Siddiky, Chowdhury Irad Ahmed (2005): Mahatma Gandhi and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Strategic Civil Disobedience and Great Britain’s Great Loss of Empire in India. Published in: Public Choice Society Annual Conference, Papers and Proceedings 2006 , Vol. Public, No. Public Choice Society Annual Conference, Papers and Proceedings 2006 (2. April 2006): pp. 15-50.
Download (305kB) | Preview
This paper examines the relationship between statutory monopoly and collective action as a multi-person assurance game culminating in an end to British Empire in India. In a simple theoretical model, it is demonstrated whether or not a collective good enjoys (or is perceived to enjoy) pure jointness of production and why the evolutionary stable strategy of non-violence was supposed to work on the principle that the coordinated reaction of a ethnically differentiated religious crowd to a conflict between two parties (of colonizer and colonized) over confiscatory salt taxation would significantly affect its course. Following Mancur Olson (1965) and Dennis Chong (1991), a model of strategic civil disobedience is created which is used to demonstrate how collective action can be used to produce an all-or-nothing public good to achieve economic and political independence.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Mahatma Gandhi and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Strategic Civil Disobedience and Great Britain’s Great Loss of Empire in India|
|Keywords:||confiscatory taxation; multi-person assurance game; strategic civil disobedience|
|Subjects:||N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation > N45 - Asia including Middle East|
|Depositing User:||Chowdhury Irad Ahmed Siddiky|
|Date Deposited:||06. Oct 2006|
|Last Modified:||21. Jun 2015 11:48|
1. Acemoglu, Daron (2003). “Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 31, 620-652. 2. Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson (2000). "Political Losers As a Barrier to Economic Development" American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol 90, 126-130. 3. Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Simon Johnson (2001) “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review, volume 91, pp. 1369-1401. 4. Acemoglu, Daron, James A. Robinson and Simon Johnson (2002) “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 117, pp. 1231-1294. 5. Agarwal, S.C. (1976) The Salt Industry in India. New Delhi: Government of India Press. 6. Akerlof George A. and Kranton Rachel E. (2000) “Economics and Identity.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume CXV, pp. 715-753 7. Akerlof, George A. (1982) and Dickens, William. “The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance” American Economic Review Vol. 72. pp. 307-317. 8. Albert O. Hirschman (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 9. Axelrod, Robert (1985), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 10. Banerjee, Abhijit (1992). "A Simple Model of Herd Behaviour." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107(3), p. 797-817. 11. Banerjee, Abhijit (1997). "A Theory of Misgovernance." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112(4), p. 1289-1332. 12. Bannerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer (2002). "History, Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India." Mimeo. 13. Becker, Carl (1931) Annual Address of the President of the American Historical Association, delivered at Minneapolis. December 29, 1931. Reprinted in the American Historical Review, Volume 37(2), p. 221-236 14. Bikhchandani Sushil, Hirshleifer Jack and Welch, Ivo (1998) “Learning from the Behaviour of Others: Conformity, Fads and Informational Cascades” Journal of Economic Perspective. Volume 12(3). p. 151-170 15. Bridbury, A.R. (1955) England and the Salt Trade in the Later Middle Ages. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 16. Calvert, Albert F. (1915) Salt in Cheshire. New York: Spon and Chamberlain. 17. Calvert, Albert F. (1919) Salt and the Salt Industry. London: Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons. 18. Chong, Dennis (1991), Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 19. Choudhury, Sadananda (1979) The Economic History of Colonialism: A History of British Salt Policy in Orissa. New Delhi: Inter-India Publications. 20. Coase, Ronald (1937) “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 4(16), 386-405. 21. Coase, Ronald (1960) “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, III, 1-44. 22. Condorcet, J.A (1795) Sketch for a History for the Progress of the Human Mind. Connecticut: Hyperion Press, 1979. 23. Colley, Linda (1994) Britons. New Haven: Yale University Press. 