Göbel, Jürgen (2009): In search of an appropriate tax base for local Leviathans.
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The impact of local fiscal policy depends on the choice of the tax base. In this paper, we take four criteria to evaluate tax bases, namely: efficiency, simplicity, flexibility, and fairness. The results of such an evaluation depend on how we describe the involved agents. We construct a two stage model of a local economy with three types of agents: Leviathans, households, and housing firms. Each Leviathan seeks to maximize the surplus of his local fiscal budget. Each household seeks to maximize its life-time utility from three types of goods: composite private goods, housing, and local public goods. Each housing firm seeks to maximize its profits. In this model, we analyze the characteristics of four distinct tax bases: land rent, housing capital rent, housing sales, and housing property. In particular, we analyze the responses of the households, the housing firms, and the housing prices on a change of a specific tax rate. The results are used to evaluate each tax base with respect to our four criteria.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||In search of an appropriate tax base for local Leviathans|
|Keywords:||Leviathan; tax base; exit option; sensitivity analysis|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
H - Public Economics > H1 - Structure and Scope of Government > H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R5 - Regional Government Analysis > R51 - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies
|Depositing User:||Juergen Goebel|
|Date Deposited:||11. Mar 2009 02:20|
|Last Modified:||22. Feb 2013 22:33|
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