The Political Economy of Immigration Policy

Facchini, Giovanni and Mayda, Anna Maria

Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Aziendali e Statistiche, Universita' degli Studi di Milano, Department of Economics and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University

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Giovanni Facchini is Professor at the Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Aziendali e Statistiche, Universita' degli Studi di Milano. E-mail: giovanni.facchini@unimi.it.

Anna Maria Mayda is Professor at the Department of Economics and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. E-mail: amm223@georgetown.edu.

Comments should be addressed by email to the author(s).

Abstract

We analyze a newly available dataset of migration policy decisions reported by governments to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs between 1976 and 2007. We find evidence indicating that most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining the status quo or at lowering the level of migration. We also document variation in migration policy over time and across countries of different regions and income levels. Finally, we examine patterns in various aspects of destination countries' migration policies (policies towards family reunification, temporary vs. permanent migration, high-skilled migration). This analysis leads us to investigate the determinants of migration policy in a destination country. We develop a political economy framework in which voter attitudes represent a key component. We survey the literature on the determinants of public opinion towards immigrants and examine the link between these attitudes and governments' policy decisions. While we find evidence broadly consistent with the median voter model, we conclude that this framework is not sufficient to understand actual migration policies. We discuss evidence which suggests that interest-groups dynamics may play a very important role.

Keywords: immigration, immigration policy, median voter, interest groups, political economy

1. Introduction

As it has been pointed out by many observers (Freeman 2006, Pritchett 2006) we are experiencing a wave of globalization that involves everything but labor. Capital flows have increased dramatically in the past decades, trade is becoming more and more important as a share of world GDP, but as of today only slightly less than three per cent of the world population lives in a country different from the one in which it was born. Every year, international migration flows involve on average only one in 600 individuals (United Nations).

What explains the modest size of observed flows of people across borders? The income gap between sending and receiving countries is still substantial, whereas transportation and communication costs have declined rapidly in the past few decades. Thus, supply side considerations would seem to imply – if anything – an increase in the flow of migrants. It follows that the most likely driver of the limited flows is to be found on the demand side, and it is represented by the migration policies implemented by the receiving countries.

The first goal of this paper is to carry out a survey of the existing literature on the political economy of migration policy. In particular, we review studies of individual attitudes towards migration as well as political economy frameworks – such as the median-voter and the interest-groups models – which have been developed to link attitudes to actual migration policy.

The second goal is to provide a characterization of the restrictiveness of policies towards migration reported by governments to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs between 1976 and 2007. We find evidence that most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining the status quo or at lowering the level of migration. We also document variation in migration policy over time and across countries of different regions and income levels. Finally, we examine patterns in different aspects of destination countries' migration policies (policies towards family reunification, temporary vs. permanent migration, high-skilled migration).

Next, we merge the information contained in this dataset with cross-country data on individual attitudes towards immigrants. We use data on public opinion from the International Social Survey Programme, National Identity Module, for the years 1995 and 2003, and from the World Value Survey, for the years 1995-97. The merged datasets allow us to investigate whether – within a median voter framework (Benhabib 1996, Ortega 2005, Facchini and Testa 2008) –

voters' migration attitudes are consistent with migration policy decisions as reported by governments.

Our answer is yes, but only in part. Given the very low fractions of voters in favor of increasing the number of immigrants in the majority of destination countries, restrictive migration policies are broadly consistent with a median voter framework. We also find that in countries where the median voter and, in general, public opinion are more favorable to migration, governments' policies tend to be more open. In other words, there exists a positive correlation between actual migration policy and public opinion across countries. This evidence suggests that policy makers take public opinion into account as they formulate policy decisions, which is in line with the predictions of the median voter model.

However, given the extent of opposition to migration revealed by voters' attitudes in the majority of destination countries, it is a puzzle that migration is allowed to take place at all. We document a "public opinion gap", i.e. a gap between very restrictionist public opinion on one side, and more open stated policy goals on the other. We conclude the paper by discussing alternative analytical frameworks – in particular, the interest groups model (Facchini and Willmann, 2005) – which help reconcile the evidence on attitudes with the patterns of migration policy decisions. Work in the literature suggests that many interest groups are pro-migration – for example, native workers who are complemented by foreign immigrants and capital owners (Facchini and Mayda 2008, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra, 2008). The activities of these groups can explain the public opinion gap.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature, while section 3 describes both the individual level and country level data we are using. Section 4 presents evidence on the median voter model and discusses the results in the literature on the interest groups model, while section 5 concludes.

2. Literature Review

How do migration policies come about? In developing our analysis, we will review the explanations that have been proposed in the economics literature, while referring the interested reader to Joppke (1998), Money (1997), Freeman G. (1992) and Freeman G. (1995) for important contributions in the political science field.

A useful conceptual scheme to analyze the migration policy formation process - which is based on Rodrik (1995)[1] - is illustrated in Figure 1. The basic idea is that the formulation of migration policies involves at least four elements. First, policy making necessarily needs to take into account voters' individual preferences, and how these preferences are shaped by the inflows of foreign workers. Both economic and non-economic factors are likely to play a role in shaping public opinion (non-economic factors more so than in the context of trade policy). The second step is to map these preferences into a policy demand. Various channels have been suggested in the literature, ranging from pressure groups to grass-roots movements (Benhabib 1996, Facchini and Willmann 2005, Ortega 2005). On the supply side of migration policies, we need to identify the policy maker preferences, and finally, we need to understand the details of the institutional setting in which they are introduced.

Building upon this framework, we will review the existing literature. Our starting point is the analysis of drivers of individual attitudes towards immigration.

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[1] Rodrik (1995) uses the conceptual scheme in Figure 1 to analyze *trade* policy outcomes.

Figure 1: Determination of immigration policy

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│  │                        │        │ movements (B)          │   immigration│
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
2.1 What drives individual attitudes towards immigration?

A substantial body of literature has studied the effect of both economic and non economic factors on attitudes towards immigration. The overall message from these studies is that, whereas non economic drivers have an important and independent effect on individual preferences, economic characteristics of the respondents are shown to systematically shape attitudes towards international labor mobility.

The early contributions have mainly focused on individual countries like the United States (see for example Citrin et al. 1997; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Kessler 2001, Scheve and Slaughter 2001) and the United Kingdom (Dustmann and Preston 2001, 2004, 2007). More recently, cross country studies have taken advantage of newly available social surveys, which cover large samples of both advanced and developing countries (Chiswick and Hatton

2003, Mayda 2006, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2005, Facchini and Mayda 2007, 2008) and allow richer studies.

The analysis of the economic determinants of attitudes towards immigration focuses on the income distribution effects of the inflow of foreign workers. Most of the existing literature considers a highly stylized economy that is usually described by a simple factor proportions analysis or a two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin trade model. In both these frameworks, ignoring cases in which wages are not affected, the labor market effects of immigration depend on the skill composition of the migrants relative to the natives in the destination country. If immigrants are on average less skilled than the native population, their presence will hurt unskilled and benefit skilled natives. On the other hand, if immigrants are on average more skilled than natives, they will benefit the domestic unskilled, while hurting the skilled.

In an early influential study using the 1992 US National Election Study, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) analyze the labor-market drivers of attitudes towards immigration and find support for the theoretical predictions we have just discussed. In particular, in the United States, where immigrants are on average less skilled than natives, unskilled workers are more likely to oppose immigrants than skilled ones.

Using the 1995 round of the International Social Survey Panel and the 1995-1997 round of the World Value Survey, Mayda (2006) can fully exploit the predictions of the model by taking advantage of the different skill composition of migrants across countries. She finds strong evidence suggesting that individual skill is positively correlated with pro-immigration attitudes in countries where immigrants are on average unskilled, while it is negatively correlated with pro immigration attitudes in countries where migrants are on average more skilled than the native population.

The main OECD destination countries of immigrant flows are often characterized by large welfare states (Boeri, Hanson and McCormick 2002), in which the public sector redistributes a substantial fraction of national income across individuals. In these contexts, immigration has a non-negligible impact on public finances, since foreign workers both contribute to and benefit from the welfare state. The aggregate net effect of immigration on the welfare state is either positive or negative, depending on the socio-economic characteristics of immigrants relative to natives.

To understand how the welfare state shapes attitudes towards immigration, we follow Facchini and Mayda (2007) and consider a simple redistributive welfare state, characterized by a linear income tax and assume that revenues are lump-sum rebated to all citizens. In this model, an inflow of *unskilled* migrants (relative to natives) will make all natives worse off, by causing a given level of redistribution to become more costly. More specifically, if the welfare state adjusts through a change in the taxation level, in order to maintain the same level of per capita benefits (tax adjustment model), higher income individuals will be more negatively affected, as they are on the "contributing" end of the system. On the other hand, if the adjustment takes place through changes in the size of per capita benefits, in order to keep the same level of taxation (benefit adjustment model), lower income individuals will be the ones more adversely affected by immigration, as they are on the "receiving" end of the system. If, on the other hand, an inflow of *skilled* migrants takes place, all the above effects are reversed. All natives will gain with migration through the welfare-state channel. Under the tax adjustment model, higher-income individuals will be more positively affected than poor ones by the decrease in tax rates. Under the benefit adjustment model, lower-income individuals will be more positively affected than rich ones, given that the increase in per capita benefits is mostly relevant for this income category. Figures 1 and 2 (adapted from Facchini and Mayda 2008) represent the correlations between individual income and pro-migration attitudes implied by the tax adjustment model and the benefit adjustment model, respectively, when migration is unskilled (right panel) and skilled (left panel). Finally, besides the income distribution effects outlined above, an "efficiency" channel can be identified – since the destination economy as a whole will gain from international migration (the destination country's "migration surplus"). The efficiency channel is independent from the skill composition of migrants relative to natives and results in an increase in the tax base.

In their analysis of the variation in attitudes across US states, Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007) implicitly assume the tax adjustment model to hold. They find evidence that the positive correlation between pro-immigration attitudes and education – driven by the labor market – becomes smaller in absolute value and even negative in US states where the fiscal exposure to immigration is high. This evidence provides empirical support for the tax adjustment model, since education and income tend to be positively correlated at the individual level.

Using two surveys covering a large sample of advanced countries, and information on both the characteristics of the immigrant population and of the destination country's welfare state, Facchini and Mayda (2007) also find evidence consistent with the tax adjustment model. In countries where natives are on average more skilled than immigrants, individual income is negatively correlated with pro-immigration preferences, while individual skill is positively correlated with them. These relationships have the opposite signs in economies characterized by skilled migration (relative to the native population). Thus, their results suggest that the very same skilled and high income German businessman may feel ambivalent regarding the arrival of unskilled immigrants since he might benefit from hiring them (labor market complementarity) but be hurt by paying their way through the welfare state. The authors confirm these results when they exploit international differences in the characteristics of the destination countries' welfare state.

Which economic channel matters most in shaping attitudes? Focusing on a group of advanced countries, Dustmann and Preston (2007) show that welfare state determinants are more important than the two other economic channels (labor-market competition and efficiency considerations) in shaping immigration preferences.

Until now we have focused on economic determinants of attitudes towards immigrants. Besides this set of drivers, Scheve and Slaughter (2001), Mayda (2006) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2005) also consider factors such as the perceived crime and cultural impact of immigration, racism, sciovinsm etc, although these factors are not the main focus of their analysis. A recent work investigates, instead, the role played by media exposure in shaping migration preferences (Facchini, Mayda and Puglisi 2009). This paper uses the CCES survey, which took place before the 2006 US midterm elections, and analyses the link between attitudes towards two alternative migration reform proposals – being discussed at the time in the House and in the Senate – and the evening news program watched by the respondent. Controlling for ideology, income and education, Facchini, Mayda and Puglisi (2009) find that individuals watching Fox News are 16% more likely to oppose the more lenient Senate plan, which allows a path to citizenship for illegal migrants. The paper finds a weaker effect, but in the same direction, for CNN viewers. Finally, compared to the other networks, individuals preferring PBS are more likely to support the Senate plan.

