Hanauske, Matthias and Kunz, Jennifer and Bernius, Steffen and König, Wolfgang (2009): Doves and hawks in economics revisited [An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises].
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The last financial and economic crisis demonstrated the dysfunctional long-term effects of aggressive behaviour in financial markets. Yet, evolutionary game theory predicts that under the condition of strategic dependence a certain degree of aggressive behaviour remains within a given population of agents. However, as the consequences of the financial crisis exhibit, it would be desirable to change the 'rules of the game' in a way that prevents the occurrence of any aggressive behaviour and thereby also the danger of market crashes. The paper picks up this aspect. Through the extension of the in literature well-known Hawk-Dove game by a quantum approach, we can show that dependent on entanglement, also evolutionary stable strategies can emerge, which are not predicted by classical evolutionary game theory and where the total economic population uses a non aggressive quantum strategy.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Doves and hawks in economics revisited [An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises]|
|English Title:||Doves and hawks in economics revisited [An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises]|
|Keywords:||Evolutionary game theory; financial crisis; hawk-dove game; quantum game theory|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D53 - Financial Markets
A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics > A13 - Relation of Economics to Social Values
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General > C02 - Mathematical Methods
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Matthias Hanauske|
|Date Deposited:||16. Apr 2009 23:34|
|Last Modified:||21. Feb 2013 22:26|
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