Rosato, Antonio (2006): An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion.
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The main object of this paper is the study of tax evasion from a theoretical point of view. We construct a simple two-player model in order to analyze the interaction between the taxpayer and the IRS and the main tool we use is game theory. We derive equilibrium solutions for the static game and we also provide some interesting comparative statics results. Then, we develop a dynamic game over an infinite number of periods. We show and comment two different kinds of long-run equlibria.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion|
|English Title:||An Attempt to Control Tax Evasion|
|Keywords:||Tax Evasion; Policy; Game Theory;|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue > H26 - Tax Evasion
|Depositing User:||Dr. Antonio Rosato|
|Date Deposited:||09. May 2009 07:19|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 09:37|
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