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# TESTING THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA

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## ABSTRACT

The relationship between globalization and human rights remains highly controversial in African context. Neoliberals argue that globalization lead to growth and development generating respect for human rights. While skeptics contend that globalization process always tends to be ‘exclusive of poor’ increasing inequality leading to social unrest and economic insecurity. This leads to domestic violence and conflicts, allowing governments to resort to repressive measures. We unpack both these arguments and test several dimensions of human rights under the conditions of globalization. Previous studies have examined this issue for global sample with single indicators, such as trade openness and FDI. We however make use of Axel Dreher’s comprehensive measure of globalization index capturing the extent of globalization along the three dimensions of economic, political, and social globalization, to assess the propositions. Using the sample of 33 African countries for the period 1981 – 2005, our findings reveal a strong positive association between globalization and government respect for basic human rights, political terror scale. In contrast to the arguments of dependency school of thought, we also find positive relationship between disaggregated components of globalization and government respect for human rights. Of particular interest is that these results are reiterated for a sample of 28 Sub-Saharan African countries.

**Keywords:** Globalization; Human rights, Africa.

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The “do files” of the empirical results can be obtained from the author upon request.

## 1. Introduction

The relationship between globalization and human rights is a contentious issue in the international political economy framework. An increasing amount of scholarship is likewise being devoted to this topic. But very often the link between the two is not properly understood because of the divergent views on this subject. The focus of this study is to examine the relationship between globalization and government respect for human rights in African countries. Though there are vast number of studies that show a positive relationship between globalization and economic growth<sup>1</sup>, the consequences of globalization leading to social disarray remain highly contentious. The literature presents conflicting findings on this topic. Liberal theorists argue that countries which are highly engaged in globalization process are likely to experience higher economic growth, greater affluence, more democracy, and increasingly peaceful conditions in the home country and elsewhere (Jacobsen, 1996). It help promote economic development, providing trade and investment opportunities creating much needed employment generation and reduce income inequality and poverty thereby reduce social unrest and economic insecurity. Thus, countries with higher levels of globalization process should suffer lesser degree of political violence and have highest number of peace years, promoting government respect for human rights. Meaning, globalization process should not only serve in attaining development goals but also help creating peace and tranquility and thereby decreasing human rights abuses.

On the contrary, Skeptics of globalization argue the opposite, where globalization processes might lead to exploitation of the weak by the strong, the exclusion of the poor, increased inequality, and economic insecurity resulting in social unrest. This paves way for the risk of political instability and outbreak of conflicts thereby (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Barbieri, 1996; Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000) forcing governments to resort repressive measures.

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<sup>1</sup> See: Barro & Sala-i-Martin (1995); Sachs & Warner (1995); Edwards (1998); Frankel & Romer (1999).

Often, the success of Mauritius and South Africa are cited as beneficiaries of globalization. However, there is a growing perception among African intellectuals that basic human and social rights are increasingly being eroded by the momentous disruptions brought about by globalization. Be it Shell Oil Corporation one of the world's largest Multi National Company (MNC henceforth), which is accused of supporting and funding the dictatorial regime in Nigeria and collaborating in the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa, a democratic activist. The same is highlighted in the case of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. In a quest to gain control over natural resources, especially oil, MNCs in the name of globalization either directly or indirectly created unprecedented general instability and human insecurity in resource rich countries like Zaire, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Somalia, Ivory Coast, and many others. Even more globalization is often alleged of influencing and subverting the local African cultures. Despite these divergent views, arguments and counter-arguments, any systematic analysis between the two is lacking and the empirical work is underdeveloped in the case of Africa. Thus the question whether globalization improves human rights in Africa is yet unsettled. Seeking to provide some empirical insight on this topic, we employ panel data for 33 African countries (including 28 Sub-Saharan African countries) over the period 1981 – 2005 to analyze whether and to what extent globalization affect human rights in the region. Rest of the paper is structured as follows: next section presents the theoretical arguments of liberals and dependency theorists. We introduce our measures of human rights and globalization in section three. While in section four we explain our empirical results, section five concludes the study.

## **2. Globalization & Human Rights Performance in Africa – Theoretical Underpinnings**

Conventional wisdom posits absence of any systematic relationship between globalization and human rights. Both theoretical and empirical literature on relationship between the two gives contradictory picture. In general, there are two large schools of thought about how exposure to global markets or the interconnectivity of states to one

another in the social, economic, and political contexts shapes domestic outcomes namely neoliberal and critical theories. Below, we discuss each of these arguments:

## **2. 1. Neoliberal Perspective**

The neoliberals argue that globalization provides economic, social and political benefits leading to state respect for basic human rights. The liberal perspective on effects of globalization can be divided into two ways namely, one the indirect way in which globalization leads to growth and development and two the indirect way in which the globalization acts as mechanism for norm diffusion. Both the ways help improve government respect for human rights. Concentrating on the indirect effects, globalization is often associated with free markets, which is viewed as superior at allocating scarce resources. The incentives of operating in free markets raises both wealth and productivity levels. Literature in political economy points out that wealthier country has greater respect for all forms of human rights (Poe, Tate & Keith, 1999 and Milner, Leblang & Poe, 2004). These wealthier countries enjoy greater economic affluence and economic development is higher. Historical analysis reveals that internal conflicts in its various forms occur as a result of economic and financial failures (Kamenka, 1970). Amartya Sen (1996: 16) contends that it is the friendlier socioeconomic policies and not the repressive political system which provides economic growth and development. Others suggest that globalization enables peace and prosperity and thereby increases in economic activities that reinforce peace in a virtuous cycle (Crossette, 1997; Friedman, 1999 and Bhagwati, 2004). Developing and under developed countries from Africa should thus make use of the opportunities provided by globalization which would help raise themselves from languishing in underdevelopment. For developing African countries to prosper fully from the opportunities provided by globalization, avenues such as trade promotion, attracting FDI and removal of trade and investment barriers must be utilized. The human rights effects seem to work through industrialization promoted by trade and FDI rather than the extraction of natural resources, such as oil, suggesting that modernization, and all the good things associated with the productivity of labor may matter more than simply relative affluence (de Soysa & Binningsbo, 2008 and Ross 2008). Since primary-

commodity exporters, who are vulnerable to shocks, could diversify and industrialize faster by being more open, globalization will benefit poor countries, indirectly affecting their human rights (Sachs & Warner, 1995). Thus, industrialization provides tremendous economic opportunities to the people in the society and progress towards greater development. Another indirect way in which globalization promotes good human rights performance is by promoting foreign trade and investment policies to attract investments which would require strengthening rule of law, promoting good governance, lowering bureaucratic hassles and corruption, allowing greater economic freedom investing heavily in social services and social and physical infrastructure related areas. All these measures ensure greater levels of freedom for its citizens for political participation, right to access information, freedom to form and join unions which give scope for increasing labor rights. Thus, economic development and industrialization driven by globalization are the main indirect guarantors of state respect for human rights asserted by liberals.

Liberals also argue for the direct effect of globalization which works through the process of norm diffusion through contact between the rich, liberal, North and the poor South. Countries exposed to global markets will also absorb market culture, where the norms of exchange, cooperation, and understanding will tend to override other traditional mores of discrimination and suspicion (Mousseau & Mousseau, 2008). This apart, globalization also directly influences more humane governance by minimizing unreliable rule and thereby increasing respect for human rights.

## **2. 2. Alternative Perspective**

The skeptics contend the arguments of the neoliberals on globalization and human rights relationship. According to them globalization hinders economic and social growth in developing countries. They argue that countries seeking assistance from international financial institutions like World Bank and IMF in the form of grants / aid / loans are often linked to acceptance of their terms and conditions related to free market initiatives which could be detrimental to overall development. These initiatives primarily include reduction in expenditure on social sector and development spending (Meyer, 1996). The findings of

Franklin (1997); McLaren (1998) and Abouharb & Cingranelli (2004) show that acceptance of IMF and World Bank programs are associated with decline in government respect for human rights<sup>2</sup>. For example, in 1986 as a part of economic liberalization policies, the Zambian government increased the prices of certain goods and devalued its local currency against US dollar led to angry protests and riots. More than 15 people were killed in an attempt by government to suppress these violent protests. Thus, globalization is marked by increase in trade, investments and capital flows which is made possible by increased openness of the domestic markets to outside world. Increase in economic globalization means increase in trade and investments. The benefits arising from trade and investments are not reaped by everyone. Rather only certain sections of the society are often the beneficiaries. Majority segments in the society, particularly poor and minorities are often the losers. As a result of the globalization process they find themselves increasingly alienated. If these sections of the society are not compensated by the government, the end result would be 'exclusive growth and development' like in many African countries. This leads to a preconceived notion of threat to their survival by those sections of the society who perceive themselves as the losers from such policies. These negative perceptions are often used to mobilize and show their dissent and opposition against the idea of globalization.

The anti-globalization criticism is directed mostly towards developed countries because they, according to the critics, exploit the least developed countries like Africa to secure dominance. The developed countries enter the least developed African countries in the form of foreign investments and active trade to extract the existing resources leaving the host country in a disadvantaged position (Frank, 1979). The second anti-globalization criticism is against the big MNCs operating in the developing countries. According to them, these big MNCs are perceived to be greedy and are highly indifferent towards the social impact of their operations and also towards environmental degradation, labors, and consumers' interests. Most often these big MNCs engage in arm twisting tactics with the

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<sup>2</sup> Harrigan & Mosley (1991) and Stiglitz (2002) show that this relationship between World Bank & IMF programs and economic growth is not clear.

local political and governmental fraternity by operating behind the doors and outside the democratic control in formulating the policies favorable to them.