To conclude, data on public opinion allows us to investigate voters' perceptions towards different aspects of globalization. The existing cross-country evidence on migration preferences suggests that individuals are on average remarkably averse to more open migration policies. For instance, on average across 22 industrialized countries, in 1995 only 7.4% of the population favoured a more open migration policy. Similarly, in 2003, this figure was still only 10.9%. On the other hand, individuals seem to be much warmer towards another facet of globalization, i.e. international trade. In fact, using the same dataset, Mayda (2008) finds that in 1995, 23% of the respondents favoured a more open trade regime. What explains this difference?

From the point of view of a standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade, the labor market effect of an inflow of unskilled workers through migration or an inflow of unskilled labor services embodied in unskilled labor intensive goods should be very similar. However, if not all goods are traded and factors are not perfectly mobile across sectors (i.e., if a short-run horizon is assumed), this result does not necessarily hold.

Mayda (2008), for instance, focuses on the role of traded versus non traded sectors. She finds evidence of one important source of the difference between trade and migration opinion: the cleavage in trade preferences, absent in immigration attitudes, between individuals working in traded as opposed to non-traded sectors. In other words, working in a non-traded sector increases the likelihood of being pro-trade, while it does not affect migration attitudes: Workers in non-traded sectors feel shielded from foreign competition working through trade but not from the increased labor-market competition brought about by immigration. These results are intuitive, since immigrants can work in both traded and non-traded sectors, while trade liberalization does not directly affect incomes in non-traded sectors.

An alternative explanation of the different perception of trade and migration focuses on public finance considerations: migrants both contribute to and benefit from the welfare state, while traded goods do neither. This channel has been explored by Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007) who, for the United States, identify the welfare state as an important driver of the gap between trade and migration preferences. However, their argument is a good explanation of differences in attitudinal responses only if immigrants are perceived as a net burden for the destination country's welfare state, as in the US. This might not be true in other contexts, for example, if the skill composition of immigrants relative to natives is high. Facchini and Mayda

(2007) find that, if the latter condition holds, individual attitudes are consistent with a perception of immigrants as net contributors to the welfare state.

Another explanation, which has not been pursued formally so far, focuses on the difference in the size of the impact of non-economic factors. While it is true that trade creates social tensions through the pressure it exerts towards "arbitrage in national norms and social institutions" (Rodrik 1997, p.29), the societal and cultural effects of immigration can be expected to be much more direct. Finally, another way to understand the preference gap is by realizing that immigrants or their children can acquire citizenship and, therefore, affect the destination country's political balance across different groups (Ortega 2005). To the extent that natives do not favour this influence of outsiders on their political life, this channel can provide another explanation of the difference in public opinion on trade vs. migration.

2.2 From individual preferences to migration policy

Individual preferences are aggregated and become political demands thanks to the working of grass-root movements, political parties and/or interest groups (box B in Figure 1). This process of aggregation is clearly affected by how severe the collective action problem is for certain groups, which in turn is affected by several factors, for example the geographic concentration of members of a group.

On the supply side of migration policy, government preferences play an important role (box C). Do officials care only about aggregate welfare, i.e. do they just wish to maximize society's well being? Do they care only about being re-elected? Are their choices driven by ideological considerations? Do they care more about the demands of specific groups within society – i.e. do they intend to use migration policy as a tool to transfer resources to a specific group?

Finally, the institutional structure of the government, i.e. whether for instance the electoral system is majoritarian or proportional, or more specifically which body is in charge of setting migration policy plays an important role (box D).

These three dimensions of the policy making process are modelled together by the existing literature, and the detail to which they are analyzed, varies substantially. While quite a bit of attention has been dedicated to the process through which individual preferences are

aggregated, the policy makers preferences are modelled in a very reduced form fashion, and almost no attention is paid to the details of the institutional setting in which migration policy is set. This is an important shortcoming, as the destination countries vary substantially in their political institutions. In the remainder of this section, we will review the two main frameworks which have been proposed by the literature, the median voter framework and the pressure group model, and assess their empirical performance.

2.2.1 The median voter model

What is the migration policy chosen by a stylized democracy? In a very elegant paper, Benhabib (1996) considers the human (physical) capital requirements that would be imposed on potential immigrants by an income-maximizing polity under majority voting. Output is modeled using a constant returns to scale production function combining labor with human (or physical) capital. Each individual is endowed with labor and capital, and the distribution of the latter in both the native and (potential) immigrant populations are known. Benhabib shows that the policy that will defeat any other in a binary contest is the one in which the median voter chooses to admit individuals who supply a set of factors that are complementary to her own endowment. This implies that, if the median voter is unskilled, she will choose the policy that guarantees the highest possible ex-post average level of human capital. To achieve this objective, she will set a lower bound on the skill level of the immigrants, and only foreigners with a level of human (or physical) capital above that threshold will be admitted. On the other hand, if the median voter is highly educated, she will choose the policy that minimizes the ex-post average human capital level in society, by setting an upper bound on the skill level of the immigrants, and thus admitting only individuals with low levels of education.

While this model importantly highlights the role of complementarities between domestic and foreign production factors in shaping migration policy, and provides an intuitive characterization of the policy choices, it presents two important shortcomings. First of all, due to the constant returns to scale assumption, the optimal policy does not identify the actual size of the optimal inflow. It only identifies the skill composition of the flow of migrants. This is clearly at odds with the policies followed by countries all around the world. The second – practical – difficulty is that in case of a skilled median voter it is going to be very difficult to enforce a

policy that sets an upper bound to the skill level of an individual to be admitted by a country. How can a potential migrant with a high level of education be forced to report his academic achievements in order to give up the possibility to immigrate in a given country?

To deal with the first limitation of the model, one possibility is to consider a production structure where returns to scale are decreasing in the mobile factors. An alternative solution has been proposed by Ortega (2005). In a dynamic extension of Benhabib's model the author explores the tradeoff between the short run economic impact of immigration and its medium to long run political effect. In particular, while immigration affects only the labor market in the current period, in the future it also influences the political balance of the destination country, as the descendants of migrants gain the right to vote. As a result, on the one hand, skilled natives prefer an immigration policy that admits unskilled foreign workers since, due to complementarities in production, this policy will increase the skilled wage. On the other, the arrival of unskilled immigrants and the persistence of skill levels across generations can give rise to a situation in which unskilled workers gain the political majority and, therefore, vote for policies that benefit them as a group. Thus, through the political channel, skilled natives prefer an immigration policy that admits skilled foreign workers. The interplay between these two forces allows Ortega to characterize under which conditions an equilibrium migration quota might arise, i.e. to derive a prediction in terms of the size of the migration inflows.

2.2.2 The pressure group model

While the median voter model is a useful framework to understand the process of aggregation of individual preferences into migration policy, it is hardly able to capture the complexity of the political process in modern democratic societies. In particular, there is substantial anecdotal evidence suggesting that interest groups representing specific subsets of society have been very actively involved in shaping policy towards immigration. For instance, in the United States – at least until very recently – labor unions have played an active role in limiting the inflows of foreign workers (Briggs 2001, Watts 2002). This was true already for the enactment of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act, which was strongly supported by the newborn Federation of Organized Trade and Labor Unions, and labor unions have played an important

role in supporting other immigration restricting pieces of legislation, like the 1917 Literacy test provision (Goldin 1994) and, more recently, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act.

At the same time, there is ample evidence on the role played by pro immigrant lobbies, representing the business sector, in shaping migration policy. For example, already in the discussion that surrounded the introduction of the Literacy Test provision of 1917, lobby groups representing capital owners were actively engaged in trying to block the measure (Goldin 1994). More recently, during the boom of the late nineties, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs trooped in front of Congress asking for an increase in the number of H1B visas for highly skilled professionals, and warning of a looming Y2K disaster if the large number of foreign engineers and computer scientists they requested was not allowed to enter the country (Goldsborough 2000). Similarly, in 2005 Senator Barbara Mikulski from Maryland obtained the creation of a new visa category – the H2R visas – as a result of intensive lobbying by the seafood industry of her home state, which had not been allowed to hire any temporary worker under the existing H2B visa category that year. Interestingly, this pattern is common across many destination countries. For instance, in August 2006, at the peak of the debate in the UK on whether to put a cap on migration from Bulgaria and Romania once the two countries become members of the European Union, the Business for New Europe group (BNE) issued a statement saying that "...the UK should continue with its open door policy."[2]

To formally study the role played by pressure groups in shaping policy towards international factor mobility Facchini and Willmann (2005) develop a simple theoretical model, which is based upon the menu auction framework pioneered by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). In their setting, policy is determined as the result of the interaction between organized groups representing production factors, who maximize the net welfare of their members, and an elected politician who - in determining policy - trades off aggregate welfare vis a vis political contribution. Using a one-good multiple factors framework, Facchini and Willmann (2005) find that policies depend on both whether a production factor is represented or not by a lobby and on the degree of substitutability/complementarity between domestic and imported factors. In particular, they show first of all that a non-organized factor will not be able to influence the policy determination process. Secondly, an organized factor will instead be effective in reducing

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[2] This is a UK based pressure group. The heads of the supermarket chain Sainsburys and the head of the European division of investment bank Merrill Lynch were among the signatories.

the inflow of a substitute, while it will increase the inflow of a complement. Thus, this model is able to rationalize both the intense lobbying activities recently carried out for instance by the healthcare providers in the United States, which resulted in the introduction of the new H1C visa category in 1999, and the fierce opposition of the union representing local nurses (Facchini, Mayda and Mishra 2008).

2.2.3 Empirical analysis

Our empirical understanding of the demand side of immigration is still limited. A growing body of the literature presents a series of very interesting *historical* accounts of the political economy of immigration restrictions between the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX century (Goldin 1994, Timmer and Williamson 1996). Goldin's (1994) classic work on the introduction of the Literacy test provision has highlighted the role played by both the AFL and the Knight of Labor in supporting this measure. Timmer and Williamson (1996) have instead taken a cross-country perspective and documented both the pervasiveness of policy intervention to shape migration flows towards both North and South American countries, and the drivers of those policies. In particular, they have pointed out the role played by active business lobby groups in subsidizing migration in labor scarce regions, like in the case of the coffee grower lobby of Sao Paolo state in Brazil at the end of the XIX- beginning of the XX century.

However, there are only few papers that have looked at what drives *current* policies. In an interesting contribution, Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) focus on U.S. border enforcement and show that enforcement softens when sectors using illegal immigrants expand. The authors suggest that sectors that benefit greatly from lower border enforcement lobby politicians on the issue, while sectors that benefit modestly are less politically active.

In a more recent paper, Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2008) take a more systematic perspective and look at the impact of targeted lobbying activity by both pro and anti-immigration pressure groups on the allocation of work and related visas in the United States in the period 2001-2005. Using data on lobbying expenditure on immigration policy, which have become recently available, they find not only that interest groups play a statistically significant role in shaping policy, but more importantly that their activities have substantial economic effects. They

estimate that a 10 per cent increase in lobbying expenditures by business groups in a given sector leads on average to a 2.3-7.4 per cent increase in the number of work visas allocated to that sector. Similarly, a 10 percent increase in labor union density translates into a 2.6-10.4 percent decrease in the number of visas issued to that sector.

3. Patterns of opinions towards immigration

In this section, we document patterns of attitudes towards immigration. We start by focusing on two large individual level datasets which cover a broad cross section of countries, including advanced, middle income and less developed countries. Next, we explore government views and policies surveyed by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, between 1976 and 2007, and examine how voters' attitudes are reflected in the policies which are reported to be in force.

