Hubert, Franz and Ikonnikova, Svetlana (2009): Investment Options and Bargaining Power the Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas.
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We use cooperative game theory to analyze how the architecture of the pipeline network determines the power structure in the supply chain for Russian gas. If the assessment is narrowly focused on the abilities to obstruct flows in the existing system, the main transit countries, Belarus and Ukraine, appear to be strong. If investment options are accounted for, however, Russia achieves clear dominance. We show that options to bypass one of the transit countries are of little strategic importance compared to Russia's direct access to its customers through the Baltic Sea. Comparing the results of our calibrated model with empirical evidence obtained from transit and import agreements we find that the Shapley value explains the power of major transit countries better than the core and the nucleolus.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Investment Options and Bargaining Power the Eurasian Supply Chain for Natural Gas|
|Keywords:||Bargaining Power, Supply Chain, Shapley Value, Gas Transport|
|Subjects:||F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy > F50 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games
F - International Economics > F5 - International Relations and International Political Economy > F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
|Depositing User:||Svetlana Ikonnikova|
|Date Deposited:||16. Oct 2009 06:46|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 12:42|
Stern, Jonathan P (1995), The Russian gas bubble, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.