Kammas, Pantelis (2009): Strategic fiscal interaction among OECD countries.
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This paper investigates whether OECD countries compete with each other for mobile factors by using various fiscal (tax-spending) policy instruments. We use a panel dataset of 20 OECD countries over the 1982-2000 period. There is evidence that international capital inflows (FDI) are affected by fiscal policy at home and abroad. Also, there is evidence of fiscal competition for mobile factors which takes place via capital tax rates. More precisely, we find that domestic capital tax rates react: (i) positively to changes in capital tax rates and (ii) negatively to changes in public investment spending in neighbouring countries. In contrast, evidence of such a strategic interdependence over public investment spending decisions is not established.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Strategic fiscal interaction among OECD countries|
|Keywords:||capital mobility; tax competition; welfare|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
H - Public Economics > H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
|Depositing User:||Pantelis Kammas|
|Date Deposited:||22. Jun 2009 01:20|
|Last Modified:||14. Feb 2013 12:47|
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