A Corrigendum to "Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time"

Hashimoto, Tadashi (2007): A Corrigendum to "Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time".

Abstract

Sannikov (2007) investigates properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of Lemma 6, required for the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2), contains an error in computing a Hessian matrix. A correct proof of Lemma 6 is provided using an additional innocuous assumption and a generalized version of Lemma 5.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Institution: The University of Tokyo
• Language: English
• Keywords: repeated games; continuous time
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

References

He, S., J. Wang and J. Yan (1992): Semimartingale Theory and Stochastic Calculus, Science Press, CRC Press Inc.

A. Korn and M. Korn (1968): Mathematical Handbook for Scientists and Engineers. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Sannikov, Y. (2007): ``Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time," Econometrica, 75, 1285-1329.