Antonelli, Maria Alessandra (2003): Managerial discretion, incentives and governance rules for non-profit organizations. Published in: Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice , Vol. 21, No. 1 (2003): pp. 47-62.
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This paper analyzes the effects of managerial discretion and some possible solutions in non-profit sector. It is shown how the traditional incentives’ mechanisms are modified in a non-profit setting. In particular, market, reputational and ideological incentives are considered. The analysis highlights that new governance rules are necessary. In this context a new financial model is analyzed where the competition between for-profit and non-profit firms is extended from the products level to that of private financing.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Managerial discretion, incentives and governance rules for non-profit organizations|
|English Title:||Managerial discretion, incentives and governance rules for non-profit organizations|
|Keywords:||non-profit; managerial discretion; incentives, governance rules|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L30 - General
L - Industrial Organization > L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise > L31 - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs
|Depositing User:||Maria Alessandra Antonelli|
|Date Deposited:||24. Nov 2009 23:54|
|Last Modified:||07. Jan 2014 19:23|
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