Firm Performance and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Ukraine

Muravyev, Alexander and Bilyk, Olga and Grechaniuk, Bogdana (2009): Firm Performance and Managerial Turnover: The Case of Ukraine.

Abstract

The paper studies whether and how CEO turnover in Ukrainian firms is related to their performance. Based on a novel dataset covering Ukrainian joint stock companies in 2002-2006, the paper finds statistically significant negative association between the past performance of firms measured by return on sales and return on assets, and the likelihood of managerial turnover. While the strength of the turnover-performance relationship does not seem to depend on factors such as managerial ownership and supervisory board size, we do find significant entrenchments effects associated with ownership by managers. Overall, our analysis suggests that corporate governance in Ukraine operates with a certain degree of efficiency, despite the well-known lacunas in the country’s institutional environment.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corporate governance, managerial labor market, transition, Ukraine
• Subjects: J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J40 - General; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers ; Acquisitions ; Restructuring ; Corporate Governance; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L29 - Other

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