Siddiqi, Hammad (2009): Information Transmission and Micro-structure rents in Emerging Markets.
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This paper offers a first ever theoretical study of a unique financing instrument associated with prominent emerging equity markets in South Asia. The instrument known as badla, in local parlance, has two interesting aspects, which have been ignored thus far. Firstly, it may serve as an information transmission mechanism and can be thought of as an institutional response to information gaps in the emerging markets. Secondly, it creates new types of rents, called “market microstructure” rents for certain market players. These rents are then exploited to gain control of the governing boards of equity markets. Consequently, institutional inertia is created which hinders the badly needed reform process.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Information Transmission and Micro-structure rents in Emerging Markets|
|Keywords:||Information transmission; Signaling; Microstructure rents; Linked games; Institutional inertia|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior > K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General
G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G10 - General
|Depositing User:||Hammad Siddiqi|
|Date Deposited:||01. Jun 2009 07:03|
|Last Modified:||21. Feb 2013 03:32|
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