Lahiri, Somdeb (2009): A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world.
This is the latest version of this item.
Download (70Kb) | Preview
In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world|
|Keywords:||acyclic, index, single-profile, social welfare relation|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79 - Other
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
|Depositing User:||Somdeb Lahiri|
|Date Deposited:||25. Mar 2009 16:12|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 17:54|
1. Arrow, K.J. (1950): “A difficulty in the concept of social welfare”, Journal of Political Economy, 58, pages 328-346.
2. Arrow, K.J. (1963): “Social Choice and Individual Values”, 2nd Edition, John Wiley & Sons, New York.
3. Banks, J. (1995): “Acyclic social choice from finite sets”, Social choice and Welfare, 12, pages 293-310.
4. Blau, J. and R. Deb (1977): “Social Decision Functions and the Veto”, Econometrica, 45, pages 871-879.
5. Ferejohn, J. and P. Fishburn (1979): “Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisive structures”, Journal of Economic Theory, 21, pages 28-45.
6. Feldman, A and R. Serrano (2008): “Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Two Simple Single-Profile Versions”, Harvard College Mathematics Review (forthcoming) and available at http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/serrano/pdfs/wp2006-11.pdf
7. Gaertner, W. (2006): “A primer in social choice theory”, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
8. Hammond, P. (1976): “ Why ethical measures of inequality need interpersonal comparisons”, Theory and Decision, 7, pages 263-274.
9. Kemp, M. and Y-K. Ng (1976): “On the existence of social welfare functions, social orderings and social decision functions”, Economics, 43, pages 59-66.
10. Lahiri, S. (2009): “Acyclic Social Welfare”, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1347933
11. Nakamura, K. (1979): “The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences”, International Journal of Game Theory, 8, pages 55-61.
12. Parks, R. (1976): “An impossibility theorem for fixed preferences: a dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson welfare function”, Review of Economic Studies, 43, pages 447-450.
13. Pollak, R. (1979): “Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions and the theory of social choice”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, pages 73-90.
14. Roberts, K. (1980): “Social choice theory: the single-profile and multi-profile approaches”, Review of Economic Studies, 47, pages 441-450.
15. Rubinstein, A. (1984): “The single profile analogues to multi-profile theorems: mathematical logic’s approach”, International Economic Review, 25, pages 719-730.
Available Versions of this Item
A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world. (deposited 17. Mar 2009 23:35)
- A sufficient condition for acyclic social choice in a single-profile world. (deposited 25. Mar 2009 16:12) [Currently Displayed]