On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining

Corchon, Luis and Ritzberger, Klaus (1992): On the Non-Cooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining.

Abstract

In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the analyst.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Subgame Perfection Rubinstein Game
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games

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