Jellal, Mohamed (2009): A Theory of Educational Inequality Family and Agency Costs.
This is the latest version of this item.
Download (339Kb) | Preview
In this paper, we examine the consequences of imperfect information on the pattern of transfers from parents to children. Drawing on the theory of mechanism design, we consider a model of family contract with two levels of effort. We prove that equal transfers among children are expected under perfect information, while the second-best contract implies risksharing between the two generations, so that poor families experience higher agency costs..
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||A Theory of Educational Inequality Family and Agency Costs|
|Keywords:||Education; Asymmetric Information; Family Financial Incentives; Inequality|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
A - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economics Education and Teaching of Economics
D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
|Depositing User:||Mohamed Jellal|
|Date Deposited:||22. Sep 2009 10:28|
|Last Modified:||19. Feb 2013 00:04|
Altonji, J.G., F. Hayashi and L.J. Kotlikoff (1997), Parental altruism and inter vivos transfers:Theory and evidence , Journal of Political Economy 105:1121-66.
Altonji, J.G., F. Hayashi and L.J. Kotliko (2000), The effects of income and wealth on time and money transfers between parents and children , in: A. Mason and G. Tapinos, eds., Sharing the Wealth (Oxford University Press, New York) 306-357.
Arrondel, L. and A. Masson (2003), Altruism, exchange or indirect reciprocity: What do the data on family transfers show ?, in S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, eds., Handbook on The Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism (North-Holland, Elsevier).
Barnet-Verzat, C. and F.C. Wolff (2002), Motives for pocket money allowances and family Incentives , Journal of Economic Psychology 23:339-366.
Barnet-Verzat, C. and F.C. Wolff (2003),Labor opportunities against family intergenerational exchange, Economics Bulletin 10:1-7.
Becker, G.S. (1974), A theory of social interactions , Journal of Political Economy 82:1063-1093.
Becker, G.S. (1991), A Treatise on The Family (Harvard University Press, Cambridge).
Bernheim, B.D., A. Shleifer and L.H. Summers (1985), The strategic bequest motive, Journal of Political Economy 93:1045-1076.
Bisin, A. and T. Verdier (2001), The economics of cultural transmission and the dynamics of Preferences , Journal of Economic Theory 97:298-19.
Chamberlain, G. (1980), Analysis of covariance with qualitative data , Review of Economic Studies 47:225-238.
Chami, R. (1996), King Lear's dilemma : Precommitment versus the last word_, Economics Letters 52:171-176.
Chami, R. (1998), Private income transfers and market incentives , Economica 65:557-580.
Chwe M., (1990), Why were workers whipped ? Pain in a principal-agent model_, Economic Journal 100:1109-1121.
Cox, D. (1987), Motives for private income transfers, Journal of Political Economy 95:508-46.
Cox, D. (1990), Intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104:187-218.
Cox, D. and G. Jakubson (1995), The connection between public and private interfamily transfers , Journal of Public Economics 57:129-167.
Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (1996), Bequests as a heir discipline device, Journal of Population Economics 9:405-414.
Ermisch, J.F. and P. Di Salvo (1997), The economic determinants of young people's household formation , Economica 64:627-644.
Feinerman, E. and E.J. Seiler (2002), Private transfers with incomplete information : A contribution to the altruism-exchange motivation for transfers debate , Journal of Population Economics 15:715-736.
Fernandes, A. (2000), Altruism with endogenous labor supply, Mimeographed, CEMFI Working Paper.
Furnham, A. (1999), The saving and spending habits of young people , Journal of Economic Psychology 20:677-697.
Furnham, A. (2001), Parental attitudes to pocket money allowances for children, Journal of Economic Psychology 22:397-422.
Gatti, R. (2000), Family altruism and incentives Mimeographed , World Bank.
Jellal, M. and F.C. Wolff (2003), Leaving home as a self-selection device , Economica 70,423-438 .
Laferrère, A. and F.C. Wolff (2003), Microeconomic models of family transfers , in S.C.Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, eds., Handbook on The Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism (North-Holland, Elsevier).
Lin, C.C. and C.C. Lai (1996), Why parents and teachers may prefer punishment to encouragement for child education ?, Southern Economic Journal 63:244- 247.
Lindbeck, A. and S. Nyberg (2001), Raising children to work hard: Altruism, work norms and social insurance, Mimeographed, Stockholm University.
Lundholm, M. and H. Ohlsson (2000), Post mortem reputation, compensatory gifts and equal bequests , Economics Letters 68:165-171.
McGarry K., (1999), Inter vivos transfers and intended bequests, Journal of Public Economics 73:321-351.
Schoeni, R.F. (1997), Private inter household transfers of money and time : New empirical evidence, Review of Income and Wealth 43:423-448.
Villanueva, E. (2001), Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence,Mimeographed, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Weinberg, B.A. (2001), An incentive model of the effect of parental income on children,Journal of Political Economy 109:266-280.
Wilhelm, M.O. (1996), Bequest behavior and the effect of heir's earnings : Testing the altruistic model of bequests, American Economic Review 86:874-892.
Available Versions of this Item
- A Theory of Educational Inequality Family and Agency Costs. (deposited 22. Sep 2009 10:28) [Currently Displayed]