3.1 Individual attitudes towards immigrants

Are natives in favour of or against an increase in migration to their countries? Are there differences in public opinion towards immigration across destination countries? We consider evidence from two sets of individual level surveys. The first is the National Identity module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (see also Mayda 2006 and Facchini and Mayda 2007), which has been carried out in 1995 and 2003 and covers a large sample of respondents from mainly advanced OECD and middle income countries (see Tables 1, 2 for summary statistics based on these surveys). The second is represented by the third wave of the World Value Survey (WVS), which was carried out in 1995-1997. The WVS data set includes more than 50,000 respondents based in 44 mostly developing countries (see Table 3 for summary statics based on this survey).

To construct measures of attitudes towards immigration from the ISSP survey, we use respondents' answers to the following question: "There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in (respondent's country). By "immigrants" we mean people who come to settle in (respondent's country). Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent's country) nowadays should be: (a) reduced a lot, (b) reduced a little, (c) remain the

same as it is, (d) increased a little, or (e) increased a lot"? The survey format also allows for "can't choose" and "not available" responses (which we treat as missing values and thus exclude from the sample in our specifications)

In 1995, in the sample of countries considered (see list in Table 1), individuals are on average very opposed to immigration: only 7.39% of individuals – who give an opinion on this issue – agree with the statement that the number of immigrants to their countries should be increased either a little or a lot. The average of the variable *Pro Immig Opinion* in the overall sample equals 2.13.[3] Finally, the median value of the same variable in the overall sample is equal to 2.

In addition, Column 9 in Table 1 clearly shows that there exists substantial variation across countries in terms of individual attitudes towards immigrants. In 1995, Canada and Ireland are the countries most favourable to migration (with, respectively, 20.61% and 19.10% of their population favouring an increase in the number of immigrants) while Latvia and Hungary are the most opposed (with, respectively, 0.45% and 1.48% of their population supporting higher migration). In general, most Central and Eastern European countries are characterized by very low percentages of voters favouring migration (Latvia, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic). Among Western European countries, Italy (3.55%) and Germany (2.54%) have the most hostile public opinion to immigration. Besides Ireland, Spain is the Western European country whose citizenry is most receptive towards migrants (8.44%). Finally, in the United States, 8.05% of the population welcomes increases in migration.

The 2003 data set, based on a larger sample of countries (see list of countries in Table 2), confirms that voters are indeed hostile to immigration on average: only 10.84% of individuals – who give an opinion about migration – in the overall sample of countries agrees that the number of immigrants should be increased either a little or a lot. The average of the variable *Pro Immig Opinion* in the overall sample equals 2.29. Finally, the median value of the same variable is, in the overall sample, again equal to 2.

Like in 1995, there are substantial differences in attitudes towards immigrants across countries in 2003. In particular, Column 9 in Table 2 shows that in Canada and Israel, respectively, 29.02% and 27.14% of the population favours an increase in the number of

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[3] *Pro Immig Opinion* uses answers to the immigration question and ranges from 1 (reduced a lot) to 5 (increased a lot).

immigrants, while in Hungary and Latvia these percentages are, respectively, equal to 2.18% and 2.60%. Among Western European countries, Portugal (3.09%), the Netherlands (3.72%) and Germany (4.06%) show the public opinion that is most hostile to immigration. Finland (24.10%) is the only Western European country among the top five most open countries towards migration. In the United States, 9.8% of individuals favours larger numbers of immigrants, which is a higher percentage than in 1995 (8.05%): this is remarkable given that the September 11 terrorist attacks took place in 2001, i.e. between the two surveys. In France, 7.37% of voters welcomes increases in migration.

The immigration question in the 1995 round of the WVS asks the following: "How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do? (a) Let anyone come who wants to? (b) Let people come as long as there are jobs available? (c) Place strict limits on the number of foreigners who can come here? (d) Prohibit people coming here from other countries? (e) Don't know." Summary statistics are reported in Table 3. To simplify the exposition, we have also constructed a *Pro Immig Opinion* variable which uses answers to the immigration question and ranges from 1 (prohibit) to 4 (let anyone).

As can be seen from Column 9 in Table 3, 53% of individuals who gave an opinion are in favour of "letting anyone come who wants to" or of "letting people in as long as there are jobs available". The average of the variable *Pro Immig Opinion* in the overall sample equals 2.53. Finally, the median value of the same variable in the overall sample is equal to 3.

Notice that the values of immigration attitudes in the WVS display much more favourable opinions towards migration than the ISSP dataset. This can be due in part to the different wording of the question. However, the most important reason for this difference is likely to be the different coverage of countries in the two samples. While the ISSP dataset mostly covers middle and high income countries – and therefore is representative of the most important destinations of migration flows in the world – the WVS mostly covers low income countries, which may be more favourable to migration because they are at the same time immigration and emigration countries.

As in the case of the ISSP surveys, average data hide substantial differences in attitudes towards immigrants across countries. In particular, Column 8 in Table 3 shows that in Azerbaijan and Bosnia, respectively, 78% and 76% of the population favours an increase in the number of

immigrants, while in the Philippines and Macedonia these percentages are, respectively, equal to 25% and 32%.

3.2 Government views towards immigration

The 1974 World Population Conference held in Bucharest developed a World Population Plan of Action and called for a systematic monitoring of population policies across member countries. Data have been collected since the mid seventies and provide information on a broad range of issues.

Concerning immigration, two sets of questions have been asked. First, an effort has been carried out to elicit governments' views on the overall level of immigration. Second, information has been collected on government policies towards immigration, both at the aggregate level, as well as with respect to specific issues.

We start by considering government views. *View on immigration* is the government's view on the level of documented immigration into the country, including immigration for permanent settlement, temporary, high skilled work and family reunification. Government views towards asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are not reflected in this variable.[4] The variable can take three possible values: "too high", "satisfactory" and "too low". The summary statistics are reported in Table 4. As we can see, on average for the period considered (1976-2007) about 79% of the officials who have been interviewed have claimed to be satisfied with the current levels of immigration. 17% deem the immigration level too high, while only 5% share the view that immigration is too low (these percentages are broadly similar when we focus on Western European and North American countries, which represent the main destinations of migration flows – see Table A1). Thus overall governments' views appear to be more favorable to immigration than individual voters' attitudes. While this "public opinion gap" has been pointed out before in previous works (see, for example, Freeman 1992, Joppke 1998, Facchini and Mayda 2008), the UN dataset allows us to document it quantitatively for the first time in the literature.

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[4] Notice that this question does not focus on the desired *level* of immigration in the country, but rather on the change compared to the existing status quo. While the phrasing of the question is not ideal for the purpose of eliciting government preferences on the overall level of immigration, the wording chosen is very closed to the one used in the individual level surveys we have discussed in section 3.1.

This aggregate data hides a substantial degree of heterogeneity both over time and across country groups (see top and bottom panel of Table 4). Over time, between 1976 and 2007, the number of countries where immigration levels are perceived to be "too high" becomes almost three times as large. This is true even though the pattern is nonlinear: between 1976 and 1996 we observe a monotonic increase in the share of governments opposed to immigration while, between 1996 and 2007, a slight decline (from 21% to 17%). Consistent with that, the share of governments which perceive immigration levels as too low has declined from 7.3% to 5.6% between 1976 and 2007, but again the pattern is non-linear. In general, governments' views towards migration worsen between 1976 and 1996 and improve in the last decade.

It is also interesting to explore how views are affected by different levels of development. The bottom panel of Table 4 reports summary statistics according to income levels (we use the World Bank classification of high income, upper middle income, lower middle income and low income countries, as contained in the 2009 World Development Report). It is immediately evident that governments are more likely to perceive migration levels as too high, the higher is the per capita income level in the receiving country. Per capita GDP is thought to be a good proxy for the size of migration flows and the relative skill composition of the native vs. immigrant populations – i.e., richer countries receive on average larger flows and more unskilled immigrants relative to natives (Mayda 2006 and Mayda 2009). The summary statistics for governments' view are then consistent with evidence that larger flows of migrants and unskilled migrants are perceived less favourably by individual voters as well (Mayda 2006, Facchini and Mayda 2008).

Considering different regions of the World (Table A1 in the Appendix), it is interesting to notice that among the most important destinations, officials in the Gulf countries[5] are the most concerned with the current levels of immigration. On average, 46 percent of the respondents in Gulf countries believe immigration levels to be too high. By comparison, in Western Europe and North America, 29% and 27% of the officials respectively share the same view.

To conclude, the left panel of Table A4, documents the patterns in governments' opinion according to the human development index (HDI), distinguishing four groups of countries (low HDI, medium HDI, high HDI, very high HDI). The patterns we find are broadly comparable to those reported in Table 4.

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[5] Gulf countries include Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates.

3.3 Government policies towards immigration

Although a systematic, objective measurement of the restrictiveness of immigration policies does not exist on a cross-country comparable scale, the United Nations collect a wide range of information on government policies towards immigration through a survey of each country's government officials.[6] The survey questions cover not only the general policy, but also individual policy aspects.

Table 5 reports summary statistics on policies regarding the "overall level of immigration".[7] While 11% of the officials report that their country did not pursue an active migration policy, the majority of government officials appears to exhibit a strong status quo bias. On average, between 1976 and 2007, over 60% of the government respondents reports that their country has policies in place to keep immigration levels unchanged. On the other hand, 23% reports that their countries have actively pursued a reduction in immigration flows, while only 5% reports that their countries have tried to increase immigration levels. These summary statistics confirm the "public opinion gap" pointed out above: governments' policies are more liberal than individual voters' public opinion.

Once again, aggregate data hide substantial heterogeneity. Over time, the number of countries which have implemented policies geared towards lowering immigration flows has fluctuated widely. In 1976 less than 7% of the officials interviewed report policies aimed at reducing inflows, while in 1996 this number grows to over 40%. In 2007, this number shrinks to 19%, suggesting a growing acceptance of migration.

Across country groups, destinations with higher GDP per capita are more likely to report restrictive immigration policies in place (bottom panel of Table 5). This mirrors closely the findings on government views. Looking at geographic aggregates (Table A1 in the Appendix), the Gulf countries stand out as the group most actively pursuing policies aimed at reducing immigrant flows, with 50% of the officials interviewed characterizing policy in this way. Similarly, 46% of Western European officials also report policies in place to reduce foreign

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[6] See UN "World Population Policies", various issues.

[7] Notice that the question on governments' policy does not explicitly distinguish between stocks and flows of immigrants. Also, the contents of the question on governments' views and governments' policy are slightly different. In the former, issues related to asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are specifically excluded, while in the latter no such distinction is explicitly made.

workers arrivals, while the same is true for only 20% of their North American counterparts. Similar results are obtained if we use instead the HDI (right panel of Table A4).

Migration policy involves the use of a complex array of measures, and several important dimensions are considered in the data published by the UN. The first important distinction involves permanent vs. temporary migration, and both in 1996 and 2007 officials have been asked to state whether policy on permanent settlement (temporary workers) has been aimed at lowering, maintaining, increasing the current level or has involved no intervention at all (Tables 6, 7).

Overall, slightly over 20% of the respondents report no specific intervention on either dimension. Over 40% aim instead at maintaining the current levels of permanent/temporary settlements, while 28-30% try to lower these levels. Only 4-5% of the respondents report that their policies had actually the objective of increasing the overall number of migrants. Interestingly, comparing the two years for which we have data, we can see that the fraction of officials reporting policies in place to maintain the current levels of permanent and temporary migrants has substantially increased between 1996 and 2007, from 20-25% to 58-60%. This suggest once again growing acceptance of the phenomenon.

