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# **Do women choose to work in the public and nonprofit sectors? Empirical evidence from a French national survey**

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## **Abstract**

Women are over-represented in public and nonprofit sector jobs. This article aims to bring to light the reasons behind that phenomenon. In particular, do women choose these sectors because they offer female employees specific advantages that are absent from the private sector?

The feminization of the public sector can be explained by the fact that women obtain a higher wage gain from choosing this sector than men do. However, this is not true for the nonprofit sector. Working hours - in the form of part-time work in the nonprofit sector and total hours worked in the public sector - appear to play an important role in the over-representation of women in these two sectors. On the other hand, the idea that women are more attracted to the social objectives pursued by public and nonprofit organizations does not appear to play any part. “Family-friendly” measures - aiming to reconcile the demands of family life and professional life - appear to attract women to the public sector, but it is difficult to interpret their influence, because it is impossible to distinguish between the attractiveness of these measures and the result of professional segregation in the public sector.

## **I. Introduction.**

It is well-known that women are over-represented in the public and nonprofit sectors and less present in the private sector. In the United States, for example, according to data from the 2007 Current Population Survey, 57% of the labor force in the government sector are women, compared to only 44% in the private sector. In the nonprofit sector, the proportion of women is about 68% (see, for example, Light, 2002, or Weitzman *et al.*, 2002). The statistical evidence for France is very similar. According to the *Rapport Annuel sur la Fonction Publique* (Annual Report on the Civil Service), 59% of jobs in the public sector were held by women in 2005, and a survey of French nonprofit associations conducted by Tchernonog (2007) recorded that women represented 70% of the paid labor force in 2005.

The aim of this article is to bring to light the reasons behind this over-representation of women in the public and nonprofit sectors. Do women choose these sectors because they offer more than the private sector in the way of specific advantages to which women attach more importance than men?

We focus more particularly on the following determinants: a pay structure that is less penalizing in the public and nonprofit sectors than in the private sector, an organization of working time that allows for greater reconciliation between family life and professional life, and a stronger attraction among women for the social objectives pursued by the public and nonprofit sectors. However, these elements of voluntary selection of sectors by women must be weighed against explanations based on the effects of involuntary occupational segregation. The sectors of education, health, social action and personal services, the favored domains of action for public and nonprofit organizations, offer predominantly female jobs (teaching, nursing, personal services, etc.). The high representation of women in the public and nonprofit

sectors could therefore be mainly due to a structural effect, namely the predominance of these “female” occupations in the two sectors.

The question of the disproportionate presence of women in the public and nonprofit sectors has rarely been tackled in the literature. To the best of our knowledge, the article of reference is that of Preston (1990), examining the reasons why women choose between white-collar jobs in the private or nonprofit sectors in the United States. This article concluded that women have the same probability as men of working in the white-collar nonprofit sector, after the differences between sectors in terms of wage and nonwage advantages have been taken into account. The present study has the advantage of extending the analysis to the public sector, which shares with the nonprofit sector the characteristic of supplying goods of social benefit, but which differs in the wage and nonwage advantages it offers to employees. In addition, our study is not limited solely to the white-collar workers, but covers all employees between the ages of 20 and 49.

Exploring women’s choices of employment sector has the interest of bringing to light some of the determinants of female preferences. Of course, these choices are made within the context of existing constraints stemming from social norms governing the division of domestic tasks and occupational segregation. The determinants of women’s choices thus help to reveal the opportunities that they are more likely to enjoy when working in the public or nonprofit sectors rather than the private sector. This knowledge could then help to shape the adoption of measures to consolidate the participation of women in the labor market.

Our results show that the differences between sectors in terms of pay structure, hours of work and possibilities of reconciling the demands of family and professional life explain a large part of segregation between sectors, even when we take structural differences between occupations into account. On the other hand, the social objectives that are more specific to the public and nonprofit sectors do not have a particular influence on women’s choice of sector.

Our empirical analysis is based on an employer-employee matched data set from the *Familles et Employeurs* (Families and Employers) survey carried out by INED and INSEE<sup>1</sup> in 2004-2005. This database is particularly rich, including details provided by employees on their personal and job characteristics and by employers on their institutional form and their practices in the fields of pay, non-monetary advantages and family-friendly policies.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section analyzes the theoretical reasons behind the choice of sector. The contents of the survey and the variables used in the statistical analysis are described in the third section. The fourth section presents the econometric methodology, while the fifth is devoted to presenting and interpreting the results. The sixth section provides some concluding remarks.

## **II. Theoretical approach to choice of sector**

From a theoretical point of view, the choice by employees of their sector of activity can be studied under the assumption that they compare the sum of monetary and non-monetary benefits offered by each sector. Each worker then chooses in priority a job in the sector that provides him or her with the highest utility. In this section, we shall therefore discuss which individual characteristics and employment conditions might influence men's and women's choices of sector.

We consider, one after another, pay structure differences between men and women, family-friendly policies, and personal motivation for contributing to the productive activity of the

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<sup>1</sup> INED (Institut National des Etudes Démographiques) is the French National Institute for Demographic Studies and INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) is the French National Statistics Institute.

employer. But this cost-advantage analysis must also take into account labor market barriers that restrict women's choices, such as occupational segregation.

### 1. Gender pay differences

Wage formation is not necessarily identical in the sectors studied because the returns to individual characteristics of employees are likely to vary with the nature of the activity and/or the more-or-less standardized rules governing career development. As a consequence, men and women can expect different wage gains depending on the sector.

Thus, Lucifora and Meurs (2006) show that in France, Great Britain and Italy, pay differences between the public and private sectors vary according to the employee's position on the wage scale and his/her gender. When the wage gain from working in the public rather than the private sector is calculated by quantile regression for each wage decile, the wage advantage obtained by women in the public sector is systematically higher than that obtained by men, at all levels of wage distribution. The existence of a higher average wage gain for women in the public sector has also been observed on the American continent (see Hoffnar and Greene, 1996, Mueller, 1998 and Panizza and Zhen-Wei Qiang, 2005, for the United States, Canada and Latin America respectively). These estimations suggest that as far as wages are concerned, women stand to gain more from joining the public sector than their male counterparts.

Preston (1990) obtains a similar result for the nonprofit sector in the United States. Once selection effects have been controlled for, white-collar workers in the nonprofit sector earn lower wages than those in the private sector. However, this wage disadvantage is only half as high for women as it is for men and constitutes a significant explanation for the over-representation of women in nonprofits. So these results show that the difference in wage

structure between the two sectors is an element of the apparent preference of women for jobs in the nonprofit sector.

One of the reasons for this relative wage advantage of women in the public and nonprofit sectors lies in the fact that they are treated more equally here than in the private sector. Although there are no studies of wage discrimination in the public sector in France, the gender wage ratio in 2005 was 84 % in the public sector, compared to 77% in the private sector (INSEE, 2007). This difference in treatment between the two sectors is partly explained by the different distribution of qualifications between gender, but also by the fact that men's and women's career paths are more similar in the public sector in France. Several studies confirm that the nonprofit sector also appears to treat women more equally than the private sector does. In France, for example, Etienne and Narcy (2007) show, using quantile regression technique, that female employees in nonprofits suffer less wage discrimination than those in the private sector, all along the wage distribution. Similarly, the studies by Preston (1990) and Leete (2000) in the United States reveal that on average, women suffer significantly less wage discrimination in the nonprofit sector than in the private sector.

