Jung, Hanjoon Michael (2009): Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative.

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Abstract
We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general finiteperiod games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games that allow a continuum of types and strategies. The CSE is always a Nash equilibrium and is equivalent to the SE in finite games. So, the CSE is a complete solution concept in the general games as a version of the SE. The WCSE is a weak, but simple version of the CSE. It is also a complete solution concept and functions as an alternative solution concept to the CSE. Their relation with converted versions of the perfect equilibrium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium are discussed
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative 
English Title:  Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Complete Belief, Complete Sequential Equilibirum, Finiteperiod game, Solution Concept, Sequential Convergency, Sequential Equilibrium. 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  15443 
Depositing User:  Hanjoon Michael Jung 
Date Deposited:  04. Jun 2009 06:20 
Last Modified:  12. Feb 2013 20:38 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/15443 