Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Pay What You Like

Fernandez, Jose and Nahata, Babu (2009): Pay What You Like.

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Abstract

We show that when a seller of a di¤erentiated good o¤ers the product allowing consumers an option to pay what they like, then all consumers will never free ride in equilibrium when their valuations of the good are positive, and, under certain conditions, all will consumers would pay. Further, for the seller this pricing could be more pro�table than uniform pricing. If consumers consider the social cost of free riding, or not paying a "fair" price, then our results show that consumers, rather than free riding, may not opt for this option. Instead, they prefer to purchase the good at the market price from a price-setting firm.

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