## 2. The role of family-friendly policies

There have been relatively few studies of the influence of possibilities for reconciling family and professional life on the choice of employment sector. The analyses found in the literature focus mainly on the wage losses incurred by mothers as a result of career interruptions to have children and look after them. These wage losses appear to be greater and above all longer-lasting in the private sector than in the public sector (Albrecht *et al.*, 1999; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002). Likewise, Nielsen *et al.* (2004) confirm that female employees

lose less in the public sector and show, above all, that this advantage leads women who are planning to have children to prefer jobs in that sector.

In our analysis, we do not examine the effects of family and domestic constraints on wages, preferring to estimate directly the influence of employers' family-friendly policy on the choice of sector. We can do this because our data can be used to measure the presence of measures such as individual arrangements in working hours, child-care systems and family-related financial allowances. These measures may well influence women's employment choices, as the INSEE *Emploi du Temps* (Use of Time) survey shows that the sharing of domestic chores in French couples is very slow to evolve (Ponthieux and Schreiber, 2006). Women devote twice as much time to housework as men do. Likewise, the time spent looking after children remains largely monopolized by women. Under these conditions, if there are substantial differences in employers' family-friendly practices, women could well be attracted to those sectors of the labor market offering the best opportunities for reconciling family and professional life.

As an example, the particularly large offer of part-time work in the public and nonprofit sectors can appear as a possible means of adapting to the demands of family life. Thus, Bué (2002) shows that 34% of women who work part-time do so in order to be able to look after their children, compared to only 6% of men. In addition to the opportunities for part-time work, the provision of child-care services also differs between the sectors. Micheaux and Monso (2007) show that mothers employed in the public sector have better access to day-care centers and playschools, thanks to the direct provision of such services by their employers or because they can obtain more regular working hours from their employers.

### 3. The role of motivations

The third factor which may provide an explanation of the over-representation of women in the public and nonprofit sectors derives from the possible differences between men's and women's preferences. Developments in behavioral economics have brought to light the regularity with which individuals display what are called social preferences, when their satisfaction depends on the situation of other individuals (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). One of the applications of this research theme lies in the pro-social motivation of workers in sectors such as health, education, or social action, where their actions contribute to the provision of social services (see, for example, the review of the literature by François and Vlassopoulos, 2007). This altruistic motivation, which is intrinsic in the sense that it is driven by personal taste rather than financial incentive, is particularly useful to the good functioning of the public and nonprofit sectors. According to this theory, employees in these sectors are prepared to work for a lower overall pay level than in other sectors because they derive satisfaction from participating in the production of a good of high social value. Lanfranchi and Narcy (2006), for example, show that employees in the French nonprofit sector make what is effectively a "labor donation" by accepting a lower wage than they could obtain in the private sector while offering at least the same amount of effort.

From this perspective, we need to investigate the possibility that women are more likely to display social preferences. Psychological studies of female specificities suggest that women display a more strongly-developed ethos of care and attention to others in their mode of expression (Gilligan, 1982). In her research into female specificities, Bem (1976) also records sensitivity to the needs of others as a primary trait. However, economic experiments into social preferences have failed to identify any strict differences between gender, except that

women appear to behave more in keeping with the norm in environments where attention to others is naturally called for (Croson and Gneezy, 2004). As far as unpaid participation in French nonprofits is concerned, that appears to be a predominantly male domain, although this tendency is reversed in the case of humanitarian and religious organizations (Prouteau and Wolff, 2002). The empirical analysis conducted here aims to determine whether social motivations can underpin the choice of public or nonprofit sector employment, and whether this is more particularly the case for women.

#### 4. Occupational segregation

However, the model of free choice of sector of employment is limited by constraints, such as the occupational segregation from which working women may suffer. Fast growth in female participation in the French labor market has led to greater penetration by women of hitherto “male” occupations, but occupational segregation remains strong and is slow to diminish (Couppié and Epiphane, 2006). In France, the Ministry of Labor lists 84 occupational categories, and ten of them contain more than half of all women employees. Some of the most “female” occupations are more frequent in the public and nonprofit sectors, including teachers, nursery assistants and low-level administrative employees in the civil service.

In the present study, we are not interested in the theoretical causes of this apparent segregation so much as a problem of a more statistical nature, namely that the occupational structure of the three sectors should be taken into account explicitly to avoid confusing choice of sector and occupational representation.

### **III. Data and variables used**

#### 1. Description of the survey

The data used are taken from the *Familles et Employeurs* (Families and Employers) survey carried out by INED and INSEE in 2004-2005. The empirical analysis in this article is based on the employee-employer matched data file from the survey.

In the “individual” section of this matched file, 9,547 men and women between the ages of 20 and 49 were questioned in face-to-face interviews. This sample is representative of all employment situations (active employed, active unemployed, inactive) and family situations (couples with one or more children, couples without children, singles). In particular, this section provides details of individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics, their employment situation, their job characteristics and their perception of the relation between family life and professional life.

The “employers” section is a postal survey sent to the director of human resources or, failing that, to the manager of the establishment. It only covers establishments with 20 or more employees employing people interviewed in the “individual” section of the survey. 2,673 establishments were surveyed, belonging to every branch of activity in the private, public and nonprofit sectors. This sample is representative of all establishments with 20 or more employees in France. The questions in this section are mainly concerned with how the establishments take their employees’ family characteristics into account, but they also deal with work organization and working environment.

The matched data file used in this study contains 3,050 observations. The use of matched data provides more reliable information about the legal status of the employer, because the information is given by the employer rather than the employees. Another advantage of these

data is that they provide us with more precise knowledge of the family-friendly measures offered by employers. Unlike their employers, employees are not always aware of all the family-related benefits available to them in their place of work.

Once the missing and aberrant observations have been eliminated, our sample covers 2,721 employees, of whom 1,515 work in the private sector, 962 in the public sector<sup>2</sup> and 243 in the nonprofit sector.

## 2. Description of study sample

44% of all employees are women, and the proportion of women is higher in the public and nonprofit sectors than in the private sector: 76% of nonprofit employees and 51% of public employees, compared with 36% in the private sector.

As Table 1 shows, employees in the public and nonprofit sectors are slightly older, on average, than those in the private sector, and as a corollary, they have a slightly higher number of children. They are also much more highly qualified: 37% of public employees and 43% of nonprofit employees are at least undergraduates (two years of higher education), compared to only 30% in the private sector. This discrepancy in levels of qualification is observable for both men and women. Given this difference, it seems quite logical that wages should be higher on average in the public sector than they are in the private sector. Wages in the nonprofit sector, on the other hand, are not significantly higher than those in the private sector. The similarity in the wage levels of these two sectors appears to be in keeping with the results obtained from analysis of the French Labor Force surveys (Lanfranchi and Narcy, 2006).

