Chisari, Omar O. and Lambardi, Germán D. and Romero, Carlos A. (2007): Choosing the extent of private participation in public services: A computable general equilibrium perspective.
Download (297kB) | Preview
What determines the propensity to reduce or widen the extent of public ownership? Why has there been a tendency to privatise and concede public utilities during the nineties? The answers to these questions depend both on macroeconomic and microeconomic considerations. And correct answers could also help to avoid or prevent inefficient reversals and frustrations that jeopardize reform processes. An alternative perspective, that combines micro and macro arguments, is given by general equilibrium models. The objective of this paper is to explore the rationality of the decision of choosing the implicit “technologies” of private and public operators of utilities in an economy that has fiscal budget and trade balance in equilibrium. The simulations confirm that the choice of the technology to be used for servicing infrastructure depends on deep parameters of efficiency and costs. The model shows that there are plausible scenarios where the selection is not unique.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Choosing the extent of private participation in public services: A computable general equilibrium perspective|
|English Title:||Choosing the extent of private participation in public services: A computable general equilibrium perspective|
|Keywords:||Computable General Equilibrium; Trade balance; public services|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling > C68 - Computable General Equilibrium Models
F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F32 - Current Account Adjustment; Short-Term Capital Movements
L - Industrial Organization > L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities > L97 - Utilities: General
|Depositing User:||Carlos Adrián Romero|
|Date Deposited:||23. May 2009 17:50|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 05:10|
Chisari O., A. Estache and C. Romero (1999), “Winners and Losers of Privatizations and Regulation of Utilities: Lesson from a General Equilibrium Model of Argentina,” The World Bank Economic Review 13:2, pp.357-378.
Chisari, O., A. Estache, G. Lambardi y C. Romero (2003), “Trade performance and regulatory regimes,” Anales de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, November
Dierker E., R. Guesnerie and W. Neuefeind (1985), “General Equilibrium When Some Firms Follow Special Rules,” Econometrica 53:6, pp.1369-1393
Esfahani H. and A. Ardakani (2004), “What Determines the Extent of Public Ownership?” University of Illinois and University of Manchester conference on “Regulation of Development and the Development of Regulation,” Illinois. Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance.
Ginsburgh V. and M. Keyzer (1997), The Structure of Applied General Equilibrium Models, (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press).
Shoven J. and J. Whalley (1973), “General Equilibrium with Taxes: A Computational Procedure and an Existence Proof”, The Review of Economic Studies 40:4, pp. 475-489.