A Comparison among the director networks in the main listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Santella, Paolo and Drago, Carlo and Polo, Andrea and Gagliardi, Enrico (2009): A Comparison among the director networks in the main listed companies in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the literature on director interlocks by illustrating and analysing the interlocking directorships among the Italian, French, German, UK and US listed Blue Chips. The comparison of the five countries considered shows that two national models stand out. On the one hand a model made of a high number of companies linked to each other through a small number of shared directors who serve on several company boards at the time (France, Germany, and Italy). On the other hand, in the UK much fewer companies are connected to each other essentially through directors who have no more than two board positions at the time. A case in between is represented by the US, where a high number of companies are connected to each other just like Germany, France, and Italy. However, just like the UK, such connections are made through directors who tend to have just two board positions at the time, a sign that, differently from Italy, Germany, and France, the UK and US networks might not be functional to systemic collusion.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corporate governance, interlocking directorships, antitrust, competition, social network analysis (SNA), exploratory data analysis (EDA), empirical corporate finance
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0 - General; G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M2 - Business Economics; L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General; L - Industrial Organization > L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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