Lahiri, Somdeb (2009): Acyclic social welfare.
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In this paper we show that if the Pareto relation is acyclic then the set of all Pareto optimal social states coincides with chosen social states of acyclic Paretian social welfare relations. Subsequently we show that given an acyclic Paretian social welfare relations the set of all social states chosen by it coincides with the set of all states chosen by strict Paretian extensions whose strict extension is the given social welfare relation.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Acyclic social welfare|
|Keywords:||acyclic, Paretian, social welfare|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D60 - General
|Depositing User:||Somdeb Lahiri|
|Date Deposited:||04. Mar 2009 00:09|
|Last Modified:||28. Feb 2013 16:45|
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