Balkenborg, Dieter and Kaplan, Todd R. and Miller, Tim (2009): Teaching Bank Runs with Classroom Experiments.
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Once relegated to cinema or history lectures, bank runs have become a modern phenomenon that captures the interest of students. We use a simple classroom experiment based upon the Diamond-Dybvig Model (1983) to demonstrate how a bank run, a seemingly irrational event, can occur rationally. We then present possible topics for discussion including various ways to prevent bank runs and moral hazard.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Teaching Bank Runs with Classroom Experiments|
|Keywords:||bank runs; multiple equilibria|
|Subjects:||A - General Economics and Teaching > A2 - Economics Education and Teaching of Economics > A22 - Undergraduate
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
|Depositing User:||Todd R Kaplan|
|Date Deposited:||15. Nov 2009 15:16|
|Last Modified:||11. Feb 2013 22:54|
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