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The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts

Bennour, Khaled (2008): The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts. Published in: International Review of Economics , Vol. 56, No. 2 (June 2009): pp. 163-173.

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Abstract

This paper extends the prey--predator model of Grossman and Kim (1995) to analyze the relation between the value of the contested rent and the emergence of a conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes the conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That's when its valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compare to that of the prey.

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  • The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts. (deposited 05. May 2009 23:52) [Currently Displayed]
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