“.....Neoliberal ‘globalization’ is methodically biased for corporate monopoly profits rather than human well-being and development; the big developed country governments aggressively push anti-developmental economic policies, which underdeveloped country governments tolerate and indeed sometimes even embrace. The end result is that domestic productive and social welfare structures around the world are devastated with severe effects especially on the economically vulnerable parts of populations who are the most numerous.....” (The Asia Pacific Research Network, 2005).<sup>3</sup>

Critics claim that the ‘exclusive’ economic growth and development arising out of the globalization lead to concentration of wealth in the hands of few privileged groups. These privileged groups does what ever is required to keep the government stable enabling the government to implement these policies which are favorable to them. Thus, in the name of ‘globalization’ the governments often resort to eliminating subsidies, dismantling administered price controls, allocation of lands to industrial houses ignoring rehabilitation plans for the poor, clampdown on rural development and welfare spending. This uneven development and progress creates more gap between ‘haves & have nots’ leading to increase income and wage inequalities paving way for either stagnant or increasing poverty levels. Thus, the poor socioeconomic conditions generate greater economic insecurity and social unrest creating hardships to the poorer sections of the society (Veerland, 2002). Rodrik (1994) argues that the consequences of neoliberal policies often involve redistribution of income among different groups. If the efficiency gains from the neoliberal policies are not substantial and income is not redistributed properly, this leads to wide spread agitations to resist making substantial policy changes which in turn affect certain sections of the population. However, if the governments are vulnerable to the reactions of certain sections of the society, which constitute significant portion, are less likely to carry forward such policies. But, if the governments remain

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<sup>3</sup> Asia Pacific Research Network (2005) The WTO’s Decade of Human Rights Violations, APRN Statement on Human Rights and Trade, Hong Kong, December 10<sup>th</sup>.



insensitive, which most often is the case in Africa, leads to angry mob protests, conflicts, strikes & lockouts and riots risking political instability and outbreak of conflicts thereby (Boswell & Dixon, 1990; Barbieri, 1996; Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000; Blinder, 2006 and Krugman, 2007). To control the situation the government often cracks down on the dissentients and protestors leading to wide spread human rights abuses.

### **3. Measuring ‘Human Rights & Globalization’**

#### **3. 1. Human Rights**

We examine human rights performance of states as: “integrity of physical rights,” which is abuses that physically harm people, such as torture, disappearances, imprisonment for political beliefs and political murder (Cingranelli and Richards 1999). These are captured using the following index:

##### **a. Political Terror Scale:**

We use data from the Political Terror Scales (PTS hereafter). The PTS data focus on the amount of respect a society gives to personal integrity rights, specifically the freedom from politically motivated imprisonment, torture and murder. This is developed by Gibney & Dalton (1997) providing data from 1980 onwards and later extended it back from 1976. The PTS scores include two components. One is based on a codification of country information from Amnesty International’s annual human rights reports to a scale from 1 being best to 5 is worst. The other scale is based on information from the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.

The final codification is as follows:

**Score 1** : Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

**Score 2** : There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

**Score 3** : There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.

**Score 4** : Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

**Score 5** : Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

The major contentious issue with respect to PTS is which indicator amongst the two should be used. It is noteworthy to highlight the advantages and drawbacks of both these indicators. Poe et al. (2001) points out that the State Department data is biased. They argue that the U.S. State Department reports lower values (1 – best) for the countries which are allies of U.S. on international political and diplomatic front. This effectively means that the Amnesty International data is unbiased. However, Neumayer (2005) point out that Amnesty International data though unbiased, covers only few countries in the early years, leaving aside those countries in which there were no or less human rights abuses. In this indecisive framework, we take the average score of both State Department and Amnesty International scores. Thus, the parsimonious model for effects of globalization on human rights performance is specified as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{PTS} = & \delta_1 + \psi_2 \text{HYPOTHESIS VARIABLES}_{it} + \psi_3 \text{Economic Growth Rate}_{it} + \psi_4 \log \\
 & (\text{Economic Development})_{it} + \psi_5 \text{War years}_{it} + \psi_6 \text{Pace years}_{it} + \psi_7 \text{Political Regime}_{it} + \psi_8 \\
 & \log (\text{Population})_{it} + \psi_9 \text{Ethnic Fractionalization}_{it} + \psi_{10} \text{British Legal Heritage}_{it} + \psi_{11} \text{Oil} \\
 & \text{Exports Dependency}_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \dots\dots\dots (1)
 \end{aligned}$$

Where:  $i$  = country “i” at time “t”;  $\delta$  = intercept;  $\psi$  = regression coefficients for variable “n”;  $\varepsilon$  = error term for country “i” at time “t”. PTS = Political Terror Scale. The hypothesis variables are globalization index; economic; social & political globalization indices. This empirical analysis covers 33 African countries (28 Sub-Saharan African

countries and 5 North African countries, see annexure 1) for the period 1981 to 2005. We use pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) dataset with time dummies. The pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data may exhibit Heteroskedasticity and serial-correlation problems. But these problems do not bias the estimated coefficients as pooled regression analysis in itself is a more robust method for large sample consisting of cross section and time series data. However, they often tend to cause biased standard errors for coefficients, producing invalid statistical inferences. To deal with these problems, Beck and Katz (1995) propose to retain POLS parameter estimates but replace the POLS standard errors with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE). They find that these estimates of sampling variability are very accurate, even in the presence of complicated panel error structures. Following others, this analysis employs POLS regression with PCSE Cross-section weights.