Looking across income groups (bottom panel of Tables 6, 7), we can notice how high GDP countries have a more interventionist stance (only 4-6% of the respondents report no intervention), and are on average more likely to have policies that are both aimed at reducing permanent settlements (43% vs. a sample average of 30%) and the number of temporary workers (37% vs. a sample average of 28%). Among the immigrant destinations, Gulf countries stand out once again as the most likely to have active policies in place to limit both temporary and permanent settlement (88% and 67% respectively) (Table A2 in the Appendix). North America is instead the region in which officials are more likely to be trying to raise the inflow of both temporary and permanent immigrants (17% and 14% respectively).

The main channels of entry of immigrants into a destination country are family reunification, work, and asylum seeker/political refugee. As selective policies have become more widespread, it is interesting to investigate the role played by the channel of entry – as it has been shown to have an important role in shaping the skill composition of the foreign population arriving in the country.[8] Officials have been asked whether governments have policies in place to

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[8] See for instance Boeri, Hanson and McCormick (2002), Borjas (1999).

raise/maintain/lower migration for *family reunification* or if they do not actively intervene in this policy area. Summary statistics are reported in Table 8. Interestingly, they suggests that less than 4% of the countries considered have policies in place to increase the number of immigrants arriving for the purpose of family reunification, while 16% are actively trying to make it harder to migrate taking advantage of this channel. Interestingly, it is important to notice that over time the acceptance of family reunification as a channel of entry has vastly increased. As reported by the OECD (2008), 44% of the new immigrants arrived in OECD countries in 2006 were admitted as family members, and in face of this development, government policies are becoming more accommodating. In fact, in 1996 only 27% of the officials reported efforts to maintain the current immigration levels through this channel, while 25% indicated that policy was trying to limit the inflows for the purpose of family reunification. In 2007, these figures had changed to 68% and 9% respectively.

As both theoretical models and the empirical evidence suggest, the skill composition of migrants compared to the native population is likely to be a key factor to understand the labor market impact of immigration. In the 2007 survey, a question has been introduced to assess the policies implemented towards highly skilled workers (Table 9). Officials in only five countries (Bhutan, Botswana, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) have reported that policies are in place to reduce the arrivals of this type of workers. Over 80% of the countries in the sample have instead policies in place to maintain or increase the number of skilled migrants arriving.

This finding is particularly interesting. From our previous discussion of the labor market effects of immigration, we expect that skilled migrants will be welcome in countries where skilled labor is the scarce factor (and therefore the median voter is likely to be unskilled), but it will not be viewed favourably in countries that are skilled labor abundant (i.e. countries where the median voter might be skilled). The results from the UN survey suggest instead that government policies are favourable to skilled migrants also in countries where skilled labor is "abundant". There are at least three possible explanations for this result. First, through the welfare state channel, every individual – both skilled and unskilled – prefers skilled migration to unskilled migration, since skilled (unskilled) migrants are likely to represent a net contribution (burden) for the destination country's welfare state. Secondly, high income countries might prefer highly skilled migrant workers for simple but intuitive political reasons. Natives might

realize that immigrants or their children will eventually become citizens and thus will be allowed to vote. If skill levels are persistent across generations – as the existing evidence suggests (Ortega 2005)- skilled native voters will favor (oppose) skilled (unskilled) migrants because the latter ones will tend to vote for policies that favor skilled (unskilled) individuals (Ortega 2005). Third, the cultural assimilation of highly skilled migration is easier than for low-skilled migrants and therefore countries of different income groups in general tend to prefer highly skilled migrants (Chiswick and Miller 2006). The results we obtain by grouping countries according to the HDI are very similar to the ones obtained when we consider a GDP based classification (see Tables A5, A6).

Finally, as the number of individuals living in foreign countries has rapidly grown in the past decades, it is important to assess whether destination countries are actively promoting the integration of immigrants. A question on this issue has been asked both in 1996 and 2007 (Tables 10, 11 and 12). On average, 54% of the officials interviewed report active integration policies to be in place, and this number has grown over time (from 44% in 1996 to 64% in 2007). Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of high income countries (82%) have policies in place for the integration of foreigners, while poorer countries appear to be less active in this policy area. This result is confirmed in Table A7, where we investigate the determinants of policies on the integration of non-citizens. While it appears at first that countries receiving higher immigrant inflows are the ones promoting integration policies (see columns (1) and (4)), it is the per capita GDP of the destination country which seems to drive this result. In other words, higher income countries (which are also the ones receiving larger immigrant inflows) are more likely to develop integration policies (see columns (2) and (5)). Finally, we find some evidence that countries characterized by less skilled immigrants are more likely to promote integration policies (see columns (3) and (6)).

4. Individual opinions and immigration policy

In a democratic society, voters' attitudes should be the basis of policy making. This idea is at the core of the median voter model according to which migration policy should be

correlated with the opinion of the median voter and, more in general, with public opinion.[9] We next evaluate whether these predictions are consistent with the data.

Our first piece of evidence are the summary statistics in Table 1 (ISSP 1995) and Table 2 (ISSP 2003). They show that voters across countries are, on average, very much opposed to immigration. According to the ISSP dataset, in 1995 less than 10% of individuals who express an opinion about migration would like the number of immigrants to increase. In 2003 the percentage is only slightly higher than 10%.[10] Given restrictive migration policies observed across destination countries, this evidence is indeed consistent with the median-voter framework.

Figures 3-5 and Tables 13-14 provide additional evidence which is consistent with the median-voter model. Figure 3 and the left hand panel of Table 13 use data on attitudes from the 1995 ISSP dataset. Figure 4 and Table 14 use data on attitudes from the 2003 ISSP dataset. Finally, Figure 5 and the right hand panel of Table 13 use data on attitudes from the 1995-1997 WVS. In these figures and tables, we show that migration policy across countries is positively correlated with the opinion of the median voter and, in general, public opinion across countries.[11]

In particular, we start by relating the opinion on immigration of the median voter in each country to the migration policy of that country, as reported by its government to the United Nations. We identify the median voter using the *Pro Immig Opinion* variable: we rank individuals in each country according to their *Pro Immig Opinion* value and we next select the individual who corresponds to the 50th percentile (the opinion of this individual – median *Pro Immig Opinion* – appears in column (8), Table 1, in column (8), Table 2 and in column (7), Table 3). We find that the two variables – the opinion on immigration of the median voter and the migration policy of each country – are positively correlated with each other, even though this result is not always statistically significant (the regression results appear in columns (1) and (4), Table 13 and column (1), Table 14).

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[9] From the literature on the determinants of individual attitudes, we know that in a country that receives unskilled migrants relative to natives, a voter (and therefore the median voter) will be pro migration the more skilled he is. On the other hand if immigration is skilled, a voter (and therefore the median voter) will favour less restrictive policies, the more unskilled he is.

[10] As mentioned before, the evidence in Table 3 (WVS 1995) shows more favourable opinions, however the survey question is worded differently and, most importantly, the sample in the WVS dataset covers mainly developing countries.

[11] See also Figures A1 and A2 and Table A8, which relate migration flows (divided by population) to attitudes and to migration policy, using the 1995 ISSP dataset.

Next, we carry out a set of robustness checks, considering the impact on the migration policy of each country of average attitudes towards immigrants (the average of the *Pro Immig Opinion* variable, which appears in column (7), Table 1, in column (7), Table 2, and in column (6), Table 3). Once again, the correlation is positive and almost always significant (the regression results appear in columns (2) and (5), Table 13 and column (2), Table 14). Finally, we look at the impact on migration policy of the fraction of voters, in each country, favourable to an increase in the number of immigrants (the average of the *Pro-Immig Dummy* variable, which appears in column (9), Table 1, in column (9), Table 2, and in column (8), Table 3). We find a positive and this time always significant correlation between the two variables (the regression results appear in columns (3) and (6), Table 13 and column (3), Table 14). The higher significance of the correlation between actual policy and voters preferences obtained using the opinion of the average rather than the median voter seems to suggest that the views of "extreme" groups play an important role in shaping policy measures. This suggests that the direct democracy model might be too simple to capture all the complexities of the political process. Finally, notice that these figures and tables treat the independent variable (attitudes) as given and exogenous. This assumption might be problematic. In particular, our estimates might be biased because of reverse causality: i.e., migration policy will impact migration inflows, which in turn may themselves affect attitudes. As a matter of fact, Mayda (2006) finds that, in countries with higher immigrant inflows, voters tend to be on average more opposed to immigration. Notice, however, that this reverse causality biases the coefficients in our tables and figures towards zero, thus it is not problematic for our results. Hence, Figures 3-5 and Tables 13-14 provide evidence which is broadly consistent with the median-voter framework.

This evidence is the first of its kind and complements our previous work (Facchini and Mayda 2008). In that paper, we have used an *indirect* measure of migration policy, i.e. net migration flows to each destination country. In this paper, on the other hand, we consider a *direct* measure of migration policy decisions, i.e. reports to the UN by government officials in each destination country. This represents a substantial improvement relative to our previous work since net migration flows are an equilibrium outcome, i.e. the result of the interaction between demand and supply factors. Instead, government officials' reports on immigration policy are a pure "demand" indicator. In addition, the UN dataset we use in this paper allows us to document

differences in migration policies across a much larger set of countries and over a longer period of time, spanning over three decades.

While the empirical evidence in this section is consistent with the median-voter model, it is clear that this framework is not sufficient to explain migration policy decisions. In the summary statistics section, we have documented a systematic gap between very restrictionist public opinion and more open government policies. What are the other factors which are relevant in shaping governments' migration policies and help explain the public opinion gap?

In Facchini and Mayda (2008) we investigate the impact of interest groups. We focus on the United States and use a panel covering the period 1995-2005. Differentiating labor according to both skill levels and occupation, we find systematic evidence suggesting that the lobbying activities of organized labor lead to an increase in the inflow of foreign workers in different occupation/education cells. This effect is likely to be driven by complementarity.[12] In addition, as mentioned above, Facchini Mayda and Mishra (2008) find even stronger evidence that pro-migration interest groups make policy more open to migration. The number of temporary work visas in a given sector is positively affected by the lobbying expenditures for migration of firms in that sector. This is consistent with the interest groups model, given that capital and labor are complements. As mentioned in the introduction, interest groups are likely to be a very important factor explaining the gap between public opinion and government policies.

5. Conclusions

In this paper we have used a newly available dataset on migration policy decisions reported by governments, which has been constructed by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. We have found evidence suggesting that most governments have policies aimed at either maintaining the status quo or at lowering the level of migration. For example, between 1976 and 2007, approximately 61% of the government officials interviewed reported policies to maintain the status quo, while 23% were trying to reduce the number of immigrants.

We have then merged the UN dataset with two large individual level surveys, the ISSP and the WVS. We have found evidence suggesting that government policies are correlated with

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[12] We also find evidence of an effect driven by substitutability. The lobbying activity of organized labor leads to a reduction in the inflow of foreign workers in the same occupation/education cell.

individual opinions, as it is consistent with a simple median voter model. Still, individual opinions appear to be substantially more restrictionist that the actual policies implemented by governments. Thus, we have documented – for the first time in a quantitative assessment – the existence of a public opinion gap.

We have argued that the activities of pro-immigration interest groups, which heavily lobby governments in destination countries, are a primary candidate to explain the public opinion gap we have documented. Of course, alternative factors can also be at work. For example, another reason why migration flows continue to take place – notwithstanding the great opposition of voters in destination countries – is that policymakers may not have full control on migration inflows through their policies. In other words, migration pressure on the supply side might give rise to increasing inflows through illegal migration. We tend to believe that this is an implausible explanation, that is we think that governments are not willing – rather than able – to block migration inflows. For instance, it is well known that most destination countries manage migration through border enforcement rather than interior enforcement, although the latter is much more effective than the former (Hanson and Spilimbergo 2001). Thus, allowing large flows of illegal immigrants like those which have been estimated for the United States between 1995 and 2005 (Passel 2005) might well represent a government attempt to reconcile the restrictionist views of the broader public and the pro-migration requests of domestic pressure groups. Analogously, the (re)introduction of guest worker programs – like the one which was part of the failed Kennedy-McCain proposal in 2005 - suggests that increasing temporary migration might be another possible politically viable way of allowing the needed pool of talents into the country.

