Roy Chowdhury, Prabal (2009): Land Acquisition: Fragmentation, Political Intervention and Holdout.
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This paper provides a theory of holdout based on the landowners' inability to manage large sums of money and consequent lack of consumption smoothing in case of sale. We find that under some reasonable conditions fragmentation increases holdout and moreover, this happens if and only if large landowners are relatively more willing to sale. Turning to the effects of politicization, we find that voice coupled with collective bargaining increases efficiency provided fragmentation is severe. Further, whether there is political intervention or not depends on the political maturity of the landowners, i.e. if they already have voice or not.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Land Acquisition: Fragmentation, Political Intervention and Holdout|
|Keywords:||Land acquisition; holdout; fragmentation; politics; voice; collective bargaining.|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities
|Depositing User:||Prabal Roy Chowdhury|
|Date Deposited:||03. Dec 2009 05:44|
|Last Modified:||12. Feb 2013 17:07|
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