### **3. 2. Quantifying Globalization**

Previous studies addressing the issue of globalization and human rights have used proxies such as trade openness, typically measured as total trade to GDP, foreign direct investment flows and stocks, and portfolio investment flows on either the chances of democratization or increases in human rights. The results of these studies have been highly mixed (Apodaca, 2000; Blanton & Blanton, 2007; Harms & Ursprung, 2002; Li & Resnick, 2003; Richards et al. 2001; Jakobsen & de Soysa, 2006). However, these single indicators capture only very specific aspects of economic globalization that are arguably less than perfect. Trade openness is influenced of course by issues of geography, access to the sea, proximity to major markets, and history of colonization. FDI and trade might sometimes be complements and some times substitutes (Henisz, 2000). Most poor countries in Africa have such poor capital markets that globalization measured as portfolio investments will bypass much of the developing world. Others, while accepting that economic variables are important to measure globalization, argue that globalization has also political and social dimensions. The well known Freedom House discrete index of political freedom is based on a few such variables from the political and social sectors. The Freedom House index and similar measures are often used, along with a few other

economic variables, as the conditioning variables. In practice, it is hard to maintain a distinction between openness which is proxied mostly with economic variables and globalization measured with variables from the economic, social and political realms. This remains the major criticism of the previous empirical works on globalization, which only look at single indicators such as trade and investment, and there again mostly economic globalization.. Thus, we rely on an aggregated measure of economic, social, and political globalization and the disaggregated components of economic, social and political on human rights outcomes.

We make use of KOF index of Globalization 2006 constructed by Dreher et al. (2008). This index of globalization is further divided into three sub-indices viz., economic globalization index; social globalization index and political globalization index. All the indices are scaled on 0 – 100 scale, where 100 means high globalization and 0 means no globalization. The advantage of using Dreher's globalization index is that it is the most comprehensive measure of globalization because it also captures political and social dimensions, which are important and are missing in single or bi-dimensional indices. Second, the economic globalization index combines many economic indicators along with 'trade and investment restrictions' like: hidden import barriers, mean tariff rates, taxes on international trade and capital account restrictions, which no other indices captures as comprehensively as it does. Third advantage is methodological as it uses widely available technique of the principal components method and this index is most suitable for time series study as it dates back to 1970. Thus, we apply Dreher's comprehensive measure of globalization indices for 98 countries for 1981 - 2005<sup>4</sup>.

### **3. 3. Control Variables**

Previous research on the violations of human rights has established several key factors that explain why governments violate human rights (Poe & Tate, 1994; Carey & Poe, 2004 and Landman, 2005). The models control the effects of development by including per capita income (logged) in US\$ PPP constant terms and the economic growth rate

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<sup>4</sup> These indices can be downloaded from <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>

(WDI, 2007). Following others (Landman 2005) we include the log of total population (World Bank, 2007). To measure political regime, we include regime type data Polity IV constructed by Marshall and Jaggers (2002). We follow Londregan & Poole (1996) by subtracting Polity IV's autocracy score from its Democracy score, giving rise to the final democracy score that ranges from +10 to -10, wherein, +10 being the most democratic, +5 being partially democratic and -10 is fully autocratic. The study of Davenport & Armstrong (2004) show that democracy affects rights only at very high levels. Thus, we take the polity IV scores to capture for democracy levels. This would be even more interesting in the context of transition economies because of their transition from autocratic regime to democracy. Additionally, we account for the degree of ethnic fractionalization (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and participation in civil war. The war data are from the UCDP dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). In addition to these variables, oil export dependency, which is independently related to repression due to the so called 'resource curse,' is also included in the models (Ross, 2004; de Soysa & Binningsbo, 2008). This variable becomes even more important in the case of African countries because of huge natural resources wealth possessed by Africa. Oil wealth is a dummy taking the value 1 if oil exports exceed 1/3 of export revenue, and 0 if not. Finally, we also capture effect of legal heritage by including a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the country has a Socialist legal system and 0 otherwise (La Porta et al (1998)<sup>5</sup>. For more see annexure 2.

#### **4. Empirical Results & Estimates**

The sample of country-years that we examine in total make up of 825 observations. This number comes down to 750 and 800 when including economic and social globalization indices respectively. In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, the total sample observations include 700, while the observations are reduced to 625 and 675 upon inclusion of economic and social globalization indices respectively. Summary of the data is presented in annexure 3. The results of regression estimates in assessing the impact of globalization on human rights performance in African countries are presented in table 1. In model 1 (table 1) we find that globalization has a statistically significant positive

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<sup>5</sup> For theoretical justification on this, see Poe and Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & Keith (1999).

impact on Political Terror Scale (PTS). The PTS score is a scale stretching from 1 (very high human rights) to 5 (very low human rights). Therefore the negative effect suggests that higher levels of globalization reduce human rights violations. Contrary to the skeptical view, we find that for every 1 unit increase in globalization, there is a 0.020% increase in human rights. Thus, an increase by a standard deviation of the globalization index (10.037) would increase the PTS score by roughly 0.201%, which is about 21% of a standard deviation of the PTS score. The result is also true for the Sub-Saharan African countries only sample (see model 2; table 1). In this case, we find that for every 1 unit increase in globalization, there is a 0.023% increase in human rights. Thus, an increase by a standard deviation of the globalization index (10.037) would increase the PTS score by roughly 0.231%, which is about a quarter of the standard deviation of the PTS score. Thus, the direct impact of globalization is slightly lower for African countries as a whole; the effects are marginally higher in the case of Sub-Saharan countries. In model 3 & 4 we find also positive effects of Economic Globalization on basic human rights. These results are statistically highly significant in the case of Sub-Saharan sample. The substantive impact roughly half of the effect of the combined globalization index, but the results suggest that globalization has non-negligible direct effects. Remember that globalization can also have many indirect effects through the income and income growth rates that are held constant in our models. These results question the pessimistic literature on the negative effects of globalization and the deterioration of human rights in Africa. The interesting point noteworthy from the results of economic globalization is that its effects are higher in Sub-Saharan sample compared to full sample of African countries. For every 1 unit increase in economic globalization, there is a 0.010% increase in human rights in Sub-Saharan countries. This means that an increase by a standard deviation of the economic globalization index (13.684) would increase the PTS score by roughly 0.137%, which is only about 14% of the standard deviation of the PTS score. However, this is much lower in the case of full sample African countries with only 0.055%, which is just 5.63% of the standard deviation of the PTS score. One interesting point emerges from the results of economic globalization is that though the positive effects of economic globalization on human rights is very low in the case of African countries, its impact in comparison to entire region is higher in Sub-Saharan African countries.