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Index of Tables

Index of Figures

Index of Appendix tables

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Individual Attitudes towards Immigration (ISSP 1995) and country-level variables

Country	Pro Immig Opinion						average Pro Immig Opinion (7)	median Pro Immig Opinion (8)	average Pro-Immig Dummy (9)	average educ years (10)	median educ years (11)	per capita GDP, PPP (12)	relative skill mix (natives vs. imm) (13)	net migration 1996 (14)	policy on immigration 1996 (15)
	reduced a lot (1)	reduced a little (2)	remain the same as it is (3)	increased a little (4)	increased a lot (5)	missing values (6)									
Austria	28.36	24.72	37.74	2.93	0.81	5.45	2.19	2	0.04	10.36	9	29102	2.73	0.0013	1
Bulgaria	32.58	17.19	9.77	2.17	1.54	36.74	1.78	1	0.06			6312		-0.0025	2
Canada	16.48	20.58	32.89	12.17	5.99	11.9	2.67	3	0.21	14.76	15	27861	2.74	0.0049	1
Czech Republic	39.75	25.75	21.14	1.9	0.27	11.2	1.84	2	0.02	12.91	12	16144		0.0002	2
Germany	48.07	22.37	17.37	1.74	0.54	9.9	1.72	1	0.03	10.92	10	27148	4.27	0.0028	1
Great Britain	40.1	23.77	25.89	2.8	1.06	6.38	1.94	2	0.04	11.32	11	25268	1.38	0.0017	1
Hungary	55.95	24.19	13.51	0.71	0.71	4.94	1.59	1	0.01	10.49	11	11216	1.84	0.0016	1
Ireland	6.63	13.56	55.35	15.6	2.24	6.62	2.93	3	0.19	12.25	12	22908	0.41	0.0050	2
Italy	41.76	30.31	19.87	2.56	0.82	4.67	1.85	2	0.04	11.03	12	25324	0.76	0.0021	1
Japan	13.38	21.82	35.03	10.11	2.95	16.72	2.61	3	0.16	11.87	12	28235	1.43	0.0004	2
Latvia	49.74	20.05	17.19	0.26	0.13	12.63	1.64	1	0.00	11.61	11	6487		-0.0032	1
Netherlands	26.37	30.99	30.79	4.42	0.68	6.75	2.16	2	0.05	12.69	12	29039	2.74	0.0023	1
New Zealand	26.79	31.65	24.06	8.59	2.22	6.68	2.23	2	0.12	14.31	14	20948	0.96	0.0021	3
Norway	29.53	29.26	27.32	5.7	1.21	6.98	2.14	2	0.07	12.66	12	39455	2.83	0.0024	1
Philippines	31.91	27.14	25.63	7.2	3.77	4.36	2.20	2	0.11	9.39	10	2502		-0.0026	1
Poland	25.92	17.53	19.91	4.13	1.82	30.68	2.11	2	0.09	10.29	10	9398	2.52	-0.0016	2
Russia	16.08	22.15	22.28	3.99	1.46	34.05	2.28	2	0.08	11.19	11	7591		0.0030	1
Slovak Republic	30.22	24.51	24.3	1.81	0.65	18.51	2.00	2	0.03	11.84	12	11485		0.0000	1
Slovenia	29.92	29.92	31.76	1.35	0.39	6.66	2.06	2	0.02	10.68	11	16227		0.0024	1
Spain	8.77	26.64	45.49	6.39	1.07	11.64	2.60	3	0.08	10.13	9	21343	0.26	0.0040	1
Sweden	35.66	29.25	21.88	4.13	2.11	6.97	2.01	2	0.07	11.41	11	25142	1.32	0.0011	1
USA	29.69	25.19	21.83	4.58	2.14	16.57	2.09	2	0.08	13.43	13	34619	5.57	0.0046	2
Overall	29.60	24.59	26.27	4.82	1.60	13.12	2.13	2	0.07	11.68	12	20171	2.12	0.0015	1.3636

The survey sample excludes non-citizens. *Pro Immig Opinion* uses answers to the immigration question ("Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) nowadays should be ...": reduced a lot, reduced a little, remain the same as it is, increased a little, increased a lot) and ranges from 1 (reduced a lot) to 5 (increased a lot). *Pro-Immig Dummy* equals one if *Pro Immig Opinion* is equal to 4 or 5, zero if *Pro Immig Opinion* is equal to 1, 2 or 3. Both variables exclude missing values. *net migration* is equal to the net migration inflow, divided by the destination country's population, in 1996 (source: United Nations). Data for columns (1)-(11) is from the 1995 ISSP National Identity Module. Data for *per capita GDP, PPP* is for 1996 (World Development Indicators). Data for the *relative skill mix* is for 1990/1991/1996 (Docquier (2007) and Barro and Lee (2000)). Data on *net migration 1996* is from the United Nations. Data on *policy on immigration 1996* is from the United Nations.

Table 2: Summary Statistics of Individual Attitudes towards Immigration (ISSP 2003) and country-level variables

Country	Pro Immig Opinion						average Pro Immig Opinion (7)	median Pro Immig Opinion (8)	average Pro-Immig Dummy (9)	average educ years (10)	median educ years (11)	per capita GDP, PPP (12)	relative skill mix (natives vs. imm) (13)	policy on immigration 2007 (14)
	reduced a lot (1)	reduced a little (2)	remain the same as it is (3)	increased a little (4)	increased a lot (5)	missing values (6)								
Australia	16.79	19.65	34.71	15.81	5.72	7.32	2.72	3	0.23	13.06	13	33011	1.50	3
Austria	32.72	26.75	29.94	5.25	1.03	4.31	2.11	2	0.07	11.08	10	35974	2.13	2
Bulgaria	16.17	18.89	20.11	2.26	0.85	41.72	2.19	2	0.05	11.11	11	10665		2
Canada	10.21	18.65	34.51	19.92	5.99	10.72	2.92	3	0.29	13.46	13	36178	1.65	3
Chile	22.78	37.23	29.23	4.84	1.61	4.31	2.22	2	0.07	10.71	12	13108		2
Czech Republic	26.19	30.95	4.76	2.38	2.38	33.34	1.86	2	0.07	13.15	12	22505		2
Denmark	25.87	21.63	35.93	7.87	1.21	7.49	2.32	2	0.10	13.18	13	35062	1.73	1
Finland	15.83	15.61	36.97	18.70	3.02	9.87	2.75	3	0.24	11.98	12	33269	2.26	3
France	35.37	21.38	22.30	4.09	2.20	14.66	2.02	2	0.07	13.68	13	31455	3.69	1
Germany	44.29	23.66	19.39	2.79	0.90	8.97	1.82	2	0.04	10.68	11	32149	4.46	2
Great Britain	50.88	22.68	14.81	3.41	1.76	6.46	1.74	1	0.06	11.78	11	32766	0.72	2
Hungary	34.38	30.56	27.23	1.67	0.39	5.77	1.97	2	0.02	10.74	11	17960	1.87	2
Ireland	27.65	28.81	30.73	7.32	1.06	4.43	2.22	2	0.09	12.92	13	40168	0.28	2
Israel	26.68	16.49	26.68	12.10	13.92	4.13	2.69	3	0.27	13.41	12	24466		3
Japan	20.15	22.32	28.58	8.44	2.36	18.15	2.40	2	0.13	12.03	12	31607	1.34	2
Latvia	26.36	24.09	30.01	1.51	0.63	17.40	2.10	2	0.03	12.69	12	16536		2
Netherlands	37.84	26.95	23.86	2.47	0.95	7.93	1.93	2	0.04	13.59	13	36580	2.08	1
New Zealand	26.81	27.62	25.28	10.70	3.06	6.53	2.31	2	0.15	13.28	13	25306	1.02	3
Norway	36.37	29.80	19.28	5.01	1.13	8.41	1.96	2	0.07	13.45	13	49707	1.93	2
Philippines	17.92	19.58	37.67	11.50	5.58	7.75	2.64	3	0.19	9.66	10	3219		2
Poland	19.42	20.67	28.97	3.52	1.72	25.70	2.29	2	0.07	10.82	10	15401	2.38	2
Portugal	19.09	35.01	39.10	2.38	0.59	3.83	2.28	2	0.03	8.12	6	20488	0.56	2
Russia	39.01	25.14	10.26	1.64	1.68	22.27	1.74	1	0.04	11.59	12	13918		3
Slovak Republic	26.37	15.58	25.15	7.14	2.09	23.67	2.25	2	0.12	13.51	13	19241		2
Slovenia	16.71	32.05	43.34	2.48	0.37	5.05	2.34	2	0.03	11.20	11	25576		2
South Korea	9.13	23.35	34.52	17.57	5.32	10.11	2.85	3	0.25	12.30	12	23363	0.70	3
Spain	13.20	35.16	35.66	5.80	2.44	7.74	2.45	2	0.09	10.00	10	28333	0.36	2
Sweden	25.55	27.30	26.95	8.05	2.27	9.88	2.27	2	0.11	12.10	12	33760	2.11	2
Switzerland	16.91	27.02	45.64	5.11	0.32	5.00	2.42	3	0.06	11.36	10	36873	2.98	2
Taiwan	34.34	31.76	18.01	3.33	1.09	11.47	1.93	2	0.05	11.30	12			2
Uruguay	6.17	20.35	46.41	12.80	5.89	8.38	2.91	3	0.20	9.12	9	10609		2
USA	23.70	28.74	28.66	5.47	3.34	10.09	2.29	2	0.10	13.88	14	43227	5.32	2
Venezuela	20.04	28.38	42.18	3.95	2.81	2.64	2.40	3	0.07			11487		2
Overall	23.88	23.78	27.32	6.63	2.48	15.91	2.29	2	0.11	11.89	12	26374	1.96	2.1212

The survey sample excludes non-citizens. *Pro Immig Opinion* uses answers to the immigration question ("Do you think the number of immigrants to (R's country) should be ...": reduced a lot, reduced a little, remain the same as it is, increased a little, increased a lot) and ranges from 1 (reduced a lot) to 5 (increased a lot). *Pro-Immig Dummy* equals one if *Pro Immig Opinion* is equal to 4 or 5, zero if *Pro Immig Opinion* is equal to 1, 2 or 3. Both variables exclude missing values. Data for columns (1)-(11) is from the 2003 ISSP National Identity Module. Data for per capita GDP, PPP is for 2007 (World Development Indicators). Data for the relative skill mix is for 1999/2000/2001/2002 (Docquier (2007) and Barro and Lee (2000)). Data on policy on immigration 2007 is from the United Nations.

