Heller, Yuval (2009): Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games.
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Abstract
We define a new solution concept for an undiscounted dynamic game  a perfect uniform normalform constantexpectation correlated approximate equilibrium with a canonical and universal correlation device. This equilibrium has the following appealing properties: (1) “Tremblinghand” perfectness  players do not use noncredible threats; (2) Uniformness  it is an approximate equilibrium in any long enough finitehorizon game and in any discounted game with a high enough discount factor; (3) Normalform correlation  The strategy of a player depends on a private signal he receives before the game starts (which can be induced by “cheaptalk” among the players); (4) Constant expectation  The expected payoff of each player almost does not change when he receives his signal; (5) Universal correlation device  the device does not depend on the specific parameters of the game. (6) Canonical  each signal is equivalent to a strategy. We demonstrate the use of this equilibrium by proving its existence in every undiscounted multiplayer stopping game.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  stochastic games, stopping games, correlated equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, Ramsey Theorem. 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73  Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games 
Item ID:  17228 
Depositing User:  Yuval Heller 
Date Deposited:  11. Sep 2009 06:37 
Last Modified:  13. Feb 2013 02:55 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/17228 
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Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games. (deposited 12. Jun 2009 03:09)
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