**Table 1:** Globalization & Human rights performance in Africa equation function

Dependent variable: Political Terror Scale

| Variables                  | Model 1              | Model 2              | Model 3              | Model 4              | Model 5              | Model 6              | Model 7              | Model 8              |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                            | Full Sample          | SSA countries        | Full Sample          | SSA countries        | Full Sample          | SSA countries        | Full Sample          | SSA countries        |
| Constant                   | 0.750<br>(0.49)      | 1.827 ***<br>(0.53)  | 1.127 **<br>(0.56)   | 3.324 ***<br>(0.68)  | 2.005 ***<br>(0.60)  | 3.650 ***<br>(0.90)  | -0.927<br>(0.59)     | 0.019<br>(0.68)      |
| Globalization              | -0.020 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.023 ***<br>(0.00) | -----                | -----                | -----                | -----                | -----                | -----                |
| Economic Globalization     | -----                | -----                | -0.004 *<br>(0.00)   | -0.010 ***<br>(0.00) | -----                | -----                | -----                | -----                |
| Social Globalization       | -----                | -----                | -----                | -----                | -0.014 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.009 *<br>(0.00)   | -----                | -----                |
| Political Globalization    | -----                | -----                | -----                | -----                | -----                | -----                | -0.012 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.012 ***<br>(0.00) |
| Economic Growth Rate       | -0.010 **<br>(0.00)  | -0.010 **<br>(0.00)  | -0.013 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.013 **<br>(0.00)  | -0.010 **<br>(0.00)  | -0.010 **<br>(0.00)  | -0.011 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.011 ***<br>(0.00) |
| Log (Economic Development) | 0.135 ***<br>(0.03)  | 0.087 **<br>(0.03)   | 0.059 *<br>(0.03)    | 0.035<br>(0.03)      | 0.082 *<br>(0.04)    | -0.031<br>(0.06)     | 0.098 ***<br>(0.03)  | 0.049<br>(0.03)      |
| Log (Population)           | 0.111 ***<br>(0.02)  | 0.063 **<br>(0.02)   | 0.092 ***<br>(0.03)  | -0.029<br>(0.03)     | 0.041<br>(0.02)      | -0.019<br>(0.03)     | 0.220 ***<br>(0.03)  | 0.176 ***<br>(0.03)  |
| Political Regime           | -0.017 **<br>(0.00)  | -0.024 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.017 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.032 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.016 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.027 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.022 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.027 ***<br>(0.00) |
| Civil War Presence         | 0.921 ***<br>(0.07)  | 0.985 ***<br>(0.08)  | 1.000 ***<br>(0.07)  | 1.028 ***<br>(0.08)  | 0.945 ***<br>(0.07)  | 1.004 ***<br>(0.08)  | 0.917 ***<br>(0.07)  | 0.989 ***<br>(0.08)  |
| Number of Peace Years      | -0.017 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.017 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.016 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.014 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.018 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.018 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.017 ***<br>(0.00) | -0.012 ***<br>(0.00) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization   | -0.075<br>(0.10)     | -0.039<br>(0.13)     | -0.216 **<br>(0.10)  | -0.210 *<br>(0.12)   | -0.161<br>(0.10)     | -0.264 **<br>(0.12)  | -0.074<br>(0.10)     | 0.005<br>(0.14)      |

|                        |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| British Legal Heritage | 0.217 ***<br>(0.06) | 0.218 ***<br>(0.06) | 0.205 ***<br>(0.06) | 0.239 ***<br>(0.06) | 0.224 ***<br>(0.06) | 0.180 ***<br>(0.06) | 0.097<br>(0.06)     | 0.096<br>(0.06)     |
| Oil Exports Dependency | 0.448 ***<br>(0.08) | 0.590 ***<br>(0.10) | 0.196 **<br>(0.09)  | 0.521 ***<br>(0.14) | 0.371 ***<br>(0.07) | 0.503 ***<br>(0.09) | 0.466 ***<br>(0.07) | 0.546 ***<br>(0.09) |
| R-squared              | 0.490454            | 0.497151            | 0.479616            | 0.489329            | 0.476588            | 0.484010            | 0.499994            | 0.500345            |
| Adjusted R-squared     | 0.468525            | 0.471441            | 0.454871            | 0.459900            | 0.453325            | 0.456598            | 0.478475            | 0.474799            |
| F-statistic            | 22.364 ***          | 19.337 ***          | 19.382 ***          | 16.627 ***          | 20.487 ***          | 17.656 ***          | 23.234 ***          | 19.586 ***          |
| Number of countries    | 33                  | 28                  | 30                  | 25                  | 32                  | 25                  | 33                  | 33                  |
| Number of Observations | 825                 | 700                 | 750                 | 625                 | 800                 | 675                 | 825                 | 825                 |
| Time Dummies           | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 | YES                 |

