Jay (2008): Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership.
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We study the problem of dissolving an equal-entitlement partnership when the objective is to minimize maximum regret. We initially focus on the family of linear-pricing mechanisms and derive regret-optimizing strategies. We also demonstrate that there exist linear-pricing mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency. Next, we analyze a binary-search mechanism which is ex-post individually rational. We discuss connections with the standard Bayesian-Nash framework for both linear and binary-search mechanisms. On a more general level, we show that if entitlements are unequal, ex-post efficiency and ex-post individual rationality impose significant restrictions on permissible mechanisms. In particular, they rule out both linear and binary-search mechanisms.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership|
|Keywords:||Partnership dissolution; minimax regret; fair division; allocative efficiency|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Steven J. Brams|
|Date Deposited:||16. Jan 2009 17:53|
|Last Modified:||17. Feb 2013 11:37|
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