Guccio, Calogero and Pignataro, Giacomo and Rizzo, Ilde (2009): The performance of local government in the execution of public works.
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This paper aims at analysing the procurement of public works paying attention to the level of government involved. Such an issue has not received so far attention in the literature on fiscal federalism nor in the public works procurement literature. We focus the attention upon the execution stage of public works: indeed, their efficient provision and their capability to deliver the planned benefits are severely affected by the problems arising at the execution stage because of the incompleteness of the underlying contract. The main result is that local governments seem to be less efficient in the management of the execution process, suffering from longer delays than central government. This phenomenon is more severe for small municipalities and when the contract is mainly financed with external resources.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The performance of local government in the execution of public works|
|English Title:||The performance of local government in the execution of public works|
|Keywords:||public procurement; local government; soft budget|
|Subjects:||H - Public Economics > H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies > H57 - Procurement
H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations > H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
H - Public Economics > H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations > H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
|Depositing User:||Calogero Guccio|
|Date Deposited:||07. Jul 2009 17:32|
|Last Modified:||16. Feb 2013 02:18|
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