**Note:** \*\*\* Significant at 1% confidence level; \*\* Significant at 5% confidence level \* Significant at 10% confidence level. The models are controlled for Heteroskedasticity. Cross-section weights PCSE-Consistent Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis



In models 5 & 6 we test the effects of Social Globalization on rights. As seen there, social globalization too has positive effects on respect for basic human rights. The substantive effects however are very low. A standard deviation increase in the Social Globalization index would increase human rights by about 13% and 9% of a standard deviation in the PTS score for full sample and Sub-Saharan countries respectively. Though the effects are smaller, nevertheless, these results suggest that greater contact of even a social nature between people may prevent states from acting in abusive ways. Finally, in models 7 & 8, we enter Political Globalization. As seen there, this measure too correlates positively with increased human rights performance and is statistically highly significant. Closer political ties between an African government and foreign governments induce better respect for rights. For every 1 unit increase in globalization, there is a 0.026% increase in human rights performance. Thus, an increase by a standard deviation of the political globalization index (21.930) would increase the PTS score by roughly 0.263%, which is more than a quarter of the standard deviation of the PTS score. Also, the extent of closer ties between the two can also promote better economic opportunities for its citizens. Several studies in literature point out the fact that political globalization enhances economic globalization (Giavazzi & Tabellini, 2004 and De Haan et al. 2006). Lastly, we could not include all the three sub-indices of globalization viz., economic; social and political in one model because of high correlation between the three<sup>6</sup>.

With respect to control variables, we see positive relationship between economic growth and human rights performance in Africa suggesting that improvement in quality of life through increase in economic opportunities arising out of higher economic growth help reduce economic insecurity, thereby reducing social tensions and unrests in the society (see table 1). However, the findings of the level of economic development show

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<sup>6</sup> The Pearson's correlation matrix of economic; social and political globalization indices is presented here. It shows very high correlation between economic globalization and social globalization. While the correlation between social and political globalization is very low.

|                         | Globalization | Economic Globalization | Social Globalization | Political Globalization |
|-------------------------|---------------|------------------------|----------------------|-------------------------|
| Globalization           | 1.00          |                        |                      |                         |
| Economic Globalization  | 0.80          | 1.00                   |                      |                         |
| Social Globalization    | 0.72          | 0.65                   | 1.00                 |                         |
| Political Globalization | 0.70          | 0.20                   | 0.18                 | 1.00                    |


conflicting results. Most studies report that per capita income matter positively for human rights, but when we enter our globalization measures, per capita income generally has a negative effect on PTS, which suggests that much of the income effect may relate to market integration factors, rather than wealth alone. Another reason for this negative relationship is because of the positive impact of globalization on income. Meaning, the rise in income is more due to globalization than any other reason. This is confirmed when we ran the same model without globalization variables only to find 'positive relationship' between Percapita GDP and human rights performance. The third reason could be that increase in income would increase state repression because it leads to instability as the rebellion increases. This is particularly true in the case of developing countries. Milner, Poe & Leblang (1999) point that increase in economic inequality leads to social unrest in the society paving way for dissent against the government policies. This happens more when majority of the deprived sections are at the bottom of the economic ladder and when the gap between the 'haves and have nots' are very wide. We also find that increase in population levels exerts negative effect of governments' respect for human rights. This effect is consistent across both forms of human rights displayed in all models (see table 1). The results related to ethnic fractionalization are as expected negative. This is important because ethnic fractionalization is very high in African region to other regions. The other most significant finding of the study is the effect of transition to democracy. We find that democracy is very strongly associated with higher government respect for basic human rights. This is a significant finding for Africa as Rodrik (1998) opines that democratic institutions play important role in conflict management because it allows for differences to be settled amongst social groups to be resolved in an inclusive and participatory manner. The democracy results are robust and consistent across the board. While consistent with prominent past studies Poe & Tate (1994) and Poe, Tate & Keith (1999) we find that the incidence of civil war increases state repression. Likewise, the greater the years of civil peace the lower the incidence of human rights abuse. The coefficient value for civil war dummy is higher than peace years, suggesting that the risk of civil war is always detrimental to basic human rights. The results also demonstrate the negative impact of oil exports on human rights abuses in Africa. This result is consistent with the findings of Ross (2004) who argue that conflicts are vulnerable to increase in oil

exports dependency in developing countries. Since Africa as a continent is widely known to be resource rich and often conflicts are triggered due to fight for resources, these results perfectly hold true. With respect to legal heritage, we could not find any positive effects with respect to British legal heritage. The results of control variables are highly significant and consistent across all the models and are also free from the problem of multicollinearity (see annexure 4).

#### 4. 1. Marginal Effects of Globalization

To further analyze the quantitative importance of globalization on PTS, we calculate the marginal effects of all the globalization indices variables using the coefficients obtained in our models. The marginal effects help understand the impact of an independent variable would have on the dependent variable. In this case, the dependent variables are PTS index coded with the scale ranging from 1 to 5. This implies that for a given change in our ‘key independent variable’ the change in the odds of the highest value of the respective dependent variable.