Table 3: Summary Statistics of Individual Attitudes towards Immigration (WVS 1995) and country-level variables

Country	Pro Immig Opinion					average Pro Immig Opinion (6)	median Pro Immig Opinion (7)	average Pro-Immig Dummy (8)	average educ attainment (9)	median educ attain. (10)	per capita GDP, PPP (11)	relative skill mix (natives vs. imm) (12)	net migration 1996 (13)	policy on immigration 1996 (14)
	prohibit=1 (1)	limits=2 (2)	if jobs…=3 (3)	anyone=4 (4)	don't know (5)									
Argentina	9.38	31.96	51.44	7.22	0.00	2.56	3	0.59	4.78	4	10006		-0.0006	2
Armenia	9.22	17.05	47.74	20.79	5.20	2.84	3	0.72	6.59	7	1831		-0.0142	no intervention
Australia	3.32	43.37	49.69	3.63	0.00	2.54	3	0.53	6.09	6	25476	1.2302	0.0051	2
Azerbaijan	4.63	16.37	56.74	17.95	4.32	2.92	3	0.78	6.67	7	1859		-0.0033	2
Belarus	8.15	19.54	50.87	15.19	6.25	2.78	3	0.70	5.69	5	4331		0.0000	2
Bosnia	4.45	18.16	32.16	39.11	6.12	3.13	3	0.76	5.32	5	3024		0.0173	no intervention
Brazil	13.04	24.85	36.05	24.50	1.57	2.73	3	0.62	5.99	6	7794		-0.0003	2
Bulgaria	12.61	25.12	44.68	5.74	11.85	2.49	3	0.57	5.07	5	6312		-0.0025	2
Chile	6.79	31.31	49.95	10.23	1.72	2.65	3	0.61	5.32	5	9678		0.0008	2
China	10.84	45.18	37.27	6.70	0.00	2.40	2	0.44	4.46	5	2018		-0.0002	2
Croatia	8.07	30.49	49.96	11.48	0.00	2.65	3	0.61	2.03	2	9284		-0.0067	no intervention
Dominican Republic	3.02	46.35	36.52	11.34	2.77	2.58	2	0.49	7.49	8	3909		-0.0034	1
Estonia	12.07	40.74	39.37	4.12	3.70	2.37	2	0.45	5.93	5	8492		-0.0052	1
Finland	7.48	50.94	30.04	7.69	3.85	2.39	2	0.39	2.75	3	22598	3.3226	0.0008	1
Georgia	8.09	24.26	46.95	17.47	3.23	2.76	3	0.67	6.35	7	1870		-0.0141	no intervention
Germany	6.32	37.41	43.78	10.57	1.92	2.60	3	0.55	5.67	5	27148	4.2747	0.0028	1
India	23.73	26.98	17.04	10.64	21.61	2.19	2	0.35	4.53	4	1489		-0.0003	2
Japan	6.51	43.80	45.48	4.20	0.00	2.47	2	0.50			28235	1.4260	0.0004	2
Latvia	13.51	38.88	41.89	3.74	1.98	2.37	2	0.47	6.38	6	6487		-0.0032	1
Lithuania	21.30	33.01	38.34	3.94	3.41	2.26	2	0.44	5.85	5	7806		-0.0061	1
Macedonia	19.29	43.17	15.85	13.87	7.82	2.26	2	0.32	5.21	5	6209		-0.0005	1
Mexico	7.99	30.15	43.38	14.30	4.16	2.67	3	0.60	5.41	5	9356	0.4791	-0.0026	1
Moldova	15.60	29.01	41.32	10.99	3.08	2.49	3	0.54	5.43	5	1481		-0.0115	no intervention
Montenegro	13.45	29.83	31.51	14.29	10.92	2.52	3	0.51	5.28	5			0.0079	
Nigeria	5.93	39.95	36.61	17.51	0.00	2.66	3	0.54	5.59	6	1454		-0.0002	2
Norway	1.69	52.06	41.09	4.32	0.84	2.48	2	0.46	5.85	5	39455	2.8345	0.0024	1
Peru	10.95	37.51	36.51	7.30	7.72	2.44	2	0.47	5.61	5	5364		-0.0045	no intervention
Philippines	11.58	63.00	15.67	9.00	0.75	2.22	2	0.25	6.07	7	2502		-0.0026	1
Russia	17.66	26.59	45.82	5.96	3.97	2.42	3	0.54	5.80	5	7591		0.0030	1
S.Africa	16.21	48.38	27.53	5.59	2.29	2.23	2	0.34			7466		0.0019	2
S.Korea	8.65	33.41	45.19	4.01	8.73	2.49	3	0.54	4.25	4	15597	0.7301	-0.0004	1
Serbia	11.02	26.54	37.01	19.21	6.22	2.69	3	0.60	4.91	5			-0.0038	
Slovenia	9.33	30.22	58.00	2.44	0.00	2.54	3	0.60	4.98	5	16227		0.0024	1
Spain	4.50	22.90	55.47	13.74	3.39	2.81	3	0.72	4.16	3	21343	0.2591	0.0040	1
Sweden	0.96	56.34	30.46	8.73	3.51	2.49	2	0.41	4.41	4	25142	1.3209	0.0011	1
Switzerland	4.63	36.39	50.00	3.72	5.26	2.56	3	0.57	5.23	5	31884	2.0809	0.0008	1
Turkey	26.38	32.36	37.19	3.20	0.87	2.17	2	0.41	4.59	4	8378	0.7004	0.0003	1
Ukraine	6.31	17.40	47.83	17.65	10.81	2.86	3	0.73	5.84	5	3540		-0.0021	no intervention
Uruguay	6.78	23.51	55.03	11.40	3.29	2.73	3	0.69	4.72	4	8598		-0.0016	3
USA	9.40	55.98	30.03	4.59	0.00	2.30	2	0.35	6.24	6	34619	5.5674	0.0046	2
Venezuela	20.90	36.60	39.15	3.35	0.00	2.25	2	0.43	5.02	5	9935		0.0004	no intervention
Overall	10.49	34.32	40.40	10.73	4.05	2.53	3	0.53	5.39	5	11431	2.0188	-0.0008	

The survey sample excludes foreign-born. *net migration* is equal to the net migration inflow, divided by the destination country's population, in 1996 (source: United Nations). Data for columns (1)-(11) is from the 1995 WVS. Data for *per capita GDP, PPP* is for 1996 (World Development Indicators). Data for the *relative skill mix* is for 1990/1991/1996 (Docquier (2007) and Barro and Lee (2000)). Data on *net migration 1996* and on *policy on immigration 1996* is from the United Nations.

Table 4. Governments' view on the level of immigration, by year and income

by year	Governments' view on immigration			
	Too high	**Satisfactory**	**Too low**	**Total**
1976	10	129	11	150
	6.67	86	7.33	100
1986	33	125	6	164
	20.12	76.22	3.66	100
1996	41	147	4	192
	21.35	76.56	2.08	100
2007	34	150	11	195
	17.44	76.92	5.64	100
Total	118	551	32	701
	16.83	78.6	4.56	100
by income	Governments' view on immigration			
	Too high	**Satisfactory**	**Too low**	**Total**
high income	44	122	12	178
	24.72	68.54	6.74	100
upper middle income	25	100	8	133
	18.8	75.19	6.02	100
lower middle income	24	152	9	185
	12.97	82.16	4.86	100
lower income	25	163	2	190
	13.16	85.79	1.05	100
Total	118	537	31	686
	17.2	78.28	4.52	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and by income. *View on immigration* is the government's view on the level of documented immigration into the country, including immigration for permanent settlement, temporary and high skilled work and family reunification. Governments' views towards asylum seekers, refugees and undocumented migrants are not reflected in this variable. The possible values of *View on Immigration* are: the government has indicated that immigration is too high, satisfactory, too low.

Table 5. Governments' policy on the level of immigration, by year and income

	Policy on immigration				
year	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No intervention	Total
1976	10	129	11	0	150
	6.67	86	7.33	0	100
1986	33	125	6	0	164
	20.12	76.22	3.66	0	100
1996	78	58	8	48	192
	40.63	30.21	4.17	25	100
2007	38	114	11	32	195
	19.49	58.46	5.64	16.41	100
Total	159	426	36	80	701
	22.68	60.77	5.14	11.41	100
	Policy on immigration				
income	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No intervention	Total
high income	66	96	14	2	178
	37.08	53.93	7.87	1.12	100
upper middle income	29	90	8	6	133
	21.8	67.67	6.02	4.51	100
lower middle income	31	118	11	25	185
	16.76	63.78	5.95	13.51	100
lower income	32	111	2	45	190
	16.84	58.42	1.05	23.68	100
Total	158	415	35	78	686
	23.03	60.5	5.1	11.37	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and income. *Policy on immigration* is the government's policy regarding the overall level of immigration. The possible values of *Policy on Immigration* are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise the overall level of immigration; the government does not intervene with regard to the overall level of immigration.

Table 6. Governments' policy on permanent settlement, by year and income

year	Policy on permanent settlement				
	Lower	**Maintain**	**Raise**	**No interv**	**Total**
1996	54	28	6	49	137
	39.42	20.44	4.38	35.77	100
2007	34	92	10	21	157
	21.66	58.6	6.37	13.38	100
Total	88	120	16	70	294
	29.93	40.82	5.44	23.81	100
income	Policy on permanent settlement				
	Lower	**Maintain**	**Raise**	**No interv**	**Total**
high income	34	34	9	3	80
	42.5	42.5	11.25	3.75	100
upper middle income	19	35	2	7	63
	30.16	55.56	3.17	11.11	100
lower middle income	21	33	4	20	78
	26.92	42.31	5.13	25.64	100
lower income	13	16	0	40	69
	18.84	23.19	0	57.97	100
Total	87	118	15	70	290
	30	40.69	5.17	24.14	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and income. *Policy on permanent settlement* is the government's policy on migration for the purpose of permanent settlement. The possible values of *Policy on permanent settlement* are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise migration for permanent settlement; the government does not intervene with regard to migration for permanent settlement (or It is not known whether the government intervenes...).

Table 7. Governments' policy on temporary workers, by year and income

year	Policy on temporary workers				
	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv	Total
1996	40	29	2	45	116
	34.48	25	1.72	38.79	100
2007	41	99	9	16	165
	24.85	60	5.45	9.7	100
Total	81	128	11	61	281
	28.83	45.55	3.91	21.71	100
income	Policy on temporary workers				
	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv	Total
high income	29	39	5	5	78
	37.18	50	6.41	6.41	100
upper middle income	16	39	2	7	64
	25	60.94	3.13	10.94	100
lower middle income	18	33	2	21	74
	24.32	44.59	2.7	28.38	100
lower income	16	17	1	28	62
	25.81	27.42	1.61	45.16	100
Total	79	128	10	61	278
	28.42	46.04	3.6	21.94	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and income. *Policy on temporary workers* is the government's policy on the migration of temporary workers. The possible values of *Policy on temporary workers* are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise the migration for temporary workers; the government does not intervene with regard to the migration of temporary workers (or It is not known whether the government intervenes...).

Table 8. Governments' policy on family reunification, by year and income

year	Policy on family reunification				
	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv	Total
1996	28	31	2	52	113
	24.78	27.43	1.77	46.02	100
2007	12	95	8	25	140
	8.57	67.86	5.71	17.86	100
Total	40	126	10	77	253
	15.81	49.8	3.95	30.43	100
income	Policy on family reunification				
	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv	Total
high income	18	47	4	7	76
	23.68	61.84	5.26	9.21	100
upper middle income	8	33	2	14	57
	14.04	57.89	3.51	24.56	100
lower middle income	7	37	2	19	65
	10.77	56.92	3.08	29.23	100
lower income	7	9	2	36	54
	12.96	16.67	3.7	66.67	100
Total	40	126	10	76	252
	15.87	50	3.97	30.16	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and income. *Policy on family reunification* is the government's policy concerning migration for the purpose of family reunification. The possible values of *Policy on family reunification* are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise migration for the purpose of family reunification; the government does not intervene with regard to migration for family reunification (or It is not known whether the government intervenes...).