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<sup>2</sup> Here we use the term public sector in the broadest sense, i.e. including nationalized companies. We have chosen to include public companies in this sector because those companies that have not been privatized over the last twenty years are generally the ones that have objectives of public interest. Moreover, we can assume that their human resources and workforce management policies are comparable to civil service practices.

[INSERT TABLE 1]

Job characteristics differ considerably between the different sectors. Part-time work is more frequent in the public and above all the nonprofit sector, where it involves 31% of employees, than in the private sector, where it only concerns 7% of employees. As expected, part-time work is essentially female. However, a non-negligible percentage of men employed in the nonprofit sector (8%) also work part-time.

As regards the other aspects of the organization of working time, we find no systematic similarity between the public and nonprofit sectors. Night work, for example - predominantly male - is as frequent in the public as in the private sector, but rare among nonprofits. In the public sector, this high proportion can be explained by the inclusion of hospitals and large public companies. Regular Sunday work is relatively infrequent in the private sector, unlike the other two sectors, where it concerns 20% of employees. Occasional Sunday work is more frequent in the public sector (25%), and above all among male employees (31%), than in the private and nonprofit sectors (17% and 15% respectively). Daily variability in working hours (excluding shift rotation) is more widespread in the nonprofit sector (36%), than in the private or public sectors (24% and 28% respectively), for both men and women. The proportion of women with atypical working hours varies relatively little from one sector to another, which is not the case for men.

Job types reflect a high degree of specialization between sectors, with similarities between the public and nonprofit sectors. Some jobs only exist in the public sector (magistrate or police officers, for example) or are closely associated with public service (health, education). Thus, professors, scientists, teachers, intermediate health and social work occupations, clerks

and service workers are to be found in the public and nonprofit sectors. The most commonly occupations found in the private sector, on the other hand, are engineers, executives, supervisors, technicians and skilled blue-collar workers. Lastly, unskilled blue-collar workers are almost completely absent from the nonprofit sector, but present in similar proportions in the public and private sectors. These observations hold true for both men and women, but with predominance of men in the “skilled blue-collar workers” category and of women in the “clerks and service workers” category, as was to be expected.

In the previous section, we noted that altruistic motivations are often put forward as an explanation for choices of sector of employment. In this study we have selected three variables that we believe to be related to individual levels of altruism. The first is the fact of being involved in an unpaid activity of a campaigning or community-interest nature, such as town councillor. The second is considering religion to be important in daily life. We interpret these two variables as evidence of a tendency towards consideration for others. This interpretation does have its limits, of course: one can care about the wellbeing of others without having a campaigning or community-interest activity or any religious commitment, and our variables can only capture a subset of altruistic people. Nevertheless, involvement in the community does require the sacrifice of personal time, which is consistent with this interpretation. Furthermore, the 1997 survey into donations and voluntary work in France showed that their frequency and size increases with the degree of religious practice. Our third variable reflects the priority given to the content of work rather than the monetary advantages, i.e. individuals declaring that the choice of job should, in priority, be made to match one’s tastes and/or education. These three variables are distributed unequally between the three sectors. Whatever the indicator examined, the attitudes or opinions that we have classified as “altruistic” are observed more frequently in the nonprofit sector and, to a lesser degree, in the public sector than in the private sector. This is true for both men and women. This supports

our belief that in addition to any possible wage advantages, intrinsic motivational factors can also influence the choice of sector of employment.

The opportunities for reconciling family and professional life can also explain the choice of sector. We have identified four main groups of family-friendly measures, and represented the proportion of employees in each sector who work in establishments offering these measures in four charts (figures 1 to 4).

The public and nonprofit sectors both appear more likely to allow their employees to adapt their working hours, and the private sector is the most reticent in this domain (figure 1). Attributing part-time schedules to employees on request is the measure that differs the most between sectors. 61% of the public employees and 55% of the nonprofit employees in our sample work in establishments that offer these part-time schedules, compared with less than 38% of private sector employees. On the other hand, three other measures involving working hours are fairly rare in every sector. Taking family life into account in the organization of working hours only concerns 10% of private and public sector employees, although it is slightly more frequent among nonprofits (17%). Taking family life into account when organizing missions and business travels is also slightly more common in the nonprofit sector (12%) than in the private and public sectors (9% and 6% respectively). Lastly, the possibility of working from home in the event of personal constraints is slightly more common in the public sector (16%) than in the other two sectors.

[INSERT FIG 1]

Among the measures concerning child-care, the provision of a day-care centre, playschool or play centre is only offered to large numbers of employees in public sector establishments (figure 2). In fact, this is largely due to the inclusion of public hospitals in our definition of the

public sector<sup>3</sup>, but even when we exclude hospitals this measure is more frequent in the public than in the other two sectors, where it is almost non-existent. As regards family-related financial allowances, the public sector again appears to be the most generous, especially in terms of financial aid for child-care and aid for handicapped children (figure 3). Once again, there is an effect linked to the policies adopted in public hospitals, where 78% of the employees are potentially covered by this measure, but it is widespread throughout the public sector (more than half of all public sector employees work in establishments that offer these measures).

[INSERT FIG 2 AND FIG 3]

In the case of the reduction of working time<sup>4</sup>, we have isolated the possibility of systematically taking these days-off on the same day of the week, because parents of young children can use this arrangement to organize their Wednesdays<sup>5</sup>. On this point, it is the nonprofit and public sectors that appear the most “obliging” (figure 4). The public and private sectors are on a par as regards the possibility of adding days-off for the reduction of working time (RWT) onto ordinary holidays, but in terms of the combined total of RWT and annual holidays, the private sector again appears to offer less than the other two sectors.

[INSERT FIG 4]

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<sup>3</sup> Nearly half of the hospital employees in our sample have a day-care centre in their establishment; this proportion is 8% in the rest of the public sector.

<sup>4</sup> The legal working week in France is 35 hours. When employees exceed this legal limit, they benefit from days off in compensation, known as reduction of working time.

<sup>5</sup> Until they go to secondary school, French children do not have school on Wednesdays.

A certain number of other financial advantages proposed by employers, although not directly intended to help reconcile family and professional life, can also influence the choice of employment sector. We have identified five such measures: holiday vouchers, life insurance policies, savings plans, pension plans, and mutual insurance schemes. Unlike family-friendly measures, establishments in the private sector offer more of these wage complements than the other two sectors, with the exception of holiday vouchers (figure 5). The nonprofit sector offers much less in the way of savings and pension plans than the other two sectors.

