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Spreading Academic Pay over Nine or Twelve Months: Economists Are Supposed to Know Better, but Do They Act Better?

Claar, Victor V and Diestl, Christine M and Poll, Ross D (2009): Spreading Academic Pay over Nine or Twelve Months: Economists Are Supposed to Know Better, but Do They Act Better?

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Abstract

Our paper empirically considers two general hypotheses related to the literature of behavioral economics. First, we test the null hypothesis that individuals behave, on average, in a manner more consistent with the rational expectations hypothesis than with the idea of self-control in the face of hyperbolic discounting in their saving decisions. Second, along a variety of dimensions, we examine whether individuals exhibit Herbert Simon’s notion that the goal formation of individuals will differ depending upon their relative levels of experience and knowledge. Perhaps there are significant differences among groups in their saving decisions that depend upon their apparent levels of intelligence, education, and knowledge. Finally, using a variety of individual-specific control variables, we test for robustness of the results.

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  • Spreading Academic Pay over Nine or Twelve Months: Economists Are Supposed to Know Better, but Do They Act Better? (deposited 04. Nov 2009 18:52) [Currently Displayed]
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