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On the neutrality of redistribution in a general equilibrium model with public goods

Villanacci, Antonio and Zenginobuz, Unal (2001): On the neutrality of redistribution in a general equilibrium model with public goods. Forthcoming in: Journal of Public Economic Theory

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Abstract

Models on private provision of public goods typically involve a single private good and linear production technology for the public good. We study a model with several private goods and non-linear (strictly concave) production technology. We revisit the question of “neutrality” of government interventions on equilibrium outcomes and show that relative price effects that are absent with a single private good and linear production technology become a powerful channel of redistribution in this case. Contrary to previous results, redistributing endowments in favor of contributors is shown to be neither necessary nor sufficient for increasing the equilibrium level of public good.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Language:English
Keywords:public goods; private provision; neutrality results; general equilibrium
Subjects:D - Microeconomics > D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium > D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods
ID Code:190
Deposited By:Unal Zenginobuz
Deposited On:07. Oct 2006
Last Modified:25. Jul 2011 16:22
References:

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