[INSERT FIG 5]

#### IV. Methodology

We use a multinomial logit model to estimate the probability of choosing between the nonprofit, public and private sectors. Individuals are faced with three alternatives: working in the nonprofit sector ( $j = a$ ), working in the public sector ( $j = pu$ ) or working in the private sector ( $j = p$ )<sup>6</sup>. More formally, the probability that an individual  $i$  will choose the sector  $j$ , denoted  $P_{j,i}$ , is assumed to depend on certain personal and job characteristics and can be modeled as follows:

$$P_{j,i} = \gamma_j' Z_i + \alpha_j' S_i + \mu_{j,i} \text{ with } j = a, pu, p \text{ and } i = 1, \dots, n \quad (1)$$

Equation (1) corresponds to a basic model where the vector  $Z$  includes the following variables: age, marital status, number of children, level of education and whether or not the

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<sup>6</sup> To calculate such a model, we must assume the hypothesis of the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). This hypothesis states that the ratio of the probabilities associated with the choice between two sectors is independent of the other sectors. In other words, removing any of the sectors in the model should not alter the relative probabilities of choosing the remaining ones. The test developed by Kenneth A. Small and Cheng Hsiao (1985) reveals that in every case (i.e. whatever the sector left out), this hypothesis is validated. The results of this test are available from the authors.

worker's job is insecure (fixed-term or temporary contract).  $S_i$  is a dummy variable for female. Thus, the estimated coefficient  $\hat{\alpha}_j$  measures the probability of women choosing the sector  $j$ , given the variables comprised in  $Z$ .

To identify the personal and job characteristics that explain the over-representation of women in the public and nonprofit sectors, we need to examine the way the influence of the gender variable on the probability of choosing a sector changes as each of these different characteristics is introduced into the basic model. The aim here is to apply the principle of omitted variable bias in an econometric estimation. This is similar to the method used by Preston (1990), except that here we have adapted it to a multinomial logit model.

Let us assume that compared to the other two sectors, the public sector provides employees with more possibilities for organizing their working hours to fit in with school hours, and that women attach greater importance to this than their male counterparts do. Omitting the variable for the possibility of adapting working hours would result in an overestimation of the net effect of being a woman on the probability of working in the public sector. Consequently, when this variable for the adaptation of working hours is taken into account in the regression, the probability of women choosing the public sector should be lowered.

More generally, let us assume that in equation (1), the modeler has omitted a variable  $X$  that is likely to influence the probability of choosing sector  $j$ . When this variable is taken into account, the equation is rewritten as follows:

$$P_{j,i} = \gamma_j' Z_i + \alpha_j' S_i + \beta_j' X_i + v_{j,i} \text{ with } j = a, pu, p \text{ and } i = 1, \dots, n \quad (2)$$

How does the inclusion of  $X$  modify the effect of being a woman on the probability of choosing sector  $j$ ? Taking  $X$  into account in the analysis will modify the coefficient  $\hat{\alpha}_j$

whenever  $X$  has a significant influence on  $P_{j,i}$  and there is a correlation between  $X$  and  $S$ , conditionally on the variables included in  $Z$ .

$\hat{\alpha}_j$  will decrease if the significant influence of  $X$  on  $P_{j,i}$  and the correlation between  $X$  and  $S$  have the same sign. In other words, if women attach greater importance than men do to a characteristic  $X$  which positively influences the probability of choosing sector  $j$ , then taking this characteristic  $X$  into account in the analysis will reduce the effect of being a woman on the probability of choosing sector  $j$ . In this case,  $X$  is an element that explains the presence of women in sector  $j$ . The same holds true when  $X$  negatively influences the probability of choosing sector  $j$  and when women attach less importance to this characteristic than men do<sup>7</sup>.

To sum up, any personal or job characteristic which, when introduced into the regression, reduces the effect of being a woman on the probability of choosing the public and nonprofit sectors, can be identified as playing a role in women's choice of these sectors.

The different variables that might encourage women to choose these sectors were introduced in the following order. In the first step, a group of variables reflecting the usual length of the working week and different types of work schedules were introduced into the model. In the second step, the estimated wage differentials between the nonprofit, public and private sectors were taken into account. These were obtained with the help of estimated wage equations by gender and by sector. In these wage equations, the explained variable corresponds to the log of the net hourly wage and the explanatory variables considered are marital status, number of children, actual work experience, job tenure, level of education, occupational groups and the fact of having an insecure and/or part-time job. These estimations enable us to determine, for each worker, the potential wage that he or she could earned in each sector.

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<sup>7</sup> Of course,  $\hat{\alpha}_j$  would increase if the significant effect of  $X$  on  $P_{j,i}$  and the correlation between  $X$  and  $S$  have opposite signs.

In the third step, the different family-friendly measures were introduced in the following order: adaptation of working hours, child-care systems, family-related financial allowances, reduction of working time and holidays. In the fourth step we introduced the wage complements that employers can offer, and in the fifth step the variables chosen to reflect public-mindedness. Finally, to determine whether the over-representation of women in the public and nonprofit sectors might also be explained by different distributions of occupations in each sector, eight dummy variables for occupations were introduced into the regression.

The results obtained might be sensitive to the order in which we introduce these different groups of variables. Indeed, the impact of the introduction of a given group of variables on the analysis of the relation between gender and choice of sector may depend on the variables that have already been introduced. Our estimation results have shown that this impact only changes if the given group of variables is introduced either before or after the dummy variables for occupations. In the next section, we shall therefore present the results obtained when occupations are introduced as the last step and then the results obtained when they are introduced as the second step.

## **V. The results**

Tables 2 and 3 show how the marginal effect of the gender variable on the probability of choosing the private, nonprofit and public sectors changes as we introduce into the regression the different groups of variables that are likely to affect that choice. In Table 2, the variables for occupations were introduced at the end, while in Table 3, they were introduced straight after the basic specification (vector  $Z$ ).

Table 2 shows that for identical age, marital status, number of children, level of qualification and employment status, women have a 9.4 percent higher probability than men of choosing the nonprofit sector and a 9.6 percent higher probability of choosing the public sector. When all the variables likely to affect the choice of sector are taken into account in the analysis, the influence of being a woman on the probability of choosing the nonprofit and public sectors falls sharply. The last line in Tables 2 shows that the difference in probability between women and men choosing the nonprofit sector is now only 2.6 percent, a difference significant at the level of 6%. This fall is much more pronounced for the public sector, as women now have a 15.7 percent lower probability than men of choosing this sector. Let us now examine more closely the influence of the job characteristics introduced into the model on the over-representation of women in the nonprofit and public sectors. The influence of these characteristics on the probability of choosing the different sectors is presented in detail in Table A1 in the appendix. This table presents the marginal effect of the characteristics as each one is introduced into the regression.

[INSERT TABLE 2]

In Table 2, we can see that differences between sectors in terms of the number and type of hours worked partly explain the over-representation of women in the nonprofit and, to a lesser degree, the public sectors. Indeed, line 2 of Table 2 shows that the difference in probability between women and men choosing the nonprofit and public sectors is now only 5.9 and 8 percent respectively. In Table A1, we can see that the shorter working week characterizes the preference for a job in one of these two sectors rather than the private sector, contributing to the greater presence of women. The feminization of the nonprofit sector is also due to a larger offer of part-time jobs than in the other two sectors, and that of the public sector to the lower

probability of obtaining shift work. Thus, the presence of women in these two sectors is partly explained by an organization of working time that is relatively less restrictive than that of the private sector, something that is appreciated more by women than by men. These results can be interpreted as a component of a strategy of choice adopted by women with a view to reconciling the demands of professional and family life.

