Munich Personal RePEc Archive

A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model

Steinbacher, Matej and Steinbacher, Matjaz and Steinbacher, Mitja (2009): A Repeated Game Heterogeneous-Agent Wage-Posting Model.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_16706.pdf

Download (213Kb) | Preview

Abstract

In the paper, we simulate a heterogeneous-agent version of the wage-posting model as derived by Montgomery (1991) with homogeneous workers and differently-productive employers. Wage policy of particular employer is positively correlated with employer’s productivity level and the wage policy of the competitor. However, it is a less productive employer whose wage posting could also outweigh the posting of a more productive employer, though only temporarily.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.