Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Managerial discretion, incentives and governance rules for non-profit organizations

Antonelli, Maria Alessandra (2003): Managerial discretion, incentives and governance rules for non-profit organizations. Published in: Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice , Vol. 21, No. 1 (2003): pp. 47-62.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_18849.pdf

Download (218Kb) | Preview

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effects of managerial discretion and some possible solutions in non-profit sector. It is shown how the traditional incentives’ mechanisms are modified in a non-profit setting. In particular, market, reputational and ideological incentives are considered. The analysis highlights that new governance rules are necessary. In this context a new financial model is analyzed where the competition between for-profit and non-profit firms is extended from the products level to that of private financing.

UB_LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.