Jellal, Mohamed (2009): Family Institution and Filial Attention Contract.
This is the latest version of this item.
Download (338Kb) | Preview
In this paper, we examine the pure exchange motive for intergenerational transfers within the family. We consider a model where a selfish parent offers a financial transfer in exchange for the services of the child. Using a Stackelberg game, we study the optimal attention-money contract between the generations. We prove that the amount of gift received may be either positively or negatively related with the child's income. In addition, the relationship between the two variables is non linear and affected by the parent's degree of risk aversion. This nonlinearity, which has been largely neglected to date in empirical analyses, may explain why the exchange transfer motive has received little support in developed countries.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Family Institution and Filial Attention Contract|
|Keywords:||Family;Filial Attention; Care;intergenerational Transfers; Incentives|
|Subjects:||J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J10 - General
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J19 - Other
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
|Depositing User:||Mohamed Jellal|
|Date Deposited:||08. Oct 2009 01:09|
|Last Modified:||17. Feb 2013 08:28|
Altonji J.G., Hayashi F., Kotlikoff L.J., (1997), “Parental altruism and inter vivos transfers: Theory and evidence ”, Journal of Political Economy 105, 1121-1166.
Altonji J.G., Hayashi F., Kotlikoff L.J., (2000), “The effects of income and wealth on time and money transfers between parents and children”, in Mason A., Tapinos G., eds., Sharing the Wealth, Oxford University Press, New York, 306-357.
Barro R.J., (1974), “Are government bonds net wealth ?”, Journal of Political Economy 82,1095-1117.
Becker G.S., (1991), A treatise on the family, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Becker G.S., Murphy K.M., (1988) ,“The family and the state ”, Journal of Law and Economics 31, 1-18.
Bernheim B.D., Shleifer A., Summers L.H., (1985), “The strategic bequest motive”, Journal of Political Economy 93, 1045-1076.
Cigno A., (1993), “Intergenerational transfers without altruism : Family, market and State”,European Journal of Political Economy 9, 505-518.
Cigno A., (2002), “The political economy of intergenerational transfer", in Kolm S.C.,Mercier-Ythier J., Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, North-Holland, Elsevier.
Cox D., (1987), “Motives for private income transfers”, Journal of Political Economy 95,508-546.
Cox D., (1990), “Intergenerational transfers and liquidity constraints”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 187-218.
Cox D., (1996), “Comment on James Davies : Explaining intergenerational transfers”, in Menchik P.L., ed., Household and Family Economics, Kluwer Academic, Boston, 83-90.
Cox D., Eser Z., Jimenez E., (1998), “Motives for private transfers over the life cycle. An analytical framework and evidence for Peru”, Journal of Development Economics 55, 55-79.
Cox D., Hansen B.E., Jimenez E., (2000), How responsive are private transfers to income ? Evidence from a laissez-faire economy”, Mimeo, Boston College.
Cox D., Jakubson G., (1995), “The connection between public transfers and private interfamily transfers”, Journal of Public Economics 57, 129-167.
Cox D., Rank M.R., (1992), “Inter vivos transfers and intergenerational exchange ”, Review of Economics and Statistics 74, 305-314.
Hiedemann B., Stern S., (1999), “ Strategic play among family members when making longterm care decisions ”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 40, 29-57.
Laferrère A., (1999), “Intergenerational transmission models: A survey”, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 24, 2-26.
Laferrère A., Wol_ F.C., (2002), “Microeconomic models of family transfer", in Kolm S.C.,Mercier-Ythier J., Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, North- Holland, Elsevier
McGarry K., (2000), “Testing parental altruism implications of a dynamic model”, NBER Working Paper, 7593.
Sloan F.A., Picone G., Hoerger T.J., (1997), “The supply of children's time to disabled elderly Parents”, Economic Inquiry 35, 295-308.
Stark O., Falk I., (1998), “Transfers, empathy formation, and reverse transfers” American Economic Review 88, 271-276.
Wolff F.C., (2001), “Private intergenerational contact in France and the demonstration effect” , Applied Economics 33, 143-153.
Available Versions of this Item
- Family Institution and Filial Attention Contract. (deposited 08. Oct 2009 01:09) [Currently Displayed]