Gaudeul, Alexia (2009): A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students.
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Those lecture notes cover the basics of a course in microeconomic theory for MSc students in Economics. They were developed over five years of teaching MSc Economic Theory I in the School of Economics at the University of East Anglia in Norwich, UK. The lectures differ from the standard fare in their emphasis on utility theory and its alternatives.
The programme of this course is divided in three parts; choice under uncertainty, game theory and incentive theory. The whole of the course can be covered in sixteen hours of teaching, along with eight hours of workshops, over eight weeks.
This is an intensive program that is designed both to cover the basics in each area and progress quickly to more advanced topics. The course is thus accessible to students with little background in economics, but should also challenge more advanced students who can focus on the later sections in each parts and concentrate on the suggested readings.
Exercises covering each part increase gradually in difficulty and are often of theoretical interest on their own. Detailed answers are provided.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||A (micro) course in microeconomic theory for MSc students|
|Keywords:||Economics; Microeconomics; Utility Theory; Game Theory; Incentive Theory; Online Textbook; Lecture Notes; Study Guide; MSc|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D0 - General
A - General Economics and Teaching > A1 - General Economics
A - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economics Education and Teaching of Economics > A23 - Graduate
|Depositing User:||Alexia Gaudeul|
|Date Deposited:||25. May 2009 09:54|
|Last Modified:||11. Feb 2013 18:14|
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