Patent Protection with Cooperative R&D Option

Che, Xiaogang and Yang, Yibai (2009): Patent Protection with Cooperative R&D Option.

Abstract

We investigate R&D incentive under patent protection with cooperation option. Chowdhury [Economics Letters, 2005, 89(1), 120-126] claims that patent protection may decrease R&D incentive when the tournament effect (TE) is negative. However, We show that patent protection in the presence of R&D cooperation option always increases R&D incentive. In addition, to increase R&D incentive, this option strictly dominates imitation and may dominate royalty licensing under patent protection, introduced by Mukherjee [Economics Letters, 2006, 93(2), 196-201].

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: R&D investment; Patent protection; Cooperative R&D
• Subjects: O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O38 - Government Policy; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital; O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth > O3 - Innovation ; Research and Development ; Technological Change ; Intellectual Property Rights > O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

References

Che, X., and Y. Yang (2009): “Patent Protection With Licensing,” Unpublished Manuscript.

Chowdhury, P. R. (2005): “Patents and R&D: The Tournament Effect,” Economics Letters, 89(1), 120–126.

d’Aspremont, C., and A. Jacquemin (1988): “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers,” American Economic Review, 78(5), 1133–1137; Erratum: American Economic Review, 80(3), (1990), 641–642.

Kamien, M. I., E. Muller, and I. Zang (1992): “Research Joint Ventures and R&D Cartels,” American Economic Review, 82(5), 1293–306.

Mukherjee, A. (2006): “Patents and R&D with Imitation and Licensing,” Economics Letters, 93(2), 196–201.

Suzumura, K. (1992): “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in an Oligopoly with Spillovers,” American Economic Review, 82(5), 1307–20.