Commerce équitable et signaux : entre information et illusion

Lupton, Sylvie (2009): Commerce équitable et signaux : entre information et illusion. Unpublished.

Abstract

Literature on signals has developed the importance of signals to inform consumers on product quality. However, a majority of economists suppose that the signals perfectly indicate quality to consumers, and that their perceptions correspond to the real quality issued by signals. Most economists have not considered situations of extreme asymmetrical information (Parker, 1995)in which consumers have an illusion about the signalled quality. This illusion is the condition of the functioning of certain markets, and especially applies to Potemkin goods (Tietzel and Weber, 1991), for which neither the consumer nor exterior institutions can control the quality of goods. Hence, the percieved quality of the good does not correspond to the good's actual quality. Our paper sheds lights on the question of a quality illusion shared by consumers, that is not dealt with by signals. The market functions perfectly well, albeit this illusion on product quality. This will be based on an empirical case study of fair trade signals on goods.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• English Title: Fair trade and signalling: information and illusion
• Language: French
• Keywords: Signals, faire trade, asymmetrical information, illusion, product quality
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility

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