The inclusion in the regression of estimated wage differentials by sector reduces by half the influence of being a woman on the probability of choosing the public sector, whereas it has no effect on the probability of choosing the nonprofit sector. Estimation of the wage gaps between sectors, presented in Table A2 of the appendix, shows that, *ceteris paribus*, women in the public sector obtain an hourly wage that is 8% higher on average than those in the private sector, while this gain is only 2.2% for men. Employees in the nonprofit sector, on the other hand, only enjoy a very slight wage gain compared to the private sector: 0.7% for men and 2.2% for women. These results show that the wage structure in the public sector explains a large part of the feminization of the labor force in that sector, to the contrary of what we can observe in the nonprofit sector. This last result differs from that obtained by Preston for white-collar workers in the private and nonprofit sectors in the United States. In her study, women make less of a wage loss than men when they choose the nonprofit sector, and this difference significantly affects female presence in that sector. This difference in results may arise from our taking all occupations into account in our sample. If we consider only white-collar workers, women would lose 1.7% by joining the nonprofit sector rather than the private sector, whereas men would lose 11.5% if they made the same choice.

The wage gain that women obtain from working in the public rather than the private sector is partly explained by a lower degree of gender pay discrimination, measured by the decomposition of estimated wages in the two sectors presented in Table A3 of the appendix. *Ceteris paribus*, women appear to suffer less wage discrimination in the nonprofit sector than

in the private sector, confirming the results presented by Leete and Preston for the United States. However, this apparently better treatment is not significant enough to make the wage differential between nonprofit and private sectors a significant factor in women's choice of employment sector.

Family-friendly measures also partly explain the feminization of the public sector, but not that of the nonprofit sector. Once these measures have been taken into account, women no longer have a higher probability than men of working in the public sector. More precisely, among the possibilities of adapting working hours to suit family constraints, it is primarily the fact that it is easier to obtain a part-time job for family reasons in the public sector that partly explains the disproportionate number of women in that sector. In addition, women are more likely than men to choose the public sector because it offers more child-care possibilities, in the form of day centers or nurseries. Lastly, the generosity of the public sector in terms of financial allowances for child-care or for looking after a handicapped child add further to the attraction of women to this sector. On the other hand, differences between the sectors in terms of RWT and annual holidays have little influence on women's choice of the public sector. Both the nonprofit and private sectors appear to be more generous on this count.

In the nonprofit sector, the lack of family-friendly measures compared to the public sector does little to attract women employees. In particular, measures allowing for the adaptation of working hours are made less necessary by the shorter working hours and high proportion of part-time jobs for women. In the same way, the nonprofit sector is not characterized by an attractive provision of child-care services. Moreover, the low level of family-related financial payments is more likely to deter women from this sector, as shown by the slight increase of the difference in probability between women and men choosing the nonprofit sector (line 6 of Table 2).

In turn, the inclusion of advantages not related to family-friendly policy - such as savings plans, life insurance policies, pension plans, holiday vouchers and mutual insurance schemes - reduces the effect of being a woman on the probability of choosing the nonprofit or public sectors. Table A1 shows that private sector employees enjoy significantly more access to specific savings plans, life insurance policies, provident schemes and part-financing of mutual insurance policies. The over-representation of women in the public and nonprofit sectors can therefore be partly explained by the fact that women attach less importance than men to some of the monetary advantages that are significantly less frequent in these sectors. From this point of view, the disproportionate number of women in the public and nonprofit sectors stems from the reluctance of men to join these sectors because of the lack of such monetary advantages. These results are in keeping with the findings of Daniel Bollinger and Geert Hofstede (1987), who show that the “ideal job” for men requires access to a wide range of compensation schemes, unlike the “ideal job” for women.

Introducing into the regression the variables intended to reflect public-mindedness does not change the effect of being a woman on the probability of choosing the nonprofit or public sectors. Nevertheless, the results displayed in Table A1 show that participating in a campaigning or community-interest activity and considering religion to be an important dimension of daily life are positively correlated with working in the nonprofit sector, but below the usual levels of statistical significance. In addition, choice of the public or nonprofit sectors, which are more oriented towards objectives of public interest, is explained to a significant level by the degree to which they suit employees’ tastes. These conclusions are therefore in line with experimental studies that do not identify any gender-based social preferences.

On the other hand, the different distributions of occupational categories in the different sectors explain a large part of the over-representation of women in the nonprofit and especially the

public sectors. The influence of gender on the probability of choosing these two sectors falls sharply when the variables for occupation are introduced into the regression. As we can see in line 10 of Table 2, the additional probability of working in the nonprofit sector due to gender falls from 0.048 to 0.026 (a fall of about 45%), while the additional probability of working in the public sector falls from -0.051 to -0.157 (a fall of 200%). Thus, the feminization of the public and nonprofit sectors reflects the pronounced feminization of certain occupational categories. There are higher proportions of highly-feminized occupational categories in these two sectors than in the private sector. This is the case for clerks, service workers and certain professional occupations such as those involved in health and social work. Conversely, the predominantly male occupational categories, such as skilled workers, technicians, foremen/women and supervisors are less frequent. When the indicators of occupation are included in the analysis, men have a significantly higher probability than women of choosing the public sector, *ceteris paribus*. In other words, given the variables we have already examined, if the distribution of occupational categories was perfectly identical in each sector, then the public sector would contain a majority of men.

However, there remains a specific attraction of women for the nonprofit sector, the origin of which cannot be determined using the variables available in our database. Preston's results on the preference of women white-collar workers in the United States suggest that women attach particular importance to the intrinsic content of jobs: features such as the possibility of improving their qualifications and the perceived degree of autonomy. It is possible that among the intrinsic incentives offered by the nonprofit sector, such job characteristics are favored. Thus, Borzaga and Tortia (2006) for Italy and Lanfranchi and Nancy (2008) for seven European countries show that the properties of interesting work, autonomy and room for initiative by the employee are typical of nonprofits and contribute to the higher average job satisfaction observed in that sector. The impossibility of measuring these characteristics in our

database prevents us from determining whether these distinctive features really are particularly sought-after by women workers. Another potential explanation lies in the possibility that women workers are, according to the inventory of gender-based roles drawn up by Bem (1976), more sensitive to the relational dimension in work. If, as Borzaga and Tortia observe in Italy, workers in nonprofit organizations report greater satisfaction in their relations with colleagues and superiors, then the nonprofit sector would be likely to attract a higher proportion of women. Further research is required into the internal organization of work and the content of jobs in the different sectors, to establish whether these dimensions are indeed factors underlying different choices of sector between the two sexes.

Table 3 shows how the results analyzed above are modified when the variables for occupations are introduced into the model just after the basic specification, instead of at the end. As far as the choice of the nonprofit sector is concerned, the same groups of variables still reduce the influence of gender on the probability of choosing this sector. For the public sector, on the other hand, when the variables for the various family-friendly measures are included after the occupational groups, their introduction no longer reduces the influence of gender on the probability of choosing this sector. However, this result does not refute the possibility that these variables may explain the over-representation of women in this sector. It simply means that the most feminized occupational groups are also those that offer the most in the way of measures that help employees to reconcile the demands of family life and professional life. The method of estimation used here does not allow us to determine whether occupational segregation explains the distribution of these family-friendly measures over different occupational groups or whether it is this distribution that reinforces occupational segregation.

