Corchon, Luis and Ritzberger, Klaus (1992): On the NonCooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining.

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Abstract
In this note we challenge the noncooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching a frictionless world is not robusto We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informationaL requirements on the analyst.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  On the NonCooperative Foundations of Cooperative Bargaining 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Subgame Perfection Rubinstein Game 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78  Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71  Cooperative Games C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  18461 
Depositing User:  Luis C. Corchon 
Date Deposited:  08. Nov 2009 06:34 
Last Modified:  18. Feb 2013 01:04 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/18461 