Constitutional Design and Political Communication

Xefteris, Dimitrios (2009): Constitutional Design and Political Communication. Unpublished.

Abstract

This paper models the constitutional design process, and points out the importance of political communication (defined as the level of information about the social distribution of policy preferences that individuals hold, at the time of this process) on the "extent" of "democratic restraints" of the socially preferred constitution and on the welfare derived by the society from its implementation. The results demonstrate that the level of political communication has a positive effect on the level of democracy of the socially preferred constitution and on social welfare. Moreover, it is proved that, even if there exist no tolerance for dictatorship by societies in general, the level of democracy demanded by the society, reaches the maximum possible level, only if political communication is "perfect". That is, the socially preferred constitution in cases of "imperfect" political communication incorporates both dictatorial and democratic elements.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: constitution, political communication, democracy
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; K - Law and Economics > K0 - General > K00 - General; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D60 - General

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