Cotton, Christopher (2007): Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.
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A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about his private valuation over time (as he has more time to consider using the item), and (2) there is a positive probability he is unable to return to the auction to submit a bid in a later period.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations.|
|Keywords:||auction; multiple bidding; eBay; value discovery|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D44 - Auctions
|Depositing User:||Christopher Cotton|
|Date Deposited:||20. Feb 2007|
|Last Modified:||19. Feb 2013 01:47|
Bajari, Patrick and Ali Hortacsu (2003), ”Winner’s Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics, Summer 2003, pp. 329-355.
Ockenfels, Axel and Alvin E. Roth (2006), ”Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an Auction.” Games and Economic Behavior, 55, pp 297-320.
Rasmusen, Eric Bennett (2006), ”Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One’s Own Private Value in Auctions.” Advances in Theoretical Economics, 6(1), Article 7.
Roth, Alvin E. and Axel Ockenfels (2002), ”Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet,” The American Economic Review, 92, pp 1093-1103.
Vickrey, William (1961), ”Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance, 16, pp 8-37.
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