Table 9. Governments' policy on highly skilled workers, by year and income

year	Policy on highly skilled workers				
	Lower	**Maintain**	**Raise**	**No interv**	**Total**
2007	5	84	36	19	144
	3.47	58.33	25	13.19	100
Total	5	84	36	19	144
	3.47	58.33	25	13.19	100
income	Policy on highly skilled workers				
	Lower	**Maintain**	**Raise**	**No interv**	**Total**
high income	2	18	20	5	45
	4.44	40	44.44	11.11	100
upper middle income	1	24	9	2	36
	2.78	66.67	25	5.56	100
lower middle income	2	29	4	2	37
	5.41	78.38	10.81	5.41	100
lower income	0	13	3	9	25
	0	52	12	36	100
Total	5	84	36	18	143
	3.5	58.74	25.17	12.59	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by year and by income. *Policy on highly skilled workers* is the government's policy on the migration of highly skilled workers. The possible values of *Policy on highly skilled workers* are: The government has policies in place to lower, maintain, raise the migration of highly skilled workers; the government does not intervene with regard to the migration of highly skilled workers (or It is not known whether the government intervenes...).

Table 10. Policies on integration of non-citizens, by year

	Integration of non-citizens		
year	No	Yes	Total
1996	67	52	119
	56.3	43.7	100
2007	45	79	124
	36.29	63.71	100
Total	112	131	243
	46.09	53.91	100

Table 11. Policies on integration of non-citizens, by income

	Integration of non-citizens		
income	No	Yes	Total
high income	13	61	74
	17.57	82.43	100
upper middle income	18	32	50
	36	64	100
lower middle income	38	21	59
	64.41	35.59	100
lower income	43	16	59
	72.88	27.12	100
Total	112	130	242
	46.28	53.72	100

Table 12. Policies on integration of non-citizens, by region

	Integration of non-citizens		
region	No	Yes	Total
Central Asia	3	6	9
	33.33	66.67	100
East Asia & Pacific	14	12	26
	53.85	46.15	100
Eastern Europe	10	22	32
	31.25	68.75	100
Gulf countries	2	2	4
	50	50	100
Latin America & Car.	24	21	45
	53.33	46.67	100
Middle East	5	3	8
	62.5	37.5	100
North America	3	4	7
	42.86	57.14	100
North Africa	2	2	4
	50	50	100
South Asia	10	2	12
	83.33	16.67	100
Sub-Saharan Africa	36	20	56
	64.29	35.71	100
Western Europe	3	36	39
	7.69	92.31	100
Total	112	130	242
	46.28	53.72	100

Integration of non-citizens is government's policies or programmes to foster the integration of non-citizens into society. The possible values are: Yes, the government has policies or programmes to foster the integration of non-citizens (e.g., language classes, provision of social services); No, the government has no policies or programmes to foster the integration of non-citizens (or It is not known whether the government has a policy or programme to foster the integration of non-citizens into society).

Table 13. The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants (ISSP 1995 and WVS 1995) on migration policy, 1996

OLS	1	2	3	4	5	6
Dependent variable	**migration policy, 1996**					
	using attitudes from ISSP 1995			**using attitudes from WVS 1995**		
median Immig Opinion	0.125			0.2917		
	0.2087			0.2011		
average Immig Opinion		0.3482			0.8566	
		0.3706			0.5204	
average Pro Immig Dummy			3.8068			1.3401
			2.1883+			0.7986+
Constant	1.1136	0.6257	1.0856	0.75	-0.6526	0.8003
	0.4359*	0.7952	0.1989**	0.516	1.3018	0.4193+
Observations	22	22	22	31	31	31
R-squared	0.02	0.04	0.13	0.07	0.09	0.09

Data source: 1995 ISSP National Identity Module, WVS 1995 and United Nations. Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Table 14. The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants (ISSP 2003) on migration policy, 2007

OLS	1	2	3
Dependent variable	**migration policy, 2007**		
median Immig Opinion	0.3352		
	0.1759+		
average Immig Opinion		0.6934	
		0.2650*	
average Pro Immig Dummy			4.2208
			1.0454**
Constant	1.3743	0.5523	1.6865
	0.3955**	0.6008	0.1304**
Observations	37	37	37
R-squared	0.09	0.16	0.32

Data source: 2003 ISSP National Identity Module and United Nations. Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Figure 1. The tax adjustment model

Figure 2. The benefit adjustment model

Figure 3: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration policy (ISSP 1995, United Nations 2007)

policyimmREC ——— fitted migration policy, 1996

policyimmREC ——— fitted migration policy, 1996

Raise

2.5

Maintain

1.5

Lower

migration policy, 1996 (UN)

NZL

BGR

POL USA

IRN

DEN

CAN

1   1.5   2   2.5   3
median Pro Immig Opinion, 1995

Raise

2.5

Maintain

1.5

Lower

migration policy, 1996 (UN)

NZL

BGR CZE   USA POL   JPN   IRL

HUN LVA   DEU   ITA   GBR SVK SVN   NOR PHL   RUS   ESP CAN

1.5   2   2.5   3
average Pro Immig Opinion, 1995

policyimmREC ——— fitted migration policy, 1996

Raise

2.5

Maintain

1.5

Lower

migration policy, 1996 (UN)

NZL

CZE   BGR   USA POL   JPN   IRL

LVA HUN SVN DEU SVK GBR   NLD   SWE NOR ESP   PHL   CAN

0   .05   .1   .15   .2
average Pro Immig Dummy, 1995

Figure 4: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration policy (ISSP 2003, United Nations 2007)

Figure 5: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration policy (WVS 1995, United Nations 2007)

Table A1. Government's view and policy on the level of immigration, by region

region	Government's view on immigration				Policy on immigration				
	Too high	Satisfactory	Too low	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv,	Total
Central Asia	0	15	1	16	1	8	1	6	16
	0	93.75	6.25	100	6.25	50	6.25	37.5	100
East Asia & Pacific	10	77	5	92	12	71	5	4	92
	10.87	83.7	5.43	100	13.04	77.17	5.43	4.35	100
Eastern Europe	6	49	1	56	12	39	1	4	56
	10.71	87.5	1.79	100	21.43	69.64	1.79	7.14	100
Gulf countries	11	12	1	24	12	10	1	1	24
	45.83	50	4.17	100	50	41.67	4.17	4.17	100
Latin America & Caribbean	14	104	8	126	18	89	9	10	126
	11.11	82.54	6.35	100	14.29	70.63	7.14	7.94	100
Middle East	8	14	6	28	9	13	6	0	28
	28.57	50	21.43	100	32.14	46.43	21.43	0	100
North America	4	10	1	15	3	10	1	1	15
	26.67	66.67	6.67	100	20	66.67	6.67	6.67	100
North Africa	6	9	1	16	6	8	1	1	16
	37.5	56.25	6.25	100	37.5	50	6.25	6.25	100
South Asia	8	30	1	39	11	25	2	1	39
	20.51	76.92	2.56	100	28.21	64.1	5.13	2.56	100
Sub-Saharan Africa	24	153	5	182	32	94	7	49	182
	13.19	84.07	2.75	100	17.58	51.65	3.85	26.92	100
Western Europe	27	64	1	92	42	48	1	1	92
	29.35	69.57	1.09	100	45.65	52.17	1.09	1.09	100
Total	118	537	31	686	158	415	35	78	686
	17.2	78.28	4.52	100	23.03	60.5	5.1	11.37	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by region. Gulf countries exclude Iran and Iraq.

Table A2. Governments' policy on permanent settlement and on temporary workers, by region

region	Policy on permanent settlement					Policy on temporary workers				
	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
Central Asia	1	6	1	4	12	1	7	0	3	11
	8.33	50	8.33	33.33	100	9.09	63.64	0	27.27	100
East Asia & Pacific	10	18	4	3	35	11	21	4	2	38
	28.57	51.43	11.43	8.57	100	28.95	55.26	10.53	5.26	100
Eastern Europe	12	21	1	2	36	10	20	2	4	36
	33.33	58.33	2.78	5.56	100	27.78	55.56	5.56	11.11	100
Gulf countries	4	0	0	2	6	7	0	0	1	8
	66.67	0	0	33.33	100	87.5	0	0	12.5	100
Latin America & Car.	11	29	2	14	56	8	29	1	14	52
	19.64	51.79	3.57	25	100	15.38	55.77	1.92	26.92	100
Middle East	5	3	2	0	10	5	3	0	2	10
	50	30	20	0	100	50	30	0	20	100
North America	3	2	1	1	7	0	4	1	1	6
	42.86	28.57	14.29	14.29	100	0	66.67	16.67	16.67	100
North Africa	2	1	0	1	4	3	2	0	1	6
	50	25	0	25	100	50	33.33	0	16.67	100
South Asia	6	4	2	3	15	2	9	0	4	15
	40	26.67	13.33	20	100	13.33	60	0	26.67	100
Sub-Saharan Africa	13	13	2	39	67	17	12	1	27	57
	19.4	19.4	2.99	58.21	100	29.82	21.05	1.75	47.37	100
Western Europe	20	21	0	1	42	15	21	1	2	39
	47.62	50	0	2.38	100	38.46	53.85	2.56	5.13	100
Total	87	118	15	70	290	79	128	10	61	278
	30	40.69	5.17	24.14	100	28.42	46.04	3.6	21.94	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by region. Gulf countries exclude Iran and Iraq.

Table A3. Governments' policy on highly skilled workers and on family reunification, by region

region	Policy on highly skilled workers					Policy on family reunification				
	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
Central Asia	0	5	1	0	6	0	3	0	4	7
	0	83.33	16.67	0	100	0	42.86	0	57.14	100
East Asia & Pacific	0	14	8	0	22	3	20	4	5	32
	0	63.64	36.36	0	100	9.38	62.5	12.5	15.63	100
Eastern Europe	0	10	6	2	18	5	22	1	7	35
	0	55.56	33.33	11.11	100	14.29	62.86	2.86	20	100
Gulf countries	2	3	0	0	5	3	4	0	1	8
	40	60	0	0	100	37.5	50	0	12.5	100
Latin America & Car.	0	28	4	0	32	7	28	1	13	49
	0	87.5	12.5	0	100	14.29	57.14	2.04	26.53	100
Middle East	1	5	0	1	7	1	4	0	2	7
	14.29	71.43	0	14.29	100	14.29	57.14	0	28.57	100
North America	0	0	2	1	3	1	3	1	1	6
	0	0	66.67	33.33	100	16.67	50	16.67	16.67	100
North Africa	0	3	0	0	3	1	3	0	1	5
	0	100	0	0	100	20	60	0	20	100
South Asia	1	4	2	0	7	3	5	0	5	13
	14.29	57.14	28.57	0	100	23.08	38.46	0	38.46	100
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	4	3	10	18	7	9	2	34	52
	5.56	22.22	16.67	55.56	100	13.46	17.31	3.85	65.38	100
Western Europe	0	8	10	4	22	9	25	1	3	38
	0	36.36	45.45	18.18	100	23.68	65.79	2.63	7.89	100
Total	5	84	36	18	143	40	126	10	76	252
	3.5	58.74	25.17	12.59	100	15.87	50	3.97	30.16	100

The table presents frequencies and row percentages by region. Gulf countries exclude Iran and Iraq.

