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Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative

Jung, Hanjoon Michael (2009): Complete Sequential Equilibrium and Its Alternative.

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Abstract

We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution concept (WCSE) for general finite-period games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium (SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general games that allow a continuum of types and strategies. The CSE is always a Nash equilibrium and is equivalent to the SE in finite games. So, the CSE is a complete solution concept in the general games as a version of the SE. The WCSE is a weak, but simple version of the CSE. It is also a complete solution concept and functions as an alternative solution concept to the CSE. Their relation with converted versions of the perfect equilibrium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium are discussed

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