**Graph 1**



Graph 1 shows how much an increase in the standardized value of all the statistically significant globalization variables in the models will increase the odds of an increased level of PTS for full sample and Sub-Saharan African countries. In graph 1, we notice that overall globalization has the greatest impact on government respect for human rights in Sub-Saharan African countries. We see that for one unit change in the level of main globalization index is leading to increase in odds of full PTS indices by 1.023 for Sub-Saharan African and 1.020 full countries respectively. With respect to economic globalization, it increases the odds of full respect for PTS by 1.010 for Sub-Saharan countries and 1.004 times for full sample African countries respectively. While, economic globalization effects are higher in Sub-Saharan African countries to full sample of African countries, it is other way round with respect to social globalization. The impact of social globalization index increasing the odds of PTS is 1.014 for all African countries to 1.009 times for Sub-Saharan Africa countries respectively. Finally, the odds of PTS increase equally by 1.012 times for both sample respectively for a unit change in political globalization. The interesting point noteworthy here is that the impact of economic globalization is marginally higher in the case of Sub-Saharan African countries than Social and political globalization.

#### **4. 2. Robustness Check**

We ran several tests of sensitivity. First, we ran all the results again by replacing our human rights indicator – PTS with PTS scores of both Amnesty international and U.S. State Department. The results show that globalization and its disaggregated components lead to increase in government respect for PTS coded either by Amnesty International and U.S. State department<sup>7</sup>. We find that all the three sub indices of globalization have a significant positive impact on both the dependent variables. Finally, we also replace our original PTS variable with civil and political liberties indices of freedom house as they deal with political and civil rights in general. We compute the average of civil liberties and political freedom scores and replace it with PTS. The results show that globalization improves civil and political rights in African countries.

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<sup>7</sup> Results not shown here due to brevity, but would be provided upon request.

## 5. Conclusion

The association between globalization and human rights in Africa is not only interesting but is also most litigious topic in domain of political economy. On the one hand, the neoliberal perspective argues that globalization is important as it leads to growth and development which creates much needed job opportunities in Africa, improving poor socioeconomic conditions. This leads to civil peace in the society paving way for government respect for basic human rights. On the other hand, the skeptics contend that globalization leads to scaremongering as it always benefits the affluent class ignoring the grievances of the majority poor and deprived sections in the society. It creates uneven development and progress thereby further widening the gap between 'haves and have nots'. As a result the poor and deprived sections of the society finds themselves increasingly alienated. They perceive the globalization as a major threat to their very existence leading to dissent against government. This often takes the form of domestic violence and conflicts, allowing governments to resort to repressive measures. But the linkage between the two seems to be empirically underdeveloped. Though considerable amount of attention is devoted on this topic in the recent past, nonetheless there are seldom studies which have captured and quantified the comprehensive process of globalization. Most studies on the topic, have concentrated on estimating the effects of single variables, such as trade and FDI, as proxies for the spread of globalization. This study uses a comprehensive measure and its components disaggregated into economic, social, and political globalization on the level of human rights in Africa.

Using pooled cross section time series data for 33 African countries during the period 1981 – 2005, we find that contrary to the dependency school of thought, globalization leads to increase in government respect for basic human rights viz., political terror scale. By gauging overall effects of globalization on human rights, we find that economic; social and political globalization has significant positive impact on human rights performance. Moreover, the interesting findings of this study are that the results remain robust and consistent when we test the same for 28 Sub-Saharan African countries. The table 3 summarizes our findings:

**Table 3: Summary of our findings**

| Variables of Interest   | Hypothesis                                    | Results obtained in our study |                        |
|-------------------------|---|-------------------------------|------------------------|
|                         |   | PTS<br>(Full Sample)          | PTS<br>(SSA Countries) |
| Economic Globalization  | Increases government respect for human rights | +                             | +                      |
| Social Globalization    | Increases government respect for human rights | +                             | +                      |
| Political Globalization | Increases government respect for human rights | +                             | +                      |
| Overall Globalization   | Increases government respect for human rights | +                             | +                      |

**Note:** + is support for hypothesis

As seen in the table 3 we find positive relationship between the disaggregates of globalization and government respect for basic human rights for full sample as well as for Sub-Saharan African countries. These results confirm the need to consider globalization not just as a single component, economic globalization, but rather as a multifaceted concept by including social and political dimensions. The results obtained in our study are the most comprehensive till date. This is because of obvious important reasons: first, contrary to other studies in the literature on quantifying globalization process, we adapt Dreher's globalization index which takes into account all the three components of globalization namely, economic, social and political. This apart, the economic globalization index which we consider captures economic variables as well as trade and investment restrictions, which is missing in the previous studies that often use only economic variables or single or bi-dimensional economic variables. Second, this relationship is tested against basic human rights for Africa and Sub-Saharan African region. Thus, overall our results do not find support for any of the dependency theorists' arguments on the negative effects of globalization in African countries.

