Pelosse, Yohan (2009): Mediated Contests and Strategic Foundations for Contest Success Functions.

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Abstract
This paper examines the foundations of arbitrary contest success functions (CSFs) in two distinct types of contests – unmediated and mediated contests. In an unmediated contest, CSFs arise as the (interim) players’ equilibrium beliefs of a twostage game – the gunbutter game – in which players choose an activity (appropriative vs. productive) in the first stage, and apply effort to their activity in the second stage. In this view a CSF is rationalizable if a contest is induced on the equilibrium path of the gunbutter game. In the second approach, a CSF is the result of the optimal design of an administrator. Here, the designer seeks to maximize his utility by implementing a probability distribution on the set of contestants. However, he is curbed by a disutility term which represents the underlying institutional constraints or the designer’s preferences. Both approaches provide foundations for arbitrary CSFs with no restrictions on the number of contestants.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Mediated Contests and Strategic Foundations for Contest Success Functions 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Induced contests; Gunbutter game; Control costs 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  18664 
Depositing User:  Yohan Pelosse 
Date Deposited:  16. Nov 2009 15:18 
Last Modified:  02. Mar 2013 04:34 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/18664 