Kou, Zonglai and Zhou, Min (2009): Multi-Tasking vs. Screening: A Model of Academic Tenure.
This is the latest version of this item.
Download (178kB) | Preview
The paper develops a model of academic tenure based on multi-tasking and screening. A professor has two tasks, researching and teaching. We assume that researching performance is easy to measure but teaching performance is immeasurable. Then Holmtrom and Milgrom's (1991) classical muli-task principal-agent model implies that the only way for the the university to "incentivize" teaching activity is decreasing the incentive power to researching activity. This justifies the low-powered contract to tenured professors. However, with low-powered contract, the university will face serious informational problem in the process of enrollment, either transferring rents to the candidates with low ability if the wage level is high, or suffering from the potential occupational vacancy if the wage level is low. To this dilemma, the up-or-out contract is a possible solution.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Multi-Tasking vs. Screening: A Model of Academic Tenure|
|Keywords:||Multi-tasking, Screening, Academic Tenure, Up-or-Out Contract|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J41 - Labor Contracts
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J4 - Particular Labor Markets > J44 - Professional Labor Markets; Occupational Licensing
M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M55 - Labor Contracting Devices
|Depositing User:||Zonglai Kou|
|Date Deposited:||06. Oct 2009 09:11|
|Last Modified:||22. Feb 2013 11:56|
Working paper, CCES, Fudan University
Available Versions of this Item
- Multi-Tasking vs. Screening: A Model of Academic Tenure. (deposited 06. Oct 2009 09:11) [Currently Displayed]