Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Fiat money and the value of binding portfolio constraints

Páscoa, Mário R. and Petrassi, Myrian and Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo (2009): Fiat money and the value of binding portfolio constraints.

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.
[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_13782.pdf

Download (254Kb) | Preview

Abstract

We establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the individual optimality of a consumption-portfolio plan in an infinite horizon economy where agents are uniformly impatient and fiat money is the only asset available for inter-temporal transfers of wealth. Next, we show that fiat money has a positive equilibrium price if and only if for some agent the zero short sale constraint is binding and has a positive shadow price (now or in the future). As there is always an agent that is long, it follows that marginal rates of inter-temporal substitution never coincide across agents. That is, monetary equilibria are never full Pareto efficient. We also give a counter-example illustrating the occurrence of monetary bubbles under incomplete markets in the absence of uniform impatience.

Available Versions of this Item

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.