[INSERT TABLE 3]

## **VI. Conclusion**

At the beginning of this article we suggested a certain number of reasons that might explain why a disproportionate number of women choose jobs in the public and nonprofit sectors rather than the private sector. Some of those reasons appear to be corroborated by our empirical analysis. Thus, a wage gap in favor of public sector jobs, after controlling for individual characteristics, that is higher for women than for men appears to contribute to the high proportion of women in this sector. On the other hand, this factor does not influence their choice of the nonprofit sector. The higher frequency of wage complements in the private sector, such as life insurance schemes or pension and mutual insurance plans, plays a role in attracting male workers, who appear to attach more importance to these additional monetary advantages.

In the field of family-friendly measures, the length of the working week, and particularly, in the case of the nonprofit sector, access to part-time jobs, appears to be an important determinant of female over-representation in the public and nonprofit sectors. The public sector is strongly characterized by the development of family-friendly practices, such as the ease with which part-time jobs can be obtained for family reasons, the provision of child-care centers of one form or another, or allowances to help pay for child-care. However, the influence of these practices is difficult to interpret in this sector. They appear to play a role in women's choice to work in the public sector, but we cannot determine whether this is the result of an attraction for these measures or the result of occupational segregation. This is because some occupations are at the same time predominantly female and practiced almost exclusively in the public sector. We cannot tell whether the feminization of these jobs has driven the development of family-friendly measures, or whether the existence of such

measures has attracted a high proportion of women to these occupations. On the other hand, the low frequency of such measures in the nonprofit sector, apart from the access to part-time jobs, does not discourage women from choosing this sector.

Pro-social motivational factors influence the choice of sector of employment, but they do not appear to be any stronger among women than they are among men; the high proportion of women in the public and nonprofit sectors could not, therefore, be attributed to a greater degree of altruism in women. When the differences between the practices of organizations in the three sectors are taken into account, men are more strongly attracted to the public sector than women, whereas there is a positive propensity for women to choose the nonprofit sector.

The empirical evidence produced in this article shows that in addition to occupational segregation, which explains a large part of women's choice of employment sector, certain practices adopted by public and nonprofit employers in terms of flexibility in working hours, length of the working week and pay structure offer women possibilities that the private sector fails to offer them. Encouraging companies in the private sector to develop policies of individual adaptation of working hours could be a means of increasing the employment opportunities for women and so, eventually, of reducing sector-based segregation. All else being equal, a more favorable wage treatment for women in the private sector could help to make this sector more attractive to them.

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**Table 1: Main employee characteristics by sector and gender**

	Overall			Men			Women		
	Private	Public	Assoc.	Private	Public	Assoc.	Private	Public	Assoc.
<b>Socio-demographic characteristics</b>									
average age	35.7	37.4	38.8	36.0	37.7	38.6	35.3	37.1	38.9
% living in a couple	75.1	75.7	69.8	75.2	79.9	71.8	74.8	71.6	69.1
number of children	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.5	1.6
general lower secondary	24.5	15.4	12.1	25.5	17.0	8.7	22.8	13.9	13.2
vocational lower secondary	28.0	25.2	28.3	33.1	26.3	28.3	19.1	24.1	28.3
vocational or general upper secondary	17.1	22.4	16.2	15.4	24.8	17.4	20.2	20.0	15.8
undergraduates	15.4	13.3	20.5	13.1	10.7	20.0	19.5	15.8	20.7
graduates and above	15.0	23.7	22.9	13.0	21.3	25.7	18.4	26.1	22.0
<b>Job characteristics</b>									
average hourly wage (log)	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.3	2.2
(standard deviation)	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
% in fixed-term or temporary employment	8.3	10.7	12.2	8.1	11.2	9.5	8.8	10.2	13.1
job tenure	8.9	11.7	10.1	9.0	12.2	9.5	8.8	11.2	10.3
actual experience (excl. tenure)	6.3	4.5	6.1	6.8	4.8	7.2	5.4	4.3	5.8
monthly hours worked	154.8	144.2	128.9	159.1	151.1	152.7	147.5	138.0	122.3
% part time	7.0	14.5	30.9	1.7	3.8	7.8	16.4	24.7	38.1
% regular evening work	21.7	22.2	22.1	24.3	22.3	25.6	17.2	22.0	21.0
occasional evening work	23.6	23.8	12.9	27.4	31.5	16.5	17.1	16.4	11.8
regular night work	11.5	11.3	5.9	15.1	14.8	9.2	5.1	7.9	4.9
occasional night work	13.0	15.4	8.5	17.1	23.8	13.6	5.8	7.4	6.9
regular Saturday work	23.3	28.5	27.3	21.4	28.0	32.1	26.7	29.0	25.8
occasional Saturday work	28.8	28.3	22.1	33.7	35.7	24.8	20.2	22.6	21.3
regular Sunday work	8.9	20.1	23.9	8.9	18.8	27.7	8.8	21.4	22.8
occasional Sunday work	17.6	24.2	14.6	19.4	31.3	11.7	14.5	17.6	15.5
rotating shifts	17.7	9.7	7.8	21.8	9.8	8.6	10.4	9.7	7.6
varying hours each day	23.7	28.4	35.8	22.8	27.4	36.3	25.1	29.5	35.6
varying hours each week	8.4	8.5	9.0	7.0	8.3	11.6	10.5	9.7	7.5
<b>Occupational groups</b>									
professors, scientific occupations	0.6	9.4	6.6	0.5	9.7	5.1	0.6	9.1	7.0
engineers and managers	15.0	9.3	8.1	16.1	13.3	14.8	13.0	5.5	6.0
teachers, public and health white-collar	0.9	20.1	27.2	0.7	16.1	28.5	1.3	24.0	26.8
admin. and commercial white-collar	11.6	1.7	10.0	7.5	1.2	9.1	18.9	2.3	10.3
supervisors and technicians	14.4	5.4	2.9	19.7	10.3	4.9	5.1	0.8	2.2
clerks and service workers	18.0	34.6	40.1	5.7	14.9	17.6	39.8	53.3	47.1
skilled blue-collarworkers	26.5	7.9	3.9	36.2	14.7	14.6	9.4	1.5	0.6
unskilled blue-collar workers	13.0	11.4	1.3	13.6	19.9	5.3	12.0	3.5	0.0
<b>Public-mindedness</b>									
campaigning or community-interest activity	6.7	10.4	12.1	7.6	11.7	17.1	4.9	9.1	10.5
job criterion "suitability in terms of taste and/or training "	18.1	21.6	25.4	15.1	17.5	23.3	23.6	25.5	26.0
religion important or fairly important	12.0	19.2	26.9	10.6	18.9	23.9	14.6	19.5	27.8

Source: Ined-Insee, Familles et Employeurs 2004-2005.

