Hamanaka, Shingo (2008): Inequality and Authoritarianism in the Developing Countries. Published in: International Political Economy , Vol. 22, (31. November 2008): pp. 57-74.
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This research attempts a theoretical and quantitative analysis of authoritarian regimes enduring in the developing countries. We attempt computer visualization of the model developed by Acemoglu and Robinson in order to derive an empirical hypothesis easily. There is a reason for us to accept the model that they build on the principle of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium. The numerical simulation describes a causal relationship between national income sharing and regime change, and delineates the economic impact of regime transformations. The random effects ordered probit analysis of panel data provides evidence that supports the hypothesis from the simulation. This result contributes to empirical democratization studies because of non adherence to a positive relationship between inequality and democracy among quantitative researches. According to The Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, the poor have no incentive for regime transformation and authoritarian regimes are preserved in a state of equilibrium in comparatively equal societies.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Inequality and Authoritarianism in the Developing Countries|
|Keywords:||Dictatorship, Acemoglu and Robinson Model, Democratization, Computer Simulation, Panel Data Analysis|
|Subjects:||N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation > N45 - Asia including Middle East
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C2 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables > C23 - Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables > C35 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D58 - Computable and Other Applied General Equilibrium Models
D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Shingo Hamanaka|
|Date Deposited:||15. Aug 2009 07:14|
|Last Modified:||20. Feb 2013 01:54|
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