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Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications

Pedro, de Mendonça (2009): Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications. Unpublished.

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Abstract

Based on recent proposals on non cooperative dynamic games for analysing climate negotiation outcomes, such as Dutta and Radner (2004, 2006a), we generalize a specific framework for modelling differential games of this type and describe the set of conditions for the existence of closed loop dynamics and its relation to adaptive evolutionary dynamics. We then show that the Dutta and Radner (2004, 2006a) discrete time dynamic setup is a specific case of that generalization and describe the dynamics both analytically and numerically for closed loop feedback and perfect state patterns. Our discussion is completed with the introduction of a cooperative differential framework for welfare analysis purposes, within our non cooperative proposal for climate negotiations.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Language:English
Keywords:Differential Game Theory, Environmental Economics, Evolutionary Dynamics, Climate Change Treaties
Subjects:Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics > Q5 - Environmental Economics > Q56 - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounting; Environmental Equity
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming > C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
ID Code:17889
Deposited By:Gui Pedro de Mendonça
Deposited On:16. Oct 2009 09:04
Last Modified:19. Oct 2009 10:21
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