Competition Law, Cartel Enforcement & Leniency Program

Samà, Danilo (2008): Competition Law, Cartel Enforcement & Leniency Program.

Abstract

The present assessment focuses the attention on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analyzing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is to comprehend under which circumstances leniency program represents a functional and successful tool for preventing the formation of anti-competitive agreements. The problem statement that follows is therefore: how can Law&Economics approach help competition authorities to achieve and realize this form of enforcement?

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Antitrust Cartels Enforcement Game Theory Leniency Program Oligopolistic Markets
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory; K - Law and Economics > K2 - Regulation and Business Law > K21 - Antitrust Law; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

References

Matthew J. Elsmore

Valdemar Smith