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## Annexures

### Annexure 1: Countries under Study

|                            |               |              |
|----------------------------|---------------|--------------|
| Algeria                    | Gabon         | Nigeria      |
| Benin                      | Ghana         | Rwanda       |
| Botswana                   | Guinea-Bissau | Senegal      |
| Burundi                    | Kenya         | Sierra Leone |
| Cameroon                   | Madagascar    | South Africa |
| Central African Republic   | Malawi        | Tanzania     |
| Chad                       | Mali          | Togo         |
| Congo, Democratic Republic | Mauritius     | Tunisia      |
| Congo, Republic            | Morocco       | Uganda       |
| Cote d'Ivoire              | Namibia       | Zambia       |
| Egypt                      | Niger         | Zimbabwe     |

### Annexure 2: Data Sources

| Indicators                       | Data Sources   |
|----------------------------------|--|
| All Globalization indices        | <a href="http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/">http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/</a>  |
| PTS index                        | ( <a href="http://www.politicalterroryscale.org">http:// www.politicalterroryscale.org</a> )   |
| Economic Growth Rate             | World Development Indicators – 2007, <a href="http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI">http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI</a>   |
| Log (Economic Development)       | World Development Indicators – 2007, <a href="http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI">http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI</a>   |
| Log (Population)                 | World Development Indicators – 2007, <a href="http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI">http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/WDI</a>   |
| Political Regime                 | Polity IV, ( <a href="http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html">http://www.colorado.edu/IBS/GAD/spacetime/data/Polity.html</a> )               |
| Civil War Presence               | Gleditsch Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand (2002)   |
| Number of Peace Years            | Gleditsch Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand (2002)   |
| Ethnic Fractionalization         | Fearon & Laitin (2003); (online): <a href="http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/">http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/</a>  |
| British/Socialist Legal Heritage | La Porta et al. (1998):<br><a href="http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/">http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/rafael.laporta/</a> |
| Oil Exports Dependency           | Fearon & Laitin (2003): <a href="http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/">http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/</a>  |

### Annexure 3: Descriptive Statistics

| Variables                | Mean     | Median   | Maximum   | Minimum | Standard Deviation | Total Observations | No. of Countries |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|-----------|---------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------|
| Globalization            | 34.620   | 34.760   | 63.027    | 13.961  | 10.037             | 825                | 33               |
| Economic Globalization   | 38.022   | 37.472   | 76.651    | 9.394   | 13.684             | 750                | 30               |
| Social Globalization     | 27.245   | 25.693   | 60.125    | 9.427   | 9.238              | 800                | 32               |
| Political Globalization  | 40.719   | 37.869   | 94.227    | 3.108   | 21.930             | 825                | 33               |
| Political Terror Scale   | 2.804    | 2.500    | 5.000     | 1.000   | 0.972              | 825                | 33               |
| Percapita GDP            | 2337.773 | 1246.073 | 11311.910 | 140.839 | 2354.502           | 825                | 33               |
| GDP growth rate          | 3.115    | 3.756    | 103.930   | -50.248 | 6.609              | 825                | 33               |
| Population               | 16217552 | 9325053  | 132000000 | 730507  | 20327128           | 825                | 33               |
| Democracy                | -1.815   | -4.000   | 10.000    | -9.000  | 5.898              | 825                | 33               |
| Civil war                | 0.194    | 0.000    | 1.000     | 0.000   | 0.396              | 825                | 33               |
| No. of Peace Years       | 15.570   | 15.000   | 47.000    | 0.000   | 13.088             | 825                | 33               |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.633    | 0.706    | 0.925     | 0.036   | 0.262              | 825                | 33               |
| British Legal Heritage   | 0.364    | 0.000    | 1.000     | 0.000   | 0.481              | 825                | 33               |
| Oil exports share        | 0.159    | 0.000    | 1.000     | 0.000   | 0.366              | 825                | 33               |

### Annexure 4: Correlation Matrix

|                          | Globalization | Percapita GDP | GDP growth rate          | Population             | Democracy         |
|--------------------------|---------------|---------------|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Globalization            | 1.00          |               |                          |                        |                   |
| Percapita GDP            | 0.53          | 1.00          |                          |                        |                   |
| GDP growth rate          | 0.15          | 0.15          | 1.00                     |                        |                   |
| Population               | 0.30          | -0.16         | 0.00                     | 1.00                   |                   |
| Democracy                | 0.30          | 0.25          | 0.17                     | -0.25                  | 1.00              |
| Civil war                | -0.18         | -0.08         | -0.07                    | 0.11                   | -0.10             |
| No. of Peace Years       | 0.07          | -0.11         | -0.01                    | -0.05                  | 0.14              |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 0.13          | -0.18         | 0.01                     | 0.09                   | 0.09              |
| British Legal Heritage   | 0.24          | -0.04         | 0.04                     | 0.13                   | 0.15              |
| Oil exports share        | 0.20          | 0.15          | -0.01                    | 0.44                   | -0.17             |
|                          | Civil war     | Peace Years   | Ethnic Fractionalization | British Legal Heritage | Oil exports share |
| Civil war                | 1.00          |               |                          |                        |                   |
| No. of Peace Years       | -0.37         | 1.00          |                          |                        |                   |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | -0.02         | -0.01         | 1.00                     |                        |                   |
| British Legal Heritage   | -0.10         | 0.03          | 0.43                     | 1.00                   |                   |
| Oil exports share        | 0.07          | 0.02          | -0.09                    | -0.08                  | 1.00              |