Haggard, Stephan and Noland, Marcus (2009): The political economy of North Korea: implications for denuclearization and proliferation.
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Despite North Korea’s turn away from economic reform and the constraints of the second nuclear crisis, the country has in fact become more economically open. But it has emphasized closer economic relations with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let alone sanctions. Yet the US can still exercise economic leverage by going aggressively after third-party financial intermediaries. This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral coordination, since foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a strong interest in avoiding institutions that the United States Treasury has identified as money-laundering or proliferation concerns.
There is some evidence that North Korea moderated its missile proliferation activities during periods when rapprochement with the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, was a priority, but in the absence of such interest and as legitimate trade, investment, and aid dry up, the incentives to intensify proliferation activities increase.
The internal organization of the North Korean economy has important implications for any policy seeking transformation via engagement. The economy is structured in such a way that outside economic ties are still largely monopolized by state-owned enterprises and other gatekeepers, such as the military. Under such circumstances, the precise design of engagement policies requires very close scrutiny. Even nominally commercial relations can be exploited if the North Korean counterparties believe that they are ultimately political in nature, subsidized and thus vulnerable to blackmail. If economic ties are truly commercial in nature, those choosing to trade and invest with North Korea do so at their own risk. Under these circumstances, private actors will make economic decisions fully factoring in political risk, and North Korea will bear the costs if it chooses to renege on commitments or fails to provide a supportive policy environment.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The political economy of North Korea: implications for denuclearization and proliferation|
|Keywords:||North Korea, sanctions, transition|
|Subjects:||P - Economic Systems > P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions > P33 - International Trade, Finance, Investment, Business, and Aid
F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy
F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
|Depositing User:||Marcus Noland|
|Date Deposited:||26. Jun 2009 06:14|
|Last Modified:||11. Feb 2013 10:42|
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