24. Crowley, B. (1987) The Self, the Individual, and the Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 25. Diamond, J. (1997), Guns, Germs, and Steel. W.W. Norton and Co., New York. 26. Engerman, Stanley and Kenneth Sokoloff (2002) “Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economies, NBER Working Paper # 9259. 27. Engerman, Stanley, and Kenneth, Sokoloff (1997) “Factor Endowments, Institutions and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States,” in How Latin America Fell Behind, edited by Stephen Haber, Stanford University Press. 28. Engerman, Stanley, and Kenneth, Sokoloff (2000) “Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 14(3), p. 217-32. 29. Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart (1986) “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Ownership,” Journal of Political Economy, 94, 691-719. 30. Haag, Matthew & Lagunoff, Roger (2004) “Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning” Working Paper, Georgetown University. 31. Hardin, Russell (1982) Collective Action. Baltimore: Resources for the Future/Johns Hopkins University Press. 32. Hardin, Russell (1997) One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 33. Hobbes, Thomas (1660) Leviathan. edited by: J.C.A. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 34. Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1992) Industry and Empire. New York: Viking Press. 35. Jack, Homer A. (1956) The Gandhi Reader: A Source Book of His Life and Writings. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 36. K. N. Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics, Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. 37. LaPorta (1998), F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), December 1998; 38. LaPorta (1999), R., Lopez-de-Silenas, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, A., “The Quality of Government”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, V.15, p.222-279. 39. LaPorta (2000), F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,” Journal of Financial Economics, October, 2000. 40. Laver, Michael (1981) The Politics of Private Desires. New York: Penguin Books. 41. Lichbach, Mark Irving (1995) The Rebel's Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: Unversity of Michigan Press. 42. Lichbach, Mark Irving (1996) The Cooperator’s Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: Unversity of Michigan Press. 43. McNeill, W.H. (1976), Plagues and Peoples. Anchor Books, New York. 44. Meyer, David S., and Nancy Whittier (1994) “Social Movement Spillover.” Social Problems 41:277-298 45. Mullainathan, Sendhil (2002) “A Memory-Based Model of Bounded Rationality,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, (3), p. 735-774 46. North, Douglas C. (1981) Structure and Change in Economic History, W.W. Norton & Co., New York. 47. North, Douglas C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, New York. 48. North, Douglas C. (1991), “Institutions, Transaction Costs and the Rise of Merchant Empires”, in Tracy, J. D. ed., The Political Economy of Merchant Empires. 49. Olson, Mancur (1965) The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 50. Ostrom, Eleanor (1990) Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. 51. Rosenau, James N (2003) Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 52. Roy, Moxham (2001) The Great Hedge of India. London: Constable. 53. Samuelson, Paul A. (1954) “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure” Review of Economics and Statistics 36. 54. Sandel, Michael (1998) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 55. Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1918) “Crisis of the Tax State” in Swedberg, R. (1991) The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 56. Selten, Reinhard and Reinhard Tietz (1980). “Zum Selbstverstandnis der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung im Umkreis von Heinz Sauermann. (An Inside View of Experimental Economics in the Vicinity of Hans Sauermann. With English summary.),” Z. ges. Staatswiss, 136:1 (March), 12-27. 57. Sen, Amartya K. (1999) Reason Before Identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 58. Simon, Herbert A. (1957) Models of Man. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 59. Simon, Herbert A. (1982) Models of Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press. 60. Tarrow, Sydney (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 61. Thoreau, Henry David (1951) Cape Cod. New York: Bramhal House. 62. Watts, D.J. (2003) Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, New York: W.W. Norton. 63. Williamson, Oliver (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York: Free Press. 64. Williamson, Oliver (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press. 65. Wintrobe, Ronald (1992) “Some Economics of Ethnic Capital Formation and Conflict”, in Breton, Albert. ed., Nationalism and Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.