Heifetz, Aviad and Meier, Martin and Schipper, Burkhard C. (2009): Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior.
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We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. We apply prudent rationalizability to the analysis of verifiable communication with unawareness. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior|
|Keywords:||Unawareness; extensive-form games; extensive-form rationalizability; prudent rationalizability; iterative conditional dominance|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Burkhard C Schipper|
|Date Deposited:||09. Nov 2009 01:49|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 22:26|
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Dynamic Unawareness and Rationalizable Behavior. (deposited 07. May 2009 00:25)
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