**Table 2: Effect of gender on the probability of choosing the private, nonprofit or public sector (SPC introduced at the last step)**

	<b>Nonprofit</b>	<b>Public</b>	<b>Private</b>
Vector Z	0.094*** (8.83)	0.096*** (5.09)	-0.190*** (9.82)
Number and type of hours worked	0.059*** (5.59)	0.080*** (3.72)	-0.139*** (6.20)
Wage differentials	0.062*** (5.46)	0.041* (1.80)	-0.103*** (4.34)
Family-friendly measures:			
<i>Adapting working hours</i>	0.063*** (5.40)	0.036 (1.52)	-0.099*** (4.01)
<i>Child-care systems</i>	0.061*** (5.23)	0.020 (0.80)	-0.081*** (3.14)
<i>Financial payments</i>	0.066*** (5.07)	0.008 (0.27)	-0.074** (2.45)
<i>Holidays and reduction of working time</i>	0.066*** (5.04)	0.002 (0.08)	-0.068** (2.22)
Advantages not related to family-friendly policy	0.050*** (3.80)	-0.052 (1.51)	0.002 (0.06)
Public-mindedness	0.048*** (3.78)	-0.051 (1.48)	0.003 (0.07)
Occupational groups	0.026* (1.94)	-0.157*** (3.60)	0.131*** (2.82)
<b>N</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>962</b>	<b>1515</b>

Source: Ined-Insee, Familles et Employeurs 2004-2005

**Note:** The coefficients presented correspond to the marginal effects (calculated at the mean point). The Student's t values, in brackets, are absolute values. Coefficient significant at the level of: \*\*\*1%, \*\*5%, \*10%.

**Guide:** The coefficient on the first line of the first column should be interpreted as follows: the probability of choosing the nonprofit sector is 9.4 percent higher for women than it is for men.

**Table 3: Effect of gender on the probability of choosing the private, nonprofit or public sector (SPC introduced at the second step)**

	<b>Nonprofit</b>	<b>Public</b>	<b>Private</b>
Vector Z	0.094*** (8.83)	0.096*** (5.09)	-0.190*** (9.82)
Occupational groups	0.052*** (3.99)	-0.074*** (2.78)	0.022 (0.79)
Number and type of hours worked	0.031** (2.53)	-0.065** (2.27)	0.034 (1.11)
Wage differentials	0.033** (2.50)	-0.109*** (3.62)	0.076** (2.32)
Family-friendly measures:			
<i>Adapting working hours</i>	0.034** (2.52)	-0.094*** (3.05)	0.060* (1.79)
<i>Child-care systems</i>	0.034*** (2.59)	-0.111*** (3.42)	0.077** (2.23)
<i>Financial payments</i>	0.038** (2.48)	-0.107*** (2.86)	0.072* (1.83)
<i>Holidays and reduction of working time</i>	0.036*** (2.60)	-0.104*** (2.76)	0.068* (1.71)
Advantages not related to family-friendly policy	0.025* (1.84)	-0.161*** (3.71)	0.136*** (2.93)
Public-mindedness	0.026* (1.94)	-0.157*** (3.60)	0.131*** (2.82)
<b>N</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>962</b>	<b>1515</b>

Source: Ined-Insee, Familles et Employeurs 2004-2005

Note: The coefficients presented correspond to the marginal effects (calculated at the mean point). The Student's t values, in brackets, are absolute values. Coefficient significant at the level of: \*\*\*1%, \*\*5%, \*10%.

## Appendix

**Table A1: Effect of job characteristics on the probability of choosing the nonprofit, public or private sector.**

	Nonprofit	Public	Private
<b>Number and type of hours worked</b>			
Part time	0.038** (2.26)	0.027 (0.73)	-0.065 (1.64)
Log of monthly working hours	-0.076*** (4.60)	-0.278*** (5.05)	0.354*** (5.70)
<i>Evening work</i>			
Never	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Occasionally	-0.031*** (2.67)	-0.055* (1.77)	0.086*** (2.62)
Regularly	-0.014 (0.99)	-0.031 (0.84)	0.045 (1.14)
<i>Night work</i>			
Never	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Occasionally	-0.018 (1.16)	0.091** (2.35)	-0.073* (1.81)
Regularly	-0.037*** (2.88)	-0.034 (0.77)	0.071 (1.52)
<i>Saturday work</i>			
Never	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Occasionally	0.007 (0.49)	-0.012 (0.39)	0.005 (0.15)
Regularly	-0.029** (2.07)	-0.084** (2.44)	0.113** (3.13)
<i>Sunday work</i>			
Never	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Occasionally	0.016 (0.93)	0.218*** (6.43)	-0.234** (7.05)
Regularly	0.121*** (3.03)	0.360*** (7.94)	-0.481*** (15.63)
<i>Working hours</i>			
The same every day	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Rotation (2*8, 3*8, teams, brigades)	-0.023* (1.65)	-0.139*** (4.46)	0.163*** (4.77)
Varying each day	0.009 (0.84)	-0.023 (0.94)	0.014 (0.52)
Varying each week	-0.009 (0.60)	-0.078** (2.28)	0.087** (2.33)
<b>Wage differentials</b>			
Nonprofit – Private	-0.039 (1.11)	0.289*** (3.95)	-0.250*** (3.24)
Public – Private	-0.002 (0.03)	0.692*** (4.27)	-0.690*** (4.02)

**Table A1 (continued)**

	<b>Nonprofit</b>	<b>Public</b>	<b>Private</b>
<b>Family-friendly measures</b>			
<i>Adapting working hours</i>			
Part-time work always granted on request	0.010 (1.09)	0.167*** (7.92)	-0.177*** (7.98)
Family life taken into account for adjusting of part-time work (for all employees)	-0.010 (0.97)	0.163*** (6.05)	-0.153*** (5.45)
Family life taken into account for working hours (for all employees)	0.024 (1.12)	0.009 (0.21)	-0.033 (0.70)
Family life taken into account for the organization of missions and business travels (for all employees)	0.024 (1.05)	-0.126*** (3.35)	0.102** (2.27)
Adjusting working hours for the start of the school year	-0.002 (0.19)	0.239*** (10.95)	-0.237*** (9.30)
Adjusting working hours to fit in with school or day-care centre	0.009 (0.83)	-0.095*** (4.11)	0.086*** (3.42)
Adjusting working hours in the event of sick children	0.024** (2.36)	-0.044* (1.82)	0.020 (0.79)
Possibility of working from home in the event of personal constraints	-0.030*** (2.77)	0.148*** (4.30)	-0.118*** (3.35)
<i>Child-care systems</i>			
Existence of a day-care centre or possibility of obtaining places in one	-0.048*** (4.73)	0.557*** (17.12)	-0.509*** (15.89)
Existence of a playschool or play centre	-0.063*** (6.08)	0.219*** (3.50)	-0.156** (2.48)
<i>Financial payments</i>			
Financial help for child-care	0.023 (1.58)	0.403*** (12.71)	-0.426*** (13.88)
Financial help with school costs	-0.026** (2.13)	-0.117*** (3.71)	0.143*** (4.36)
Allowance for handicapped child	-0.065*** (6.10)	0.490*** (16.25)	-0.425*** (13.65)
<i>Holidays and reduction of working time (RWT)</i>			
The employer offers a maximum 13 RWT days per year	0.021* (1.88)	-0.088** (2.19)	0.067* (1.67)
The employer offers RWT days that can be taken systematically on the same day of the week	0.015 (1.18)	-0.064** (2.10)	0.050 (1.56)
The employer offers RWT days that can be added to ordinary holidays	-0.020** (2.00°)	-0.090*** (3.12)	0.110*** (3.75)
The employer offers a maximum 25 days holiday per year	-0.015 (1.48)	-0.173*** (6.35)	0.188*** (6.76)
Family life taken into account for planning staff holidays (for all employees)	0.028** (2.16)	-0.056* (1.87)	0.028 (0.91°)