Table A4. Government's view and policy on the level of immigration, by human development index

HDI classification	Government's view on immigration				Policy on immigration				
	Too high	Satisfact	Too low	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.	13	96	0	109	17	61	0	31	109
	11.93	88.07	0	100	15.6	55.96	0	28.44	100
medium human dev.	48	239	14	301	57	186	16	42	301
	15.95	79.4	4.65	100	18.94	61.79	5.32	13.95	100
high human dev.	22	113	6	141	31	100	6	4	141
	15.6	80.14	4.26	100	21.99	70.92	4.26	2.84	100
very high human dev.	32	80	11	123	47	62	13	1	123
	26.02	65.04	8.94	100	38.21	50.41	10.57	0.81	100
Total	115	528	31	674	152	409	35	78	674
	17.06	78.34	4.6	100	22.55	60.68	5.19	11.57	100

Table A4. Government's view and policy on the level of immigration, by human development index and *by year*

Year 1976	Government's view on immigration				Policy on immigration				
HDI classification	**Too high**	**Satisfact**	**Too low**	**Total**	**Lower**	**Maintain**	**Raise**	**No interv.**	**Total**
low human dev.	1	24	0	25	1	24	0		25
	4	96	0	100	4	96	0		100
medium human dev.	2	56	6	64	2	56	6		64
	3.13	87.5	9.38	100	3.13	87.5	9.38		100
high human dev.	1	23	3	27	1	23	3		27
	3.7	85.19	11.11	100	3.7	85.19	11.11		100
very high human dev.	5	22	2	29	5	22	2		29
	17.24	75.86	6.9	100	17.24	75.86	6.9		100
Total	9	125	11	145	9	125	11		145
	6.21	86.21	7.59	100	6.21	86.21	7.59		100

Year 1986	Government's view on immigration				Policy on immigration				
HDI classification	**Too high**	**Satisfact**	**Too low**	**Total**	**Lower**	**Maintain**	**Raise**	**No interv.**	**Total**
low human dev.	4	23	0	27	4	23	0		27
	14.81	85.19	0	100	14.81	85.19	0		100
medium human dev.	13	54	4	71	10	57	4		71
	18.31	76.06	5.63	100	14.08	80.28	5.63		100
high human dev.	5	24	1	30	3	26	1		30
	16.67	80	3.33	100	10	86.67	3.33		100
very high human dev.	10	19	1	30	13	16	1		30
	33.33	63.33	3.33	100	43.33	53.33	3.33		100
Total	32	120	6	158	30	122	6		158
	20.25	75.95	3.8	100	18.99	77.22	3.8		100

Year 1996	Government's view on immigration				Policy on immigration				
HDI classification	Too high	Satisfact	Too low	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.	4	24	0	28	8	6	0	14	28
	14.29	85.71	0	100	28.57	21.43	0	50	100
medium human dev.	14	68	1	83	25	26	4	28	83
	16.87	81.93	1.2	100	30.12	31.33	4.82	33.73	100
high human dev.	11	29	1	41	19	17	1	4	41
	26.83	70.73	2.44	100	46.34	41.46	2.44	9.76	100
very high human dev.	11	19	2	32	23	5	3	1	32
	34.38	59.38	6.25	100	71.88	15.63	9.38	3.13	100
Total	40	140	4	184	75	54	8	47	184
	21.74	76.09	2.17	100	40.76	29.35	4.35	25.54	100

Year 2007	Government's view on immigration				Policy on immigration				
HDI classification	Too high	Satisfact	Too low	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.	4	25	0	29	4	8	0	17	29
	13.79	86.21	0	100	13.79	27.59	0	58.62	100
medium human dev.	19	61	3	83	20	47	2	14	83
	22.89	73.49	3.61	100	24.1	56.63	2.41	16.87	100
high human dev.	5	37	1	43	8	34	1	0	43
	11.63	86.05	2.33	100	18.6	79.07	2.33	0	100
very high human dev.	6	20	6	32	6	19	7	0	32
	18.75	62.5	18.75	100	18.75	59.38	21.88	0	100
Total	34	143	10	187	38	108	10	31	187
	18.18	76.47	5.35	100	20.32	57.75	5.35	16.58	100

Table A5. Governments' policy on permanent settlement and on temporary workers, by HDI

HDI classification	Policy on permanent settlement					Policy on temporary workers				
	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.	5	9	0	25	39	9	7	0	18	34
	12.82	23.08	0	64.1	100	26.47	20.59	0	52.94	100
medium human dev.	35	43	5	38	121	32	46	3	34	115
	28.93	35.54	4.13	31.4	100	27.83	40	2.61	29.57	100
high human dev.	22	39	1	5	67	17	45	2	5	69
	32.84	58.21	1.49	7.46	100	24.64	65.22	2.9	7.25	100
very high human dev	25	23	9	1	58	22	26	5	3	56
	43.1	39.66	15.52	1.72	100	39.29	46.43	8.93	5.36	100
Total	87	114	15	69	285	80	124	10	60	274
	30.53	40	5.26	24.21	100	29.2	45.26	3.65	21.9	100

Table A6. Governments' policy on highly skilled workers and on family reunification, by HDI

HDI classification	Policy on highly skilled workers					Policy on family reunification				
	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.	0	3	1	7	11	5	3	1	22	31
	0	27.27	9.09	63.64	100	16.13	9.68	3.23	70.97	100
medium human dev.	3	43	9	5	60	9	48	3	39	99
	5	71.67	15	8.33	100	9.09	48.48	3.03	39.39	100
high human dev.	1	28	8	3	40	12	39	2	10	63
	2.5	70	20	7.5	100	19.05	61.9	3.17	15.87	100
very high human dev	1	9	18	2	30	14	33	4	5	56
	3.33	30	60	6.67	100	25	58.93	7.14	8.93	100
Total	5	83	36	17	141	40	123	10	76	249
	3.55	58.87	25.53	12.06	100	16.06	49.4	4.02	30.52	100

Year 1996	Policy on permanent settlement					Policy on temporary workers				
HDI classification	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.	3	4	0	16	23	6	2	0	11	19
	13.04	17.39	0	69.57	100	31.58	10.53	0	57.89	100
medium human dev.	17	10	3	28	58	12	7	1	26	46
	29.31	17.24	5.17	48.28	100	26.09	15.22	2.17	56.52	100
high human dev.	14	8	0	4	26	9	12	0	5	26
	53.85	30.77	0	15.38	100	34.62	46.15	0	19.23	100
very high human dev.	19	4	3	1	27	13	7	1	3	24
	70.37	14.81	11.11	3.7	100	54.17	29.17	4.17	12.5	100
Total	53	26	6	49	134	40	28	2	45	115
	39.55	19.4	4.48	36.57	100	34.78	24.35	1.74	39.13	100

Year 1996	Policy on highly skilled workers					Policy on family reunification				
HDI classification	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.						3	2	0	14	19
						15.79	10.53	0	73.68	100
medium human dev.						6	10	2	26	44
						13.64	22.73	4.55	59.09	100
high human dev.						10	7	0	8	25
						40	28	0	32	100
very high human dev.						9	11	0	4	24
						37.5	45.83	0	16.67	100
Total						28	30	2	52	112
						25	26.79	1.79	46.43	100

ent and on temporary workers, by HDI and *by year*

Year 2007	Policy on permanent settlement					Policy on temporary workers				
HDI classification	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.	2	5	0	9	16	3	5	0	7	15
	12.5	31.25	0	56.25	100	20	33.33	0	46.67	100
medium human dev.	18	33	2	10	63	20	39	2	8	69
	28.57	52.38	3.17	15.87	100	28.99	56.52	2.9	11.59	100
high human dev.	8	31	1	1	41	8	33	2	0	43
	19.51	75.61	2.44	2.44	100	18.6	76.74	4.65	0	100
very high human dev.	6	19	6	0	31	9	19	4	0	32
	19.35	61.29	19.35	0	100	28.13	59.38	12.5	0	100
Total	34	88	9	20	151	40	96	8	15	159
	22.52	58.28	5.96	13.25	100	25.16	60.38	5.03	9.43	100

:ers and on family reunification, by HDI and *by year*

Year 2007	Policy on highly skilled workers					Policy on family reunification				
HDI classification	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv	Total	Lower	Maintain	Raise	No interv.	Total
low human dev.	0	3	1	7	11	2	1	1	8	12
	0	27.27	9.09	63.64	100	16.67	8.33	8.33	66.67	100
medium human dev.	3	43	9	5	60	3	38	1	13	55
	5	71.67	15	8.33	100	5.45	69.09	1.82	23.64	100
high human dev.	1	28	8	3	40	2	32	2	2	38
	2.5	70	20	7.5	100	5.26	84.21	5.26	5.26	100
very high human dev.	1	9	18	2	30	5	22	4	1	32
	3.33	30	60	6.67	100	15.63	68.75	12.5	3.13	100
Total	5	83	36	17	141	12	93	8	24	137
	3.55	58.87	25.53	12.06	100	8.76	67.88	5.84	17.52	100

Table A7. The determinants of the policy on the integration of non-citizens

probit	1	2	3	4	5	6
dependent variable	policy on the integration of non-citizens					
year	1996			2007		
net migration, divided by population	2.34041133	-2.57638449		42.55180421	-0.12215755	
	4.68707925	5.20404834		13.10843051**	9.48110047	
per capita GDP (PPP-adjusted)		0.00001723			0.00002572	
		0.00000470**			0.00000684**	
relative skill mix (natives vs. imm.)			0.1061808			0.00002797
			0.05510909+			0.00056058
Observations	117	113	24	118	108	27

Standard errors in parentheses. The table reports marginal effects.

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

The dependent variable *policy on the integration of non-citizens* indicates whether or not (1 and 0, respectively) there exists a policy to foster the integration of non-citizens

Table A7 (cont.). The determinants of the policy on the integration of non-citizens

probit	1	2	3	4	5	6
dependent variable	policy on the integration of non-citizens					
year	1996			2007		
net migration, divided by population	2.34041133	3.50589187		42.55180421	27.04520477	
	4.68707925	4.75068949		13.10843051**	13.74180074*	
human development index		1.08835177			1.18374051	
		0.27183735**			0.30364651**	
relative skill mix (natives vs. imm.)			0.1061808			0.00002797
			0.05510909+			0.00056058
Observations	117	116	24	118	117	27

Standard errors in parentheses. The table reports marginal effects.

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

The dependent variable *policy on the integration of non-citizens* indicates whether or not (1 and 0, respectively) there exists a policy to foster the integration of non-citizens

Table A8. The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants and migration policy on migration inflows (ISSP 1995 and United Nations)

OLS	1	2	3	4
Dependent variable	net migration, 1996 (divided by population)			
median Immig Opinion	0.002			
	0.0007*			
average Immig Opinion		0.0035		
		0.0013*		
average Pro Immig Dummy			0.0159	
			0.0088+	
migration policy, 1996				-0.0002
				0.0009
Constant	-0.0025	-0.006	0.0003	0.0017
	0.0015	0.0028*	0.0008	0.0013
Observations	22	22	22	22
R-squared	0.26	0.26	0.14	0

Data source: 1995 ISSP National Identity Module and United Nations. Standard errors in parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Figure A1: The impact of individual attitudes towards immigrants on migration inflows (ISSP 1995, United Nations)

net migration/pop, 1996 — fitted net migration/pop, 1996

.005

net migration, 1996 (divided by population)

USA
IRL CAN
ESP
DEU
RUS
NOR NLD
NZL
HUN
GBR
AUT
SWE
JPN
CZE
SVK
0
POL
BGR
PHL
LVA

1   1.5   2   2.5   3
median Pro Immig Opinion, 1995

net migration/pop, 1996 — fitted net migration/pop, 1996

.005

net migration, 1996 (divided by population)

CAN
IRL
USA
ESP
DEU
RUS
ITA
SVN NOR NLD
NZL
HUN
GBR
AUT
SWE
JPN
CZE
SVK
0
POL
BGR
PHL
LVA

-.005

1.5   2   2.5   3
average Pro Immig Opinion, 1995

net migration/pop, 1996 — fitted net migration/pop, 1996

.005

net migration, 1996 (divided by population)

IRL   CAN
USA
ESP
DEU
RUS
SVN
ITA
NLD   NOR
HUN
GBR
AUT
NZL
SWE
JPN
0
CZE
SVK
POL
BGR
PHL
LVA

-.005

0   .05   .1   .15   .2
average Pro Immig Dummy, 1995

Figure A2: The impact of migration policy on migration inflows (United Nations 2007, United Nations)

net migration/pop, 1996 ——————— fitted net migration/pop, 1996