**Table A1 (end)**

	<b>Nonprofit</b>	<b>Public</b>	<b>Private</b>
<b>Advantages not related to family-friendly policy</b>			
Life insurance, benefit plans	0.015 (1.57)	-0.293*** (8.89)	0.278*** (8.15)
Specific savings plans	-0.110*** (7.23)	-0.351*** (11.09)	0.461*** (14.26)
Pension plans	-0.035*** (2.65)	0.129*** (2.77)	-0.094** (1.99)
Funding of a mutual insurance plan for all employees	-0.015 (1.54)	-0.382*** (12.66)	0.397*** (13.01)
Holiday vouchers	0.050*** (4.15)	0.133*** (3.98)	-0.183*** (5.27)
<b>Public-mindedness</b>			
Campaigning or community-interest activity	0.025 (1.29)	-0.003 (0.06)	-0.022 (0.39)
Religion important or fairly important	0.020 (1.56)	0.007 (0.18)	-0.027 (0.69)
Job criterion: "suitability in terms of taste and/or training"	0.049*** (2.83)	0.093** (2.12)	-0.143*** (3.10)
<b>Occupational groups</b>			
Unskilled blue-collar workers	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Skilled blue-collar workers	0.056 (0.90)	-0.235*** (5.48)	0.179*** (2.63)
Clerks and service workers	0.218** (2.44)	-0.020 (0.31)	-0.198** (2.49)
Intermediate occupations 1	0.565*** (3.96)	0.052 (0.43)	-0.617*** (14.37)
Intermediate occupations 2	0.311** (2.10)	-0.294*** (8.70)	-0.017 (0.12)
Intermediate occupations 3	0.186 (1.52)	-0.227*** (4.88)	0.041 (0.35)
White-collar 1	0.450** (2.40)	0.100 (0.62)	-0.550*** (8.40)
White-collar 2	0.262* (1.91)	-0.241*** (4.73)	-0.021 (0.16)
<b>N</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>962</b>	<b>1515</b>

*Source* : Ined-Insee, *Familles et Employeurs*, 2004-2005.

*Note*: The coefficients presented correspond to the marginal effects (calculated at the mean point). The Student's t values, in brackets, are absolute values. Coefficient significant at the level of: \*\*\*1%, \*\*5%, \*10%.

*Intermediate occupations 1*: teachers and assimilated occupations, intermediate health and social work occupations, intermediate civil service occupations; *Intermediate occupations 2*: intermediate corporate administrative and commercial occupations; *Intermediate occupations 3*: technicians, foremen/women, supervisors; *White-collar 1*: Professors, scientific occupations, computing, arts and entertainment occupations; *White-collar 2*: senior civil service, corporate administrative and commercial managers, corporate engineers and technical executives.

**Table A2 Estimated wage differentials between sectors by gender.**

	<b>Public-Private</b>	<b>Nonprofit-Private</b>	<b>Public-Nonprofit</b>
Women	8.0%	2.2%	6.5%
Men	2.2%	0.7%	6.5%

Source: Ined-Insee, *Familles et Employeurs*, 2004-2005.

Note: this table presents the wage gains obtained from choosing one sector rather than another.

Guide: women obtain a wage gain of 8% by choosing the public rather than the private sector.

**Table A3: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of hourly wage differential between men and women within each sector.**


	<b>Public sector</b>	<b>Private sector</b>	<b>Nonprofit sector</b>
Explained part	0.0387 (25.9%)	0.0219 (14.2%)	0.0469 (37.8%)
Unexplained part	0.1105 (74.1%)	0.1319 (85.8%)	0.0772 (62.2%)
Observed differential (log)	0.1492 (100.0%)	0.1538 (100.0%)	0.1242 (100.0%)

Source: Ined-Insee, *Familles et Employeurs*, 2004-2005.

Note: for each sector, this table presents a breakdown of the average wage difference between men and women into an explained part and an unexplained part, calculated using the following equation:

$$\overline{\ln W_m} - \overline{\ln W_f} = \underbrace{\hat{\beta}_f' (\bar{X}_m - \bar{X}_f)}_{\text{explained part}} + \underbrace{(\hat{\beta}_m - \hat{\beta}_f)' \bar{X}_m}_{\text{unexplained part}}$$

**Figure 1 : Adaptation of working hours and family-friendly measures by sector  
(in % of the number of organizations)**



Source : Ined-Insee, *Familles et Employeurs*, 2004-2005.

Note : A1 : Part-time hours always granted on request.

A2 : Family life taken into account for the allocation of part-time work (for all employees).

A3 : Possibility of adjusting working hours for the start of school term.

A4 : Possibility of adjusting working hours to fit in with school or day-care centre timetables.


A5 : Possibility of adjusting working hours in the event of sick children.

A6 : Family life taken into account for the organization of working hours (for all employees)

A7 : Family life taken into account for the organization of missions and transfers (for all employees).

A8 : Possibility of working from home in the event of personal constraints.

**Figure 2 : Presence of child-care system by sector  
(in % of the number of organizations)**




Source : Ined-Insee, *Familles et Employeurs*, 2004-2005.

Note : S1 : Existence of a day-care centre or possibility of places in one.

S2 : Existence of a playschool or play centre.

S3 : Possibility of access to holiday camps or resorts.

**Figure 3 : Financial payments related to family life by sector  
(in % of the number of organizations)**



Source : Ined-Insee, *Familles et Employeurs*, 2004-2005.


Note : F1 : Wage level maintained during maternity or paternity leave when the wage exceeds social security ceiling.

F2 : Financial help for child care.

F3 : Financial help with school costs.

F4 : Allowance paid for handicapped child.

**Figure 4 : Annual holidays and reduction of working time (RWT)  
(in % of the number of organizations)**



Source : Ined-Insee, *Familles et Employeurs*, 2004-2005.


Note : C1 : The employer offers RWT days that can be taken systematically on the same day of the week.

C2 : The employer offers RWT days that can be added to ordinary holidays.

C3 : The employer offers maximum 13 RWT days per year.

C4 : The employer offers maximum 25 days holiday per year.

**Figure 5 : Monetary and financial advantages  
(in % of the number of organizations)**



Source : Ined-Insee, Familles et Employeurs, 2004-2005.

Note : P1 : Holiday vouchers.

P2 : Life insurance.

P3 : Savings plan.

P4 : Pensions plan.

